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| Corus admits guilt on fatal blast | Corus admits guilt on fatal blast |
| (about 3 hours later) | |
| Corus has admitted failing to ensure its workers and contractors' safety after an investigation into a massive explosion at its Port Talbot works. | Corus has admitted failing to ensure its workers and contractors' safety after an investigation into a massive explosion at its Port Talbot works. |
| Three workers died in the blast and 12 others were injured in November 2001. | Three workers died in the blast and 12 others were injured in November 2001. |
| The steel firm had previously admitted civil liability and could face massive fines when sentenced on Friday. | The steel firm had previously admitted civil liability and could face massive fines when sentenced on Friday. |
| But Corus' defence barrister argued that the company's admission should not be interpreted to mean it acknowledged it knew lives were at risk. | |
| The family of one of the men who died accused the company in court of paying for the replacement "shiny new blast furnace" with their blood. | The family of one of the men who died accused the company in court of paying for the replacement "shiny new blast furnace" with their blood. |
| The explosion in 2001 destroyed blast furnace five, lifting it off its base and blasting out 200 tonnes of steel slag and hot gasses. | The explosion in 2001 destroyed blast furnace five, lifting it off its base and blasting out 200 tonnes of steel slag and hot gasses. |
| The prosecution for which Corus was to stand trial until it entered a guilty plea at the last minute followed a Health and Safety Executive (HSE) investigation. | The prosecution for which Corus was to stand trial until it entered a guilty plea at the last minute followed a Health and Safety Executive (HSE) investigation. |
| Stephen Galsworthy, Andrew Hutin, and Len Radford died in the explosion | Stephen Galsworthy, Andrew Hutin, and Len Radford died in the explosion |
| Len Radford, 53, from Maesteg, Andrew Hutin, 20, and 25-year-old Stephen Galsworthy, from Port Talbot, all died. | Len Radford, 53, from Maesteg, Andrew Hutin, 20, and 25-year-old Stephen Galsworthy, from Port Talbot, all died. |
| Prosecutor Anthony Donne QC outlined how expert advice, which could have averted the tragedy, had been ignored. | Prosecutor Anthony Donne QC outlined how expert advice, which could have averted the tragedy, had been ignored. |
| He blamed the company for "long-standing faults in company procedures" and "a pattern of failure and management" to react to warnings of the dangers faced by employees. | He blamed the company for "long-standing faults in company procedures" and "a pattern of failure and management" to react to warnings of the dangers faced by employees. |
| Mr Donne told how Corus was "well aware" of the dangers as the company had been prosecuted over an incident at its Llanwern steelworks in 2000 when they had been an explosion after water mixed with molten metal. | Mr Donne told how Corus was "well aware" of the dangers as the company had been prosecuted over an incident at its Llanwern steelworks in 2000 when they had been an explosion after water mixed with molten metal. |
| The prosecutor also described how a special committee set up to monitor the furnace, commissioned in 1959, had made a series of recommendations - none of which appeared to have been acted on. | The prosecutor also described how a special committee set up to monitor the furnace, commissioned in 1959, had made a series of recommendations - none of which appeared to have been acted on. |
| Electrical transformer | Electrical transformer |
| He said blast furnace number five had suffered "many, many pump failures" before the explosion in 2001. | He said blast furnace number five had suffered "many, many pump failures" before the explosion in 2001. |
| The prosecutor also described the chain of events which led to the fatal blast when an electrical transformer needed repairs. | The prosecutor also described the chain of events which led to the fatal blast when an electrical transformer needed repairs. |
| All relevant witnesses were called and many used words such as 'theexplosion was unprecedented' Hugh Carlisle QC, defending | |
| Mr Donne said the operation required careful monitoring to ensure the voltage remained constant but the team working in the furnace number five the day before the accident was never told about the work. | Mr Donne said the operation required careful monitoring to ensure the voltage remained constant but the team working in the furnace number five the day before the accident was never told about the work. |
| When the transformer switch was made voltage dropped dramatically, causing both it and an auxiliary pump which came on, to trip. | When the transformer switch was made voltage dropped dramatically, causing both it and an auxiliary pump which came on, to trip. |
