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Why are we so dissatisfied with democracy? The reasons are many Why are we so dissatisfied with democracy? The reasons are many
(25 days later)
Liberal democracy in the west is facing its greatest crisis in decades, challenged from within by populists and from without by authoritarianism in Russia, China and elsewhere. Reflecting what is becoming a widespread view, Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s rightwing prime minister, recently proclaimed: “The era of liberal democracy is over.”Liberal democracy in the west is facing its greatest crisis in decades, challenged from within by populists and from without by authoritarianism in Russia, China and elsewhere. Reflecting what is becoming a widespread view, Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s rightwing prime minister, recently proclaimed: “The era of liberal democracy is over.”
What went wrong? Many analysts focus on economic problems. Slow growth, rising inequality, and welfare-state cutbacks have made life more insecure for the working and middle classes and spread economic risk, fear of the future, and social divisions throughout western societies.What went wrong? Many analysts focus on economic problems. Slow growth, rising inequality, and welfare-state cutbacks have made life more insecure for the working and middle classes and spread economic risk, fear of the future, and social divisions throughout western societies.
Others argue social grievances are to blame. Traditional norms about religion, sexuality, family life and more have been challenged while massive immigration and, especially in the United States, the mobilization of oppressed minority groups has disrupted existing hierarchies, leaving some citizens angry and resentful.Others argue social grievances are to blame. Traditional norms about religion, sexuality, family life and more have been challenged while massive immigration and, especially in the United States, the mobilization of oppressed minority groups has disrupted existing hierarchies, leaving some citizens angry and resentful.
Most discussions stop here, arguing economic or social change has led inevitably to dissatisfaction with democracy and a populist backlash. But economic and social changes only become problems if politicians, parties and governments don’t recognize and respond to them.Most discussions stop here, arguing economic or social change has led inevitably to dissatisfaction with democracy and a populist backlash. But economic and social changes only become problems if politicians, parties and governments don’t recognize and respond to them.
In fact, dissatisfaction with democracy is rooted in the belief that democracy is not working – that it is unable or unwilling to deal with citizens’ demands and concerns. And there is evidence the dissatisfied are right: over time, politicians, parties and governments have become less responsive to a broad cross-section of citizens.In fact, dissatisfaction with democracy is rooted in the belief that democracy is not working – that it is unable or unwilling to deal with citizens’ demands and concerns. And there is evidence the dissatisfied are right: over time, politicians, parties and governments have become less responsive to a broad cross-section of citizens.
Slow growth, rising inequality, and welfare-state cutbacks have made life more insecure for the working and middle classesSlow growth, rising inequality, and welfare-state cutbacks have made life more insecure for the working and middle classes
In the United States, gerrymandering has increasingly warped the translation of voter preferences into political outcomes. By some measures, close to 45% of the US population lives in gerrymandered districts where outcomes heavily favor one party, diminishing the need for parties to consider the preferences of voters outside their base.In the United States, gerrymandering has increasingly warped the translation of voter preferences into political outcomes. By some measures, close to 45% of the US population lives in gerrymandered districts where outcomes heavily favor one party, diminishing the need for parties to consider the preferences of voters outside their base.
The role of money in politics has also increased, skewing who politicians pay attention to and who controls the agenda-setting process. Several political scientists have found that the interests of economic elites and the organized groups representing their interests powerfully shape government policy while less well-off Americans and the mass-based interest groups that represent their interests have much less influence.The role of money in politics has also increased, skewing who politicians pay attention to and who controls the agenda-setting process. Several political scientists have found that the interests of economic elites and the organized groups representing their interests powerfully shape government policy while less well-off Americans and the mass-based interest groups that represent their interests have much less influence.
In addition, private funding of campaigns has grown, influencing who runs for office, who gets elected, and what issues candidates respond to. The Koch network, whose preferences, especially on economic policy, are to the right of even most Republican voters, now raises about as much money as the entire Republican party spent on the 2016 elections.In addition, private funding of campaigns has grown, influencing who runs for office, who gets elected, and what issues candidates respond to. The Koch network, whose preferences, especially on economic policy, are to the right of even most Republican voters, now raises about as much money as the entire Republican party spent on the 2016 elections.
Perhaps because campaigns increasingly require candidates to fundraise themselves, few lower-income people run for office. This biases economic debate in particular since politicians with working-class backgrounds are dramatically more likely than others to take progressive or pro-worker positions, even when controlling for partisanship, district characteristics and other factors. The American voting system also discourages particular groups from voting, particularly the poor and minorities, shaping what voices are heard at election time and within the political sphere more generally.Perhaps because campaigns increasingly require candidates to fundraise themselves, few lower-income people run for office. This biases economic debate in particular since politicians with working-class backgrounds are dramatically more likely than others to take progressive or pro-worker positions, even when controlling for partisanship, district characteristics and other factors. The American voting system also discourages particular groups from voting, particularly the poor and minorities, shaping what voices are heard at election time and within the political sphere more generally.
