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| The Democratic Party Is Actually Three Parties | The Democratic Party Is Actually Three Parties |
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| Democratic Party voters are split. Its most progressive wing, which is supportive of contentious policies on immigration, health care and other issues, is, in the context of the party’s electorate, disproportionately white. So is the party’s middle group of “somewhat liberal” voters. Its more moderate wing, which is pressing bread-and-butter concerns like jobs, taxes and a less totalizing vision of health care reform, is majority nonwhite, with almost half of its support coming from African-American and Hispanic voters. | Democratic Party voters are split. Its most progressive wing, which is supportive of contentious policies on immigration, health care and other issues, is, in the context of the party’s electorate, disproportionately white. So is the party’s middle group of “somewhat liberal” voters. Its more moderate wing, which is pressing bread-and-butter concerns like jobs, taxes and a less totalizing vision of health care reform, is majority nonwhite, with almost half of its support coming from African-American and Hispanic voters. |
| This division revealed itself most recently in the CBS battleground tracking surveys of Democratic voters in the first 18 states that will hold primaries. Kabir Khanna, a senior elections manager at CBS, provided detailed findings on these key voters. | This division revealed itself most recently in the CBS battleground tracking surveys of Democratic voters in the first 18 states that will hold primaries. Kabir Khanna, a senior elections manager at CBS, provided detailed findings on these key voters. |
| CBS broke them into three roughly equal groups. | CBS broke them into three roughly equal groups. |
| The first two groups are made up of those who say they are “very liberal” and those who say they are “somewhat liberal.” Both groups are two-thirds white and have substantial — but for the Democratic Party below average — minority representation. They are roughly a quarter African-American and Hispanic. | |
| Those in the third group are Democratic primary voters who describe themselves as moderate to conservative. This group has the largest number of minorities; it is 26 percent black, 19 percent Hispanic, 7 percent other nonwhites, and it has the smallest percentage of whites, at 48 percent. | Those in the third group are Democratic primary voters who describe themselves as moderate to conservative. This group has the largest number of minorities; it is 26 percent black, 19 percent Hispanic, 7 percent other nonwhites, and it has the smallest percentage of whites, at 48 percent. |
| Overall, the Pew Research Center found in 2016 that Democratic voters were 57 percent white, 21 percent black, and 12 percent Hispanic. The remaining voters were Asian-American and other ethnicities. | Overall, the Pew Research Center found in 2016 that Democratic voters were 57 percent white, 21 percent black, and 12 percent Hispanic. The remaining voters were Asian-American and other ethnicities. |
| A separate Brookings study found that 2018 Democratic primary voters were 54.6 percent white, 24.1 percent black, 9.0 percent Hispanic, with the rest Asian-American, American Indian and others. | A separate Brookings study found that 2018 Democratic primary voters were 54.6 percent white, 24.1 percent black, 9.0 percent Hispanic, with the rest Asian-American, American Indian and others. |
| At the current stage in the contest, according to Khanna, very liberal Democrats are the most engaged and play a disproportionate role in setting the political agenda. | At the current stage in the contest, according to Khanna, very liberal Democrats are the most engaged and play a disproportionate role in setting the political agenda. |
| The three ideological groups favor different sets of policies. On the left, the very liberal voters stress “the environment, protecting immigrants, abortion, and race/gender,” Khanna emailed me, while the moderate to conservative Democrats are “more concerned with job creation and lowering taxes.” | The three ideological groups favor different sets of policies. On the left, the very liberal voters stress “the environment, protecting immigrants, abortion, and race/gender,” Khanna emailed me, while the moderate to conservative Democrats are “more concerned with job creation and lowering taxes.” |
| The accompanying chart, which shows what Democrats in the early primary states want candidates to talk about, illustrates these differences. | The accompanying chart, which shows what Democrats in the early primary states want candidates to talk about, illustrates these differences. |
| While 72 percent of very liberal Democrats want candidates to protect immigrants, 42 percent of moderate-to-conservative Democrats share that priority. Sixty-six percent of the very liberal groups want candidates to address “race and gender issues,” compared with 42 percent of the moderates. | |
| Even more interesting is the way these three categories of Democrats split on some of the most contentious issues raised over the first two nights of the Democratic debates: providing health insurance to undocumented immigrants and a Medicare-for-all proposal that would eliminate private health plans. | Even more interesting is the way these three categories of Democrats split on some of the most contentious issues raised over the first two nights of the Democratic debates: providing health insurance to undocumented immigrants and a Medicare-for-all proposal that would eliminate private health plans. |
