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How May miscalculated the Brexit numbers game	How May miscalculated the Brexit numbers game
2019-04-16 15:24:27 UTC	2019-04-16 19:16:20 UTC (about 4 hours later)
It is a Conservative implosion that has been years in the making. Having seen her Brexit deal defeated three times in parliament, Theresa May finally admitted that “as things stand I can’t see [MPs] accepting it”.	It is a Conservative implosion that has been years in the making. Having seen her Brexit deal defeated three times in parliament, Theresa May finally admitted that “as things stand I can’t see [MPs] accepting it”.
Just days later Tory MPs delivered their own verdict. Only a minority of May’s party – 133 out of 314 – voted in favour of the prime minister’s request for a delay. She was effectively governing on the back of opposition votes.	Just days later Tory MPs delivered their own verdict. Only a minority of May’s party – 133 out of 314 – voted in favour of the prime minister’s request for a delay. She was effectively governing on the back of opposition votes.
May has failed, so far, because she could not win around Conservative rebels, mostly hard Brexiters from the European Research Group. A last, desperate promise to quit if MPs backed her deal only reduced rebel numbers to 34, 28 of them linked to the ERG.	May has failed, so far, because she could not win around Conservative rebels, mostly hard Brexiters from the European Research Group. A last, desperate promise to quit if MPs backed her deal only reduced rebel numbers to 34, 28 of them linked to the ERG.
The rebellion had been brewing for years. In 2015, after David Cameron won the general election, a group of Conservative MPs resolved to come together to keep the then prime minister true to his referendum pledge.	The rebellion had been brewing for years. In 2015, after David Cameron won the general election, a group of Conservative MPs resolved to come together to keep the then prime minister true to his referendum pledge.
Their organiser, the energetic backbencher Steve Baker, was able to bring together veteran Eurosceptics such as Bill Cash, John Redwood and Iain Duncan Smith because, according to one friend, “none of them felt threatened by him”.	Their organiser, the energetic backbencher Steve Baker, was able to bring together veteran Eurosceptics such as Bill Cash, John Redwood and Iain Duncan Smith because, according to one friend, “none of them felt threatened by him”.
They took over the ERG, a sleepy organisation providing research material on EU issues for all Tory MPs. Two dozen or so members met weekly, shared a WhatsApp group and began to function as a therapy group-cum-caucus, which initially saw itself as “Cameron’s majority”.	They took over the ERG, a sleepy organisation providing research material on EU issues for all Tory MPs. Two dozen or so members met weekly, shared a WhatsApp group and began to function as a therapy group-cum-caucus, which initially saw itself as “Cameron’s majority”.
Few Conservatives expected Brexit to triumph in the referendum. But the 52% result and May’s elevation to Downing Street changed the picture dramatically.	Few Conservatives expected Brexit to triumph in the referendum. But the 52% result and May’s elevation to Downing Street changed the picture dramatically.
The prime minister brought some leading Brexiters into government, but few ever believed May, who had supported remain, embraced the cause.	The prime minister brought some leading Brexiters into government, but few ever believed May, who had supported remain, embraced the cause.
	Theresa May is elected Conservative leader and, having backed remain, seeks to burnish her credentials as someone who can bring her party together by appointing key leave figures to the cabinet including making Boris Johnson foreign secretary, Liam Fox trade secretary and David Davis Brexit secretary. Nigel Farage calls them “inspired choices”.
	In her first conference speech, May sets a course for a hard Brexit by vowing “we are going to be a fully independent, sovereign country”. Insisting “Brexit means Brexit”, she vows to trigger the process of invoking article 50 by the following March and implies the UK will leave the customs union and the single market. Three months later, she delivers the Lancaster House speech that inked her red lines in permanent marker and left her with little room for manoeuvre. In what would become a familiar refrain, she said: “No deal for Britain is better than a bad deal for Britain.”
	Having taken the decision to call a snap general election in order to garner a majority that would allow her to push her Brexit vision through the Commons, a calamitous campaign results in the Conservatives losing their majority. That left May not only turning to the DUP in order to prop up her government, with knock-on effects for all that followed, but set the scene for the parliamentary deadlock that was to come.
	May gathers her warring cabinet at Chequers in a bid to set out a compromise negotiating position that has a chance of finding favour with the EU. But a perceived move towards a softer Brexit provokes an immediate backlash from the right of the party, prompting the resignations of Davis and Johnson from the cabinet and a fresh wave of plotting from ERG members determined to “chuck Chequers”.
	With her deal having been voted down by a crushing 230 majority when she first brought it before the Commons in January, May tries again with 19 days left until the original Brexit date. She is again humiliated when the deal is beaten by a 149 vote majority, amid a series of votes that showed the extent to which the process had become mired in parliamentary paralysis – mirroring the position in May’s own divided cabinet and the country at large.
