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The grey area of Menezes' killing The grey area of Menezes' killing
(about 2 hours later)
By Dominic Casciani BBC News home affairs reporterBy Dominic Casciani BBC News home affairs reporter
A few minutes after 1730 BST on 22 July 2005, an officer at New Scotland Yard wrote this in the operations log: "Person shot - Stockwell, Jean Charles Menezes, 7.1.78 Brazilian national."A few minutes after 1730 BST on 22 July 2005, an officer at New Scotland Yard wrote this in the operations log: "Person shot - Stockwell, Jean Charles Menezes, 7.1.78 Brazilian national."
The wrong man was dead and the fall-out was beginning.The wrong man was dead and the fall-out was beginning.
Three years on, the inquest jury has returned an open verdict. We know how the Brazilian electrician died. But the real question at the end of a £6 million inquest is this: Could it happen again? Three years on, the inquest jury has rejected the police version of events that this was a lawful killing. They returned an open verdict and, in their answers, effectively criticised the police for what happened. We now know how Mr de Menezes died - the question is could it happen again?
Mr Menezes was caught on CCTV as he was followed by two officersMr Menezes was caught on CCTV as he was followed by two officers
In July 2005 London was facing a unique and terrifying situation. Four bombers had blown themselves up on 7 July, killing 52. Four more had tried to follow them a fortnight later and failed.In July 2005 London was facing a unique and terrifying situation. Four bombers had blown themselves up on 7 July, killing 52. Four more had tried to follow them a fortnight later and failed.
The Metropolitan Police were not only trying to solve the first crime, they were now throwing everything they could at an even more pressing manhunt. The Metropolitan Police were not only trying to solve the first crime - they were now throwing everything they could into a huge manhunt following the second attempt.
Top detectives were lucky if they could snatch a few hours' sleep in the office or in a hotel around the corner from New Scotland Yard. This was an operation like no other. Top detectives were lucky if they could snatch a few hours' sleep in the office. Police remember it as an operation like no other.
'Victim of circumstances''Victim of circumstances'
Cressida Dick, the key commander on the day, described to the inquest jury how she had sought to manage the unfolding operation in a city on security lockdown. Cressida Dick, the key police commander on the day, described to the inquest jury how she had managed the unfolding operation in a city on security lockdown.
And ultimately, she said, Mr de Menezes became a victim of "terrible and extraordinary" circumstances. Ultimately, she said, Mr de Menezes became a victim of "terrible and extraordinary" circumstances.
He had the misfortune to live in a block of flats detectives had linked to one of the bombers, Hussain Osman.He had the misfortune to live in a block of flats detectives had linked to one of the bombers, Hussain Osman.
When the Brazilian left home, some officers thought he could be the suspect. But firearms teams were not on site in time to challenge him before he boarded a bus.When the Brazilian left home, some officers thought he could be the suspect. But firearms teams were not on site in time to challenge him before he boarded a bus.
As he travelled through south London, mixed messages appeared to confirm, then reject and then confirm the view that he was the bomber.As he travelled through south London, mixed messages appeared to confirm, then reject and then confirm the view that he was the bomber.
Mr de Menezes' entirely innocent behaviour then appeared suspicious to some of the officers. Mr de Menezes' entirely innocent behaviour then appeared suspicious to some of the officers - although the jury questioned this account.
And so as Mr de Menezes approached Stockwell station, the need to stop him became crucial. Specialist armed officers from CO19 were told to intervene - and minutes later the 27-year-old was dead. As Mr de Menezes approached Stockwell underground station, the need to stop him became crucial. Specialist armed officers from CO19 were told to intervene - and minutes later the 27-year-old was dead.
'Mistaken identity''Mistaken identity'
Deputy Assistant Commissioner John McDowall, in charge of the UK's counter-terrorism operations that day, told the inquest: "It is my belief that there was a mistaken identification and then there was doubt about whether that identification was correct or not.Deputy Assistant Commissioner John McDowall, in charge of the UK's counter-terrorism operations that day, told the inquest: "It is my belief that there was a mistaken identification and then there was doubt about whether that identification was correct or not.
Why did Jean Charles die? A step-by-step guide to killingWhy did Jean Charles die? A step-by-step guide to killing
"I think that was instrumental in bringing about the tragic outcome that we know of.""I think that was instrumental in bringing about the tragic outcome that we know of."
But speaking to the BBC, Maria Otone de Menezes, Jean Charles' mother, said many questions remained unanswered.But speaking to the BBC, Maria Otone de Menezes, Jean Charles' mother, said many questions remained unanswered.