| “The very liberal are more or less evenly split (51-49) on replacing all private health insurance, while the remaining two-thirds of Democrats clearly favor a program that competes with private insurance,” Khanna wrote. Somewhat liberal Democrats were firmly opposed (68-39) to the elimination of private insurance; the moderate and conservative Democrats were slightly more so (70-30). | “The very liberal are more or less evenly split (51-49) on replacing all private health insurance, while the remaining two-thirds of Democrats clearly favor a program that competes with private insurance,” Khanna wrote. Somewhat liberal Democrats were firmly opposed (68-39) to the elimination of private insurance; the moderate and conservative Democrats were slightly more so (70-30). |
| In addition, Khanna continued, there is a “real differentiation by reported ideology on the question about federal health care for undocumented immigrants.” | In addition, Khanna continued, there is a “real differentiation by reported ideology on the question about federal health care for undocumented immigrants.” |
| In this case, the very liberal group was in favor, 75-25, the somewhat liberal Democrats split, 52-48, and the moderate-conservative group distinctly opposed, 61-39. | In this case, the very liberal group was in favor, 75-25, the somewhat liberal Democrats split, 52-48, and the moderate-conservative group distinctly opposed, 61-39. |
| What the data demonstrates is that the group containing the largest proportion of minority voters is the most skeptical of some of the most progressive policies embraced by Democratic candidates like Elizabeth Warren, Bernie Sanders and Kamala Harris. | What the data demonstrates is that the group containing the largest proportion of minority voters is the most skeptical of some of the most progressive policies embraced by Democratic candidates like Elizabeth Warren, Bernie Sanders and Kamala Harris. |
| Zach Goldberg, a graduate student in political science at Georgia State, has tracked partisan ideological trends in great detail. In a Tablet essay in June, “America’s White Saviors,” Goldberg wrote, | Zach Goldberg, a graduate student in political science at Georgia State, has tracked partisan ideological trends in great detail. In a Tablet essay in June, “America’s White Saviors,” Goldberg wrote, |
| Over the past decade, the baseline attitudes expressed by white liberals on racial and social justice questions have become radically more liberal. | Over the past decade, the baseline attitudes expressed by white liberals on racial and social justice questions have become radically more liberal. |
| He cited what he called “one especially telling example”: | He cited what he called “one especially telling example”: |
| White liberals recently became the only demographic group in America to display a pro-outgroup bias — meaning that among all the different groups surveyed white liberals were the only one that expressed a preference for other racial and ethnic communities above their own. | White liberals recently became the only demographic group in America to display a pro-outgroup bias — meaning that among all the different groups surveyed white liberals were the only one that expressed a preference for other racial and ethnic communities above their own. |
| Particularly significant — because it weakens the case that mobilization of minorities requires advocacy of very liberal policies across the board — Goldberg found that | Particularly significant — because it weakens the case that mobilization of minorities requires advocacy of very liberal policies across the board — Goldberg found that |
| black and Asian Democrats and liberals are significantly more supportive of restrictive immigration policies and less positive toward racial/ethnic diversity than their white counterparts. | black and Asian Democrats and liberals are significantly more supportive of restrictive immigration policies and less positive toward racial/ethnic diversity than their white counterparts. |
| Furthermore, Goldberg writes, black and Hispanic Democrats are more likely to part ways with white liberals “when it comes to contemporary social and gender-identity issues, including views of the #MeToo movement.” | Furthermore, Goldberg writes, black and Hispanic Democrats are more likely to part ways with white liberals “when it comes to contemporary social and gender-identity issues, including views of the #MeToo movement.” |
| Andrew Engelhardt, a political scientist at Brown whose recent work includes “Racial Attitudes through a Partisan Lens” and “Trumped by Race: Explanations for Race’s Influence on Whites’ Votes in 2016,” has documented the increasingly progressive views of white liberals on racial issues between early 2016 and late 2018. | Andrew Engelhardt, a political scientist at Brown whose recent work includes “Racial Attitudes through a Partisan Lens” and “Trumped by Race: Explanations for Race’s Influence on Whites’ Votes in 2016,” has documented the increasingly progressive views of white liberals on racial issues between early 2016 and late 2018. |
| During this period, Engelhardt wrote, “white Democrats’ average levels of racial resentment declined nearly 16 percentage points.” This is by far the biggest attitudinal shift to the left — or the right, for that matter — in the last 30 years, a reaction driven in large part by Trump’s race baiting. | During this period, Engelhardt wrote, “white Democrats’ average levels of racial resentment declined nearly 16 percentage points.” This is by far the biggest attitudinal shift to the left — or the right, for that matter — in the last 30 years, a reaction driven in large part by Trump’s race baiting. |