Boris Johnson, the face of the leave campaign, was given the job of foreign secretary, but May marginalised him from Brexit policy. Chris Wilkins, a former speech writer for May, said: “She sees him as fundamentally unserious, and for her that is the worst criticism.”	Boris Johnson, the face of the leave campaign, was given the job of foreign secretary, but May marginalised him from Brexit policy. Chris Wilkins, a former speech writer for May, said: “She sees him as fundamentally unserious, and for her that is the worst criticism.”
The prime minister later remarked there was no off-the-shelf plan for Brexit. Instead she set about devising policy in the strictest secrecy, barely consulting cabinet colleagues on the most important diplomatic event since the UK joined the European Union 40 years earlier.	The prime minister later remarked there was no off-the-shelf plan for Brexit. Instead she set about devising policy in the strictest secrecy, barely consulting cabinet colleagues on the most important diplomatic event since the UK joined the European Union 40 years earlier.
Policy was initially delivered via speeches. According to Wilkins, texts were only shared with cabinet members the day before. There was no general discussion at cabinet, where meetings amounted to “two hours of Greg Clark going on about industrial strategy and everybody going home”, according to Katie Perrior, the then director of communications.	Policy was initially delivered via speeches. According to Wilkins, texts were only shared with cabinet members the day before. There was no general discussion at cabinet, where meetings amounted to “two hours of Greg Clark going on about industrial strategy and everybody going home”, according to Katie Perrior, the then director of communications.
Before the 2017 election, the line was handed down by a key May adviser, Nick Timothy, and the decision taken to tack to the right. A key speech was May’s first – to the Conservative party conference in 2016 – in which she said the UK would be “a fully independent sovereign country”.	Before the 2017 election, the line was handed down by a key May adviser, Nick Timothy, and the decision taken to tack to the right. A key speech was May’s first – to the Conservative party conference in 2016 – in which she said the UK would be “a fully independent sovereign country”.
The implication that the UK would leave the single market and probably the customs union came as a surprise. May also promised that article 50, which gave the EU two years’ notice of the UK’s intention to quit, would be triggered by the end of March 2017, intended, Wilkins recalls, to reassure the party’s right wing.	The implication that the UK would leave the single market and probably the customs union came as a surprise. May also promised that article 50, which gave the EU two years’ notice of the UK’s intention to quit, would be triggered by the end of March 2017, intended, Wilkins recalls, to reassure the party’s right wing.
Another speech in January 2017, at Lancaster House, firmed up May’s “red lines”. Her confirmation that the UK would leave the single market and abandon full membership of the customs union was favourably, and repeatedly, cited by Johnson afterwards.	Another speech in January 2017, at Lancaster House, firmed up May’s “red lines”. Her confirmation that the UK would leave the single market and abandon full membership of the customs union was favourably, and repeatedly, cited by Johnson afterwards.
	Theresa May is elected Conservative leader and, having backed remain, seeks to burnish her credentials as someone who can bring her party together by appointing key leave figures to the cabinet including making Boris Johnson foreign secretary, Liam Fox trade secretary and David Davis Brexit secretary. Nigel Farage calls them “inspired choices”.
	In her first conference speech, May sets a course for a hard Brexit by vowing “we are going to be a fully independent, sovereign country”. Insisting “Brexit means Brexit”, she vows to trigger the process of invoking article 50 by the following March and implies the UK will leave the customs union and the single market. Three months later, she delivers the Lancaster House speech that inked her red lines in permanent marker and left her with little room for manoeuvre. In what would become a familiar refrain, she said: “No deal for Britain is better than a bad deal for Britain.”
	Having taken the decision to call a snap general election in order to garner a majority that would allow her to push her Brexit vision through the Commons, a calamitous campaign results in the Conservatives losing their majority. That left May not only turning to the DUP in order to prop up her government, with knock-on effects for all that followed, but set the scene for the parliamentary deadlock that was to come.
	May gathers her warring cabinet at Chequers in a bid to set out a compromise negotiating position that has a chance of finding favour with the EU. But a perceived move towards a softer Brexit provokes an immediate backlash from the right of the party, prompting the resignations of Davis and Johnson from the cabinet and a fresh wave of plotting from ERG members determined to “chuck Chequers”.
	With her deal having been voted down by a crushing 230 majority when she first brought it before the Commons in January, May tries again with 19 days left until the original Brexit date. She is again humiliated when the deal is beaten by a 149 vote majority, amid a series of votes that showed the extent to which the process had become mired in parliamentary paralysis – mirroring the position in May’s own divided cabinet and the country at large.
Brexit did not feature much during the election, remarkably in hindsight, but the disastrous campaign undermined May’s authority and she lost her majority.	Brexit did not feature much during the election, remarkably in hindsight, but the disastrous campaign undermined May’s authority and she lost her majority.
Under pressure from Jeremy Heywood, the then cabinet secretary, to show the EU there was continuity in government, May said she would form an administration with “our friends and allies in the Democratic Unionist party”. Becoming reliant on Northern Ireland’s DUP complicated the picture further.	Under pressure from Jeremy Heywood, the then cabinet secretary, to show the EU there was continuity in government, May said she would form an administration with “our friends and allies in the Democratic Unionist party”. Becoming reliant on Northern Ireland’s DUP complicated the picture further.