| This meant water to cool the system did not circulate and up to 50 tonnes leaked into the furnace. | This meant water to cool the system did not circulate and up to 50 tonnes leaked into the furnace. |
| Mike Hutin said 'time has not been a healer' | Mike Hutin said 'time has not been a healer' |
| Workers were sent to deal with the problem believed the leak had been repaired and the source of the problem deal with. | Workers were sent to deal with the problem believed the leak had been repaired and the source of the problem deal with. |
| But the large amount of water was still in the furnance and it reacted with molten metal to cause an explosion when the metal core was reheated the next day. | But the large amount of water was still in the furnance and it reacted with molten metal to cause an explosion when the metal core was reheated the next day. |
| Mr Donne also read out a message of tribute from the family of "gentle giant" Stephen Galsworthy. | Mr Donne also read out a message of tribute from the family of "gentle giant" Stephen Galsworthy. |
| The message said it was essential that Corus and other companies should not be allowed to let dangerous work conditions go unchecked. | The message said it was essential that Corus and other companies should not be allowed to let dangerous work conditions go unchecked. |
| Unlimited financial penalties | Unlimited financial penalties |
| "They must be made to value the lives of their workers and not a shiny new £75m blast furnace paid for with their blood". | "They must be made to value the lives of their workers and not a shiny new £75m blast furnace paid for with their blood". |
| Corus UK Ltd could now face unlimited financial penalties - the highest precedent being Transco's £15m fine in 2005, for a gas leak that killed a family of four in South Lanarkshire. | Corus UK Ltd could now face unlimited financial penalties - the highest precedent being Transco's £15m fine in 2005, for a gas leak that killed a family of four in South Lanarkshire. |
| Corus admitted civil liability for the accident around 12 months after the explosion. Negotiations about compensation are still on-going. | Corus admitted civil liability for the accident around 12 months after the explosion. Negotiations about compensation are still on-going. |
| Hugh Carlisle QC, defending, argued that Corus's admission should not beinterpreted to mean it acknowledged it knew lives were at risk. | |
| He said modern blast furnaces go back to the Victorian era and there were norecords of any such explosions having happened from then to the modern day. | |
| Evidence at the Swansea inquest into the death of the three victims, whichrecorded three accidental death verdicts in August 2005, made that clear, hesaid. | |
| "All relevant witnesses were called and many used words such as 'theexplosion was unprecedented'," he said. | |
| An internal report by Corus released at the time of the inquest had concludedthat the explosion had neither been foreseen nor was foreseeable, he added. | |
| "If you cannot foresee something you cannot be expected to take precautionsagainst it," Mr Carlisle said. | |
| He added that senior managers responsible for blast furnace number five hadmet to discuss problems with it one hour before the explosion. | |
| At that time the risk of a "discharge", but not an explosion, had been atthe top of the agenda. | |
| "The risk had been recognised from the beginning by the defendant. It wasrecognised and writ large one hour before the dreadful explosion." | |
| Outside court Andrew Hutin's father Mike said: "I expect the individuals who made decisions that day - which in my mind were the wrong decisions but obviously I can't comment on each and every decision - to be punished in some way." | Outside court Andrew Hutin's father Mike said: "I expect the individuals who made decisions that day - which in my mind were the wrong decisions but obviously I can't comment on each and every decision - to be punished in some way." |
| Councillor Anthony Taylor from Neath Port Talbot council said: "I think Corus admitting that there was liability on their behalf has meant the community can look with some certainty to the future and it comes as some closure to what's gone on. | Councillor Anthony Taylor from Neath Port Talbot council said: "I think Corus admitting that there was liability on their behalf has meant the community can look with some certainty to the future and it comes as some closure to what's gone on. |
| "It's been a sad five years. I know this won't satisfy everybody within the community but at least there's a final closure to it all." | "It's been a sad five years. I know this won't satisfy everybody within the community but at least there's a final closure to it all." |