"It was the first time we saw these people, it was very painful. I don't even know how to explain how it messes with my head.
"Someone kills your son and comes and asks you for forgiveness. How would you forgive them? It's difficult."Someone kills your son and comes and asks you for forgiveness. How would you forgive them? It's difficult.
"They're going to live the rest of their lives with the mistake they made weighing on their conscience. And I have to live the rest of my life suffering because I've lost an innocent son.""They're going to live the rest of their lives with the mistake they made weighing on their conscience. And I have to live the rest of my life suffering because I've lost an innocent son."
Giovanni de Silva, Jean Charles' brother, said he believed the Metropolitan Police were a "good police force", but added: "The point is that they made a serious mistake.Giovanni de Silva, Jean Charles' brother, said he believed the Metropolitan Police were a "good police force", but added: "The point is that they made a serious mistake.
"I hope now that they change their behaviour, their training. Their image has become dirty with the family and with the world.""I hope now that they change their behaviour, their training. Their image has become dirty with the family and with the world."
Planning and policyPlanning and policy
But according to the force, there have already been great changes.
At the heart of the 22 July operation were policies designed in the wake of 9/11 to confront suicide bombers.At the heart of the 22 July operation were policies designed in the wake of 9/11 to confront suicide bombers.
It's people acting with the best of intentions - but of course the best of intentions don't always have the outcome that you want Steve Swain, suicide bomber strategist, Metropolitan PoliceIt's people acting with the best of intentions - but of course the best of intentions don't always have the outcome that you want Steve Swain, suicide bomber strategist, Metropolitan Police
The Met had envisaged two scenarios: an attack on a major public event or a spontaneous report from the public or the police of a bomber on the streets, known as Operation Kratos. The Met had envisaged two scenarios: an attack on a major public event or the appearance of a bomber on the streets.
The plans involved training specialist officers to effectively creep up on an identified suicide bomber and shoot him dead with special ammunition. The blueprint of how to handle the scenarios was known as Operation Kratos.
Officers are authorised to fire a fatal headshot, with special ammunition, when they are 100% sure that the target is a suicide bomber. If the identification is not clear, they must challenge and see what happens. Officers were trained to creep up on an identified suicide bomber and then shoot him dead in the head with special ammunition.
The bullets used are hollow-point - meaning they spread on impact and are more likely to result in instant death.
But the order to kill can only happen once the officers are 100% sure that the target is a suicide bomber.
If the identification is not clear, the rules state they must challenge the suspect and see what happens.
Intelligence supportIntelligence support
Cressida Dick was the designated senior officer trained with overseeing a Kratos incident - but 22 July did not fit into either of those scenarios. Cressida Dick was the designated senior officer trained with overseeing a Kratos incident - but what happened on 22 July did not fit into either of the scenarios police had originally envisaged.
"Looking for a failed suicide bomber was not something we had really thought about," she told the inquest. She told the inquest: "Looking for a failed suicide bomber was not something we had really thought about."
A key element of the suicide bomber strategy was to support armed officers on the ground with operation room chiefs who might know more of the intelligence picture from high up in Scotland Yard. A key element of the suicide bomber strategy was the support of the armed officers on the ground with high-level intelligence gathered by operation room chiefs.
And this dependency network naturally extended to surveillance officers following a subject, and what they assessed to be the situation. Surveillance officers who might be following a suspect, or assessing a crucial situation as it happened were part of this dependency network.
One of the shooters who leapt on to the train, C12, said his undercover colleague Ivor had pointed out Mr de Menezes and said: "That's him". The inquest heard one of the shooters who leapt on to the train, C12, say that his undercover colleague Ivor had pointed out Mr de Menezes and said: "That's him".
C12 said those two words reinforced his understanding of what he was confronting.C12 said those two words reinforced his understanding of what he was confronting.
He told the jury he shouted a warning, but Mr de Menezes stood up and approached his visible gun. None of the passengers who gave evidence remembered hearing a warning. He told the jury he shouted a warning, but Mr de Menezes stood up and approached his visible gun.
The words of identification and Mr de Menezes' alleged actions were followed by Ivor grabbing the electrician's arms and forcing him back into his chair. C12 and colleague C2 opened fire.The words of identification and Mr de Menezes' alleged actions were followed by Ivor grabbing the electrician's arms and forcing him back into his chair. C12 and colleague C2 opened fire.