Eurosceptics argue this was the point at which May fell into the hands of the civil service, relying on Heywood and Oliver Robbins, who transferred to No 10 from the Department for Exiting the European Union led by David Davis. Gradually, on the party’s right, a betrayal narrative emerged.	Eurosceptics argue this was the point at which May fell into the hands of the civil service, relying on Heywood and Oliver Robbins, who transferred to No 10 from the Department for Exiting the European Union led by David Davis. Gradually, on the party’s right, a betrayal narrative emerged.
Downing Street developed a secretive style of negotiations with Brussels. The DUP had demanded access to the negotiating text in the five weeks leading up to the end of the first stage of talks in 2017, then May tried to bounce the party leader, Arlene Foster, going to Brussels on her own to sign off the deal with the European commission president, Jean-Claude Juncker. However, May took a lunchtime call from Foster, who unexpectedly said no to the agreement.	Downing Street developed a secretive style of negotiations with Brussels. The DUP had demanded access to the negotiating text in the five weeks leading up to the end of the first stage of talks in 2017, then May tried to bounce the party leader, Arlene Foster, going to Brussels on her own to sign off the deal with the European commission president, Jean-Claude Juncker. However, May took a lunchtime call from Foster, who unexpectedly said no to the agreement.
What had emerged was the soon to be infamous “backstop” – initially a promise for Northern Ireland to maintain “full alignment” with the customs union and single market in the absence of a Brexit deal. It was the first of many times May misjudged the limits of her authority.	What had emerged was the soon to be infamous “backstop” – initially a promise for Northern Ireland to maintain “full alignment” with the customs union and single market in the absence of a Brexit deal. It was the first of many times May misjudged the limits of her authority.
May returned to Brussels a few days later with a revised commitment to extend the backstop to the whole of the UK. While it brought the DUP on board, who had argued it would otherwise create an invisible customs border down the Irish Sea, it created fresh problems.	May returned to Brussels a few days later with a revised commitment to extend the backstop to the whole of the UK. While it brought the DUP on board, who had argued it would otherwise create an invisible customs border down the Irish Sea, it created fresh problems.
Johnson and Michael Gove said they thought it represented the beginnings of a long-term trade deal in which the UK would maintain strong alignment with the EU.	Johnson and Michael Gove said they thought it represented the beginnings of a long-term trade deal in which the UK would maintain strong alignment with the EU.
They were temporarily bought off with reassurances from Downing Street that “these were only words” and should not be taken seriously.	They were temporarily bought off with reassurances from Downing Street that “these were only words” and should not be taken seriously.
Cabinet was called to a summit at Chequers in July 2018 to discuss Britain’s future trade relationship with the EU after Brexit. It was the first substantive discussion on the topic, papers were only sent out the day before, and there was no negotiation.	Cabinet was called to a summit at Chequers in July 2018 to discuss Britain’s future trade relationship with the EU after Brexit. It was the first substantive discussion on the topic, papers were only sent out the day before, and there was no negotiation.
One minister said they were told amendments could not be proposed because it had all been signed off with the German and French leaders, Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron. Downing Street briefed that if ministers wanted to resign they would have to walk to the nearest pub and call a taxi.	One minister said they were told amendments could not be proposed because it had all been signed off with the German and French leaders, Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron. Downing Street briefed that if ministers wanted to resign they would have to walk to the nearest pub and call a taxi.
By now, May was softening – slightly – her Brexit plans, proposing that the UK sign up to the EU’s “common rule book” for food and goods. It was incremental, but surprisingly unpopular in the meeting, although nobody wanted to walk out there and then.	By now, May was softening – slightly – her Brexit plans, proposing that the UK sign up to the EU’s “common rule book” for food and goods. It was incremental, but surprisingly unpopular in the meeting, although nobody wanted to walk out there and then.
Davis quit two days later, saying May had “given away too much and too easily” and complaining he had been cut out from a policy developed by Robbins.	Davis quit two days later, saying May had “given away too much and too easily” and complaining he had been cut out from a policy developed by Robbins.
Johnson quit as foreign secretary the next day, claiming May’s plan would reduce Britain to the “status of a colony”. Baker also quit as a junior Brexit minister and returned to his role as ERG organiser, forming a double act with the chairman, Jacob Rees-Mogg.	Johnson quit as foreign secretary the next day, claiming May’s plan would reduce Britain to the “status of a colony”. Baker also quit as a junior Brexit minister and returned to his role as ERG organiser, forming a double act with the chairman, Jacob Rees-Mogg.
May’s Brexit deal finally arrived in November and although the Chequers proposal did not feature, arguments returned to the backstop.	May’s Brexit deal finally arrived in November and although the Chequers proposal did not feature, arguments returned to the backstop.