| Just as it did in the 2016 campaign, immigration has become an intensely volatile issue in this election cycle. | Just as it did in the 2016 campaign, immigration has become an intensely volatile issue in this election cycle. |
| According to The Washington Post, half of the Democratic presidential candidates support the decriminalization of border crossing, making unauthorized border crossing a civil rather than a criminal offense. | |
| There is an abundance of evidence that the more liberal Democratic presidential candidates may be pushing into dangerous terrain, taking stands that could prove difficult to defend in the general election. | There is an abundance of evidence that the more liberal Democratic presidential candidates may be pushing into dangerous terrain, taking stands that could prove difficult to defend in the general election. |
| Traditionally, candidates on both sides of the aisle move back to the center once they have secured the nomination. In March 2012, Eric Fehrnstrom, a spokesman for Mitt Romney, was asked if the candidate’s conservative stands in the primaries “would hurt him with moderate voters in the general election?” | Traditionally, candidates on both sides of the aisle move back to the center once they have secured the nomination. In March 2012, Eric Fehrnstrom, a spokesman for Mitt Romney, was asked if the candidate’s conservative stands in the primaries “would hurt him with moderate voters in the general election?” |
| Fehrnstrom famously replied: | Fehrnstrom famously replied: |
| Well, I think you hit a reset button for the fall campaign. Everything changes. It’s almost like an Etch-A-Sketch. You can kind of shake it up and restart all over again. | Well, I think you hit a reset button for the fall campaign. Everything changes. It’s almost like an Etch-A-Sketch. You can kind of shake it up and restart all over again. |
| In practice, though, with virtually everything a candidate says now recorded for posterity, it has become increasingly difficult to evade past statements. | In practice, though, with virtually everything a candidate says now recorded for posterity, it has become increasingly difficult to evade past statements. |
| The possible costs of the Democratic candidates’ commitment to decriminalization of border crossing are evident in a NPR/PBS NewsHour/Marist Poll conducted July 15-17. It found that all voters oppose decriminalization by better than two to one, 66-27. | The possible costs of the Democratic candidates’ commitment to decriminalization of border crossing are evident in a NPR/PBS NewsHour/Marist Poll conducted July 15-17. It found that all voters oppose decriminalization by better than two to one, 66-27. |
| Along similar lines, the liberal, pro-Democratic Center for American Progress issued a report on Monday warning that progressive supporters of liberalized immigration “have ceded powerful rhetorical ground to immigration restrictionists, who are happy to masquerade as the sole defenders of America as a nation of laws.” | Along similar lines, the liberal, pro-Democratic Center for American Progress issued a report on Monday warning that progressive supporters of liberalized immigration “have ceded powerful rhetorical ground to immigration restrictionists, who are happy to masquerade as the sole defenders of America as a nation of laws.” |
| There is, according to the center’s report, | There is, according to the center’s report, |
| a growing sense among some policymakers, as well as among many in the pro-immigrant advocacy community, that the entire enforcement apparatus must be unwound. Certainly, enforcement reforms are necessary, as the following sections of this report explain. But the move to reject enforcement entirely — even in theory — only fuels louder calls for maximum enforcement. | a growing sense among some policymakers, as well as among many in the pro-immigrant advocacy community, that the entire enforcement apparatus must be unwound. Certainly, enforcement reforms are necessary, as the following sections of this report explain. But the move to reject enforcement entirely — even in theory — only fuels louder calls for maximum enforcement. |
| It is not as if Democrats are lacking powerful immigration issues on which to run. An April University of Maryland “Study of American Attitudes on Immigration and Refugees” found that the Trump administration’s family separation policies are opposed 64-25, including by independent swing voters (67-18) and even by Republicans whose partisan allegiance is not strong (51-34). Only strong Republicans support the policies, 55-26. | It is not as if Democrats are lacking powerful immigration issues on which to run. An April University of Maryland “Study of American Attitudes on Immigration and Refugees” found that the Trump administration’s family separation policies are opposed 64-25, including by independent swing voters (67-18) and even by Republicans whose partisan allegiance is not strong (51-34). Only strong Republicans support the policies, 55-26. |
| Advocacy for this year’s progressive causes by a number of the Democratic presidential candidates has become a source of anxiety for some well-respected, mainstream Democrats. | |
| Paul Begala, a Democratic strategist, argued that two factors — fund-raising demands and the effect of the social media on candidates and their staff — are turning the nomination contest into “some kind of purity game to see who can be the most leftist.” | Paul Begala, a Democratic strategist, argued that two factors — fund-raising demands and the effect of the social media on candidates and their staff — are turning the nomination contest into “some kind of purity game to see who can be the most leftist.” |