Returning their verdict, the jury at the inquest said they did not believe that warning was shouted. They concluded that Mr Menezes had stood up - but not moved towards the officer. Returning their verdict, the jury at the inquest said they did not believe that warning was shouted. They sided with passengers who say they did not hear anything other than gunshots.
They concluded that Mr Menezes had stood up - but not moved towards the officer.
'Best of intentions''Best of intentions'
Steve Swain, now retired from the force, designed the suicide bomber strategy.Steve Swain, now retired from the force, designed the suicide bomber strategy.
He told the BBC that the officers' actions were consistent with their training.He told the BBC that the officers' actions were consistent with their training.
Menezes family: Protest against inquestMenezes family: Protest against inquest
"The surveillance officer pushing Mr de Menezes into the chair as he did, I think moved the firearms officers from 'I'm not sure' to 'I'm sure'," said Mr Swain."The surveillance officer pushing Mr de Menezes into the chair as he did, I think moved the firearms officers from 'I'm not sure' to 'I'm sure'," said Mr Swain.
"Grabbing him like that, [the armed officers must have thought] he must have some more information about that person than we have. And that's moved their mindset from 'I'm not sure', to 'I'm 100% sure'."Grabbing him like that, [the armed officers must have thought] he must have some more information about that person than we have. And that's moved their mindset from 'I'm not sure', to 'I'm 100% sure'.
"It's people acting with the best of intentions. But of course the best of intentions don't always have the outcome that you want.""It's people acting with the best of intentions. But of course the best of intentions don't always have the outcome that you want."
That differs fundamentally from the case put by the family.
Nobody disputes that the officers feared they were following a suicide bomber.Nobody disputes that the officers feared they were following a suicide bomber.
But the family's case is that the firearms teams were not on a Kratos operation - and therefore the officers has not established whether the suspect genuinely posed "an immediate and mortal threat" when they pulled the trigger. But the family's case is that the firearms teams were not on a Kratos operation - and therefore the officers had not established whether the suspect genuinely posed "an immediate and mortal threat" when they pulled the trigger.
Based on this argument, they said the jury should have been allowed to consider an unlawful killing - but the coroner disagreed. Based on this argument, they said the jury should have been allowed to consider an unlawful killing. The coroner disagreed on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence for a jury to say beyond a reasonable doubt that the officers acted illegally.
Unlawful killing requires the evidence to pass a criminal threshold of reliability - the jury would have to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the officers acted illegally. The law is quite clear that police can shoot to kill if they believe it is the only way to save innocent life. But the jury's conclusions on a number of key points indicate that they found the Met's operation had been fundamentally flawed.
And crucially, the idea that police can shoot to kill is not something that has emerged in the wake of 9/11. For more than 40 years English law has recognised officers may need to mortally wound a suspect if they conclude it is the only way to protect the public from serious harm.
Corporate changesCorporate changes
The Metropolitan Police say there have been a lot of changes since that summer. Operation rooms have been completely redesigned and every conversation is recorded. The Metropolitan Police say there have been a lot of changes. Operation rooms have been completely redesigned and every conversation is recorded.
Police radios now work underground and surveillance officers have some form of smartphone so they can receive updated suspect images on the move. Police radios now work underground and surveillance officers have smartphones to receive updated suspect images while on the move.
The specialist firearms officers now receive more training - but in broad terms, the tactics for dealing with suicide bombers have evolved rather than fundamentally changed. They still use the same instant-death hollow point ammunition - and the "critical head shot" is at the core of the strategy. The specialist firearms officers now receive more training - but in broad terms, the tactics for dealing with suicide bombers have evolved rather than fundamentally changed. They still use the same instant-death ammunition - and the "critical head shot" is at the core of the strategy.
Senior police officers have not stopped apologising for what happened. The man at the top, Sir Ian Blair, has quit. There is an ever-diminishing list of people left to blame. The family have demanded a review of the entire saga - including decisions not to prosecute individual officers.
But while police say they are doing all they can to prevent a repeat of the tragedy, they are at pains to stress they cannot make that guarantee. Police say they can't guarantee something like the Menezes killing will never happen again - and campaigners say this is reason enough to look again at every part of their suicide bomber strategy.
And so Cressida Dick's answer at the inquest, when she was asked if someone should be blamed, was unsurprising. But senior police officers have not stopped apologising for what happened. The man who was at the top, Sir Ian Blair, has already quit.
So Cressida Dick's answer at the inquest, when she was asked if someone should be blamed, was unsurprising.
"I don't think so," she replied."I don't think so," she replied.