Given all this, it’s unsurprising that political scientists have found that senior staff members in Congress – the people who help their bosses decide what bills to pursue and support – have “no clue what Americans want”. The more time they spend talking to big business rather than mass membership groups, the more clueless these congressional staffers become.Given all this, it’s unsurprising that political scientists have found that senior staff members in Congress – the people who help their bosses decide what bills to pursue and support – have “no clue what Americans want”. The more time they spend talking to big business rather than mass membership groups, the more clueless these congressional staffers become.
In Europe, other trends have also diminished democracy’s responsiveness, including the decline of mainstream political parties. Historically, social democratic and labour parties acted as the voice of the disadvantaged and disempowered. But over recent decades their economic policy-making became dominated by “finance-oriented economists” and neo-liberal thinktank-based policy wonks who pushed them in a more neoliberal direction, and their overall leadership shifted towards a highly educated elite whose preferences, particularly on issues like the benefits of the EU, immigration and cultural change, diverged greatly from those of their traditional voters.In Europe, other trends have also diminished democracy’s responsiveness, including the decline of mainstream political parties. Historically, social democratic and labour parties acted as the voice of the disadvantaged and disempowered. But over recent decades their economic policy-making became dominated by “finance-oriented economists” and neo-liberal thinktank-based policy wonks who pushed them in a more neoliberal direction, and their overall leadership shifted towards a highly educated elite whose preferences, particularly on issues like the benefits of the EU, immigration and cultural change, diverged greatly from those of their traditional voters.
We are living in a time when basic features of democracy have been eroded, leaving many citizens feeling disregarded and disempoweredWe are living in a time when basic features of democracy have been eroded, leaving many citizens feeling disregarded and disempowered
The rise of an unelected technocracy at the national and European level has also reshaped democracy. Over the past decades, ever-more policymaking areas fell under the purview of the EU without any corresponding increase in European citizens’ control over them. Technocrats’ preferences often diverge from those of ordinary citizens, and technocrats tend only to ask whether a policy is “effective”, when equally if not more important is whether it is legitimate. Citizens are more likely to tolerate the “inevitable disappointments and frustrations” of policy when they can vote out those whose decisions they disagree with.The rise of an unelected technocracy at the national and European level has also reshaped democracy. Over the past decades, ever-more policymaking areas fell under the purview of the EU without any corresponding increase in European citizens’ control over them. Technocrats’ preferences often diverge from those of ordinary citizens, and technocrats tend only to ask whether a policy is “effective”, when equally if not more important is whether it is legitimate. Citizens are more likely to tolerate the “inevitable disappointments and frustrations” of policy when they can vote out those whose decisions they disagree with.
Democracy is, by definition, “rule by the people”. This does not require a perfect correspondence between some impossible to define “will of the people” and political outcomes, but it does require that the divergence between the two not be too great. In addition, political equality is the heart of democracy: some citizens cannot be systematically and permanently more powerful or impactful than others. It is hard to recognize much less solve large social and economic problems if politicians, parties and governments are primarily responsive to elites or narrow groups of voters, rather than broad, cross-sections of the population.Democracy is, by definition, “rule by the people”. This does not require a perfect correspondence between some impossible to define “will of the people” and political outcomes, but it does require that the divergence between the two not be too great. In addition, political equality is the heart of democracy: some citizens cannot be systematically and permanently more powerful or impactful than others. It is hard to recognize much less solve large social and economic problems if politicians, parties and governments are primarily responsive to elites or narrow groups of voters, rather than broad, cross-sections of the population.
We are living in a time when these basic features and requirements of democracy have been eroded, leaving many citizens feeling disregarded and disempowered. As one leader of the “yellow vests” movement in France explained, “What we want above all is respect” – leaders and government should not ignore our needs and concerns. If traditional politicians and parties cannot convince citizens that they are willing and able to do this, dissatisfaction with democracy will increase – as will support for its radical alternatives.We are living in a time when these basic features and requirements of democracy have been eroded, leaving many citizens feeling disregarded and disempowered. As one leader of the “yellow vests” movement in France explained, “What we want above all is respect” – leaders and government should not ignore our needs and concerns. If traditional politicians and parties cannot convince citizens that they are willing and able to do this, dissatisfaction with democracy will increase – as will support for its radical alternatives.
Sheri Berman is a professor of political science at Barnard College, Columbia University, and the author of Democracy and Dictatorship in Europe. From the Ancien Régime to the Present Day.Sheri Berman is a professor of political science at Barnard College, Columbia University, and the author of Democracy and Dictatorship in Europe. From the Ancien Régime to the Present Day.
Sheri Berman is a professor of political science at Barnard College, Columbia University, and the author of Democracy and Dictatorship in Europe. From the Ancien Régime to the Present Day.Sheri Berman is a professor of political science at Barnard College, Columbia University, and the author of Democracy and Dictatorship in Europe. From the Ancien Régime to the Present Day.
Economic policyEconomic policy
OpinionOpinion
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