| In the case of social media, Begala declared: | In the case of social media, Begala declared: |
| Democratic Twitter is dominated by overeducated, over-caffeinated, over-opinionated pain-in-the-ass white liberals. Every candidate, and every staffer, checks Twitter and other social media scores of times a day. | Democratic Twitter is dominated by overeducated, over-caffeinated, over-opinionated pain-in-the-ass white liberals. Every candidate, and every staffer, checks Twitter and other social media scores of times a day. |
| The second and more significant factor is what Begala described as the unintended consequences of “the obsession with small donors.” Democrats legitimately “want to break the stranglehold of big money,” Begala wrote, but | The second and more significant factor is what Begala described as the unintended consequences of “the obsession with small donors.” Democrats legitimately “want to break the stranglehold of big money,” Begala wrote, but |
| when the D.N.C. made accumulating small donors a centerpiece to debate eligibility among two dozen potential candidates, that’s when the unintended consequence kicked in. Small donors are often more motivated, more activist, more engaged, more ideological. In short, more leftist. They’re less likely to send in five bucks to a candidate who says, “I’m going to preserve Obamacare, maintain private insurance, and add a public option so anyone who wants to can join Medicare” — even though that’s where most Americans and most Democrats are. | when the D.N.C. made accumulating small donors a centerpiece to debate eligibility among two dozen potential candidates, that’s when the unintended consequence kicked in. Small donors are often more motivated, more activist, more engaged, more ideological. In short, more leftist. They’re less likely to send in five bucks to a candidate who says, “I’m going to preserve Obamacare, maintain private insurance, and add a public option so anyone who wants to can join Medicare” — even though that’s where most Americans and most Democrats are. |
| Begala said he has | Begala said he has |
| spoken with numerous state party officials and congressional campaigners who have traced the leftward lurch of the presidential candidates to the small donor problem. The tyranny of the small donor cannot be underestimated. | spoken with numerous state party officials and congressional campaigners who have traced the leftward lurch of the presidential candidates to the small donor problem. The tyranny of the small donor cannot be underestimated. |
| In a July 17 article in The American Prospect, “Can the Democrats Define Their Own Cause? Or will Trump define it for them?” Paul Starr, a professor of sociology and public affairs at Princeton, warned: | In a July 17 article in The American Prospect, “Can the Democrats Define Their Own Cause? Or will Trump define it for them?” Paul Starr, a professor of sociology and public affairs at Princeton, warned: |
| Some of the leading 2020 Democratic presidential candidates didn’t help their cause in the June debates by taking a series of unpopular positions, such as banning private health insurance, providing insurance to the undocumented, and decriminalizing border entry. They’re giving Trump and the Republicans plenty to work with. | Some of the leading 2020 Democratic presidential candidates didn’t help their cause in the June debates by taking a series of unpopular positions, such as banning private health insurance, providing insurance to the undocumented, and decriminalizing border entry. They’re giving Trump and the Republicans plenty to work with. |
| In an email, Starr described these developments as “a genuine puzzle.” | In an email, Starr described these developments as “a genuine puzzle.” |
| Last year’s Democratic governorship and congressional victories, he wrote, “came almost entirely because of gains by center-left candidates. A Gallup poll last December indicated Democrats favored a more moderate rather than a more liberal party.” Turnout in 2018 was exceptionally high and resembled presidential election turnout more than other midterm elections. | Last year’s Democratic governorship and congressional victories, he wrote, “came almost entirely because of gains by center-left candidates. A Gallup poll last December indicated Democrats favored a more moderate rather than a more liberal party.” Turnout in 2018 was exceptionally high and resembled presidential election turnout more than other midterm elections. |
| Still, there is a counterargument, calling on Democrats to move decisively to the left in order to mobilize progressive voters. | Still, there is a counterargument, calling on Democrats to move decisively to the left in order to mobilize progressive voters. |
| In a May GQ article, “The Democratic Party Is Waging a War Against Its Very Own Base,” Tory Gavito, president of Way to Win, and Sean McElwee, co-founder of Data for Progress, made the case for mobilization of left-leaning voters who cast ballots in 2012 but sat out 2016. | In a May GQ article, “The Democratic Party Is Waging a War Against Its Very Own Base,” Tory Gavito, president of Way to Win, and Sean McElwee, co-founder of Data for Progress, made the case for mobilization of left-leaning voters who cast ballots in 2012 but sat out 2016. |
| Gavito and McElwee produced the accompanying chart, which shows that if these voters had gone to the polls in 2016, they would have given victories to Hillary Clinton in Florida, Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania. And of course, with these victories, Clinton, not Trump, would be president. | Gavito and McElwee produced the accompanying chart, which shows that if these voters had gone to the polls in 2016, they would have given victories to Hillary Clinton in Florida, Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania. And of course, with these victories, Clinton, not Trump, would be president. |
| The Gavito-McElwee essay is one entry in what has been a decades-long battle over the best primary strategy. | The Gavito-McElwee essay is one entry in what has been a decades-long battle over the best primary strategy. |
| Between 1958 and 2012, the primary electorates of both parties have moved ever further away from the average general election voter, according to two University of California political scientists. | Between 1958 and 2012, the primary electorates of both parties have moved ever further away from the average general election voter, according to two University of California political scientists. |
| “In the 1950s, the median Democratic primary voter was indistinguishable from the median voter in the public as a whole,” Seth J. Hill and Chris Tausanovitch, of the University of California-San Diego and U.C.L.A., wrote in their July 2018 paper “Southern realignment, party sorting, and the polarization of American primary electorates, 1958–2012.” | “In the 1950s, the median Democratic primary voter was indistinguishable from the median voter in the public as a whole,” Seth J. Hill and Chris Tausanovitch, of the University of California-San Diego and U.C.L.A., wrote in their July 2018 paper “Southern realignment, party sorting, and the polarization of American primary electorates, 1958–2012.” |
| Their data extends only through 2012, but the ideological trends for both parties are clear. “Our simulations,” Hill and Tausanovitch wrote, “suggest that polarization of primary electorates in 2012 is about six times greater than in 1958 owing to the sorting of primary voters into party primaries by ideology.” Presciently, they noted that “the changes in Democratic primary electorates evident in 2008 and 2012 may foreshadow further moves to the left by the Democratic Party.” | Their data extends only through 2012, but the ideological trends for both parties are clear. “Our simulations,” Hill and Tausanovitch wrote, “suggest that polarization of primary electorates in 2012 is about six times greater than in 1958 owing to the sorting of primary voters into party primaries by ideology.” Presciently, they noted that “the changes in Democratic primary electorates evident in 2008 and 2012 may foreshadow further moves to the left by the Democratic Party.” |
| While the focus here has been on the potential problems of the Democratic nominee in the 2020 general election, there is a possibility that Trump could face parallel difficulties, in effect counterbalancing Democratic vulnerabilities. | While the focus here has been on the potential problems of the Democratic nominee in the 2020 general election, there is a possibility that Trump could face parallel difficulties, in effect counterbalancing Democratic vulnerabilities. |
| Daniel Hopkins, a political scientist at Penn, wrote me that in 2016 voters incorrectly identified Trump’s political agenda. “Many people underestimated the extent to which Donald Trump was perceived as ideologically moderate by 2016 general election voters,” Hopkins wrote. | Daniel Hopkins, a political scientist at Penn, wrote me that in 2016 voters incorrectly identified Trump’s political agenda. “Many people underestimated the extent to which Donald Trump was perceived as ideologically moderate by 2016 general election voters,” Hopkins wrote. |
| In October of that year, just before the election, 17 percent of respondents in an Institute for the Study of Citizens and Politics panel survey described Trump as “extremely conservative” and 31 percent described him as “conservative,” for a total of 48 percent. In contrast, in 2012, 22 percent said that Mitt Romney was extremely conservative and 45 percent said conservative, for a total of 67 percent. | In October of that year, just before the election, 17 percent of respondents in an Institute for the Study of Citizens and Politics panel survey described Trump as “extremely conservative” and 31 percent described him as “conservative,” for a total of 48 percent. In contrast, in 2012, 22 percent said that Mitt Romney was extremely conservative and 45 percent said conservative, for a total of 67 percent. |
| This leads to an unanswered question: Are all of Trump’s adherents unshakably loyal or can some of them be persuaded to flip, motivated by the reality described on Monday by my colleagues Jonathan Martin and Maggie Haberman: that while Trump claims to be a pro-worker populist, he has governed as a trickle-down Republican elitist. | This leads to an unanswered question: Are all of Trump’s adherents unshakably loyal or can some of them be persuaded to flip, motivated by the reality described on Monday by my colleagues Jonathan Martin and Maggie Haberman: that while Trump claims to be a pro-worker populist, he has governed as a trickle-down Republican elitist. |
| In some respects, Trump was flying under a false flag in 2016. Will he pay a price in 2020 when he has to fly under his true colors? | In some respects, Trump was flying under a false flag in 2016. Will he pay a price in 2020 when he has to fly under his true colors? |
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