Trump’s Problem in Syria? It Was Obama’s Too

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/17/opinion/syria-airstrikes-trump-next.html

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The agonizing conflict in Syria, which has vexed both the Obama and Trump administrations, is growing increasingly complex and dangerous. Now, more than ever, the United States needs to clarify its strategic objectives in Syria and pursue them with ruthless discipline.

Russia and Iran have paid dearly to enable the Syrian leader, Bashar al-Assad, to dismantle the opposition and will stay in Syria to prop him up. The Islamic State has been dislodged from its “caliphate” but not yet defeated. And the horrific humanitarian plight of the Syrian people endures.

The United States’ policy options, ever bad, are more limited and less effectual than ever. The airstrikes launched last week by the United States, France and Britain sent a necessary, calibrated message to Mr. Assad that the civilized world does not countenance chemical weapons use. But their deterrent effect is likely, again, to be fleeting, not least because the United States — wary of provoking a wider conflict — has twice demonstrated that it will not use regime-threatening force to punish Syria’s use of chemical weapons.

Moreover, the United States has been deliberately ambiguous about whether our current “red line” is the use of chlorine gas alone, to which the United States and its allies have never responded with force. (American officials have said the recent attack in Douma may have involved both chlorine and a far deadlier nerve agent, sarin, stores of which Syria seems to have surreptitiously retained or reconstituted despite a 2013 agreement to eliminate them.) If the United States responds to incidents involving only chlorine, it will be striking Syria more frequently.

Most dangerously, the Syrian conflict now pits big players against one another: Israel versus Iran, the United States versus Iran and Russia, and Turkey versus American-backed Kurds. These standoffs risk escalating into sustained conflict, even if worst-case scenarios can still be avoided.

Against this backdrop, the United States must be clear about its interests and strict about avoiding mission creep. Here, despite their evident differences, the Obama and Trump administrations have proven more alike than not.

Mindful of the lessons of Iraq, each administration has defined the primary goal as defeating the Islamic State, not regime change. Each has sought to avoid entanglement in a wider war that requires a large, lasting commitment of American troops. (While the Trump administration has emphasized thwarting Iran’s ambitions in Syria, it has not put much muscle behind that aim.) Each has urged a diplomatic solution to the civil conflict, though the Trump administration has employed little diplomatic capital. Each drew a controversial distinction between Mr. Assad’s relentless use of conventional weapons, which has killed hundreds of thousands, and his resort to banned chemicals, because they violate important international norms that America has a direct interest in upholding.

Such narrowly defined objectives remain the least bad approach from the United States’ perspective, even as they require Americans to tolerate the intolerable from a moral and humanitarian perspective. This stark trade-off is what has made Syria the most difficult and painful policy conundrum for years.

The path forward will continue to be perilous and deeply unsatisfying.

First, America and its allies must maintain current force levels (approximately 2,000 United States troops) to defeat Islamic State and Qaeda elements, forswearing any premature withdrawal. ISIS will regain ground if we create a vacuum.

With its partners, the United States must help secure, rebuild and establish effective local governance in liberated areas. This will allow the United States to thwart Iranian ambitions to control territory spanning Iraq, Syria and Lebanon; retain influence in major oil-producing areas; and deny Mr. Assad a substantial portion of Syrian territory, pending a diplomatic solution. Yes, this is nation-building, or at least region-building. But to abandon liberated areas is to roll out the red carpet for terrorists.

Second, the United States should continue to refrain from deposing Mr. Assad militarily. The costs of this endeavor have always exceeded the obvious benefits. Now with Russia and Iran so deeply invested in sustaining him, the risks of that strategy have only increased. The United States should keep avoiding direct conflict with Russia; limit the risk of Israel coming to blows with Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah; and defuse the conflict between Turkey and the Syrian Kurds, whose help America still needs against Islamic State. This does not mean allowing Russia and Iran free rein. Rather, the United States must push back firmly and smartly, preferably with allies, whether with respect to chemical weapons or other outrages.

Third, the United States must sustain its generous humanitarian assistance to Syrians inside the country and in neighboring states, and immediately halt the inhumane and hypocritical policy of refusing admission to all Syrian refugees.

Finally, the United States should renew its push for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. While American leverage has declined, its diplomatic weight is still substantial. For Syria to be viable, it needs a government chosen by its people. Without that, it will not be a unitary state able to prevent terrorists from exploiting its territory.

Though Russia, Iran and Mr. Assad have less incentive to negotiate, the United States has two potentially valuable cards to play. The first is its effective hold on an important swath of northern and eastern Syria through its predominantly Kurdish partners. The second is its unrivaled capacity, with European and Gulf allies, to support Syrian reconstruction and refugee return. Without our money, Russia and Iran, neither economic powerhouses, will be left holding the bag on a costly failed state.

Alternatively, if we link all Western and Arab assistance in post-conflict Syria to the free and fair election of a new Syrian government under strict international verification, we hold a carrot that may become increasingly attractive to Mr. Assad’s backers.

These steps won’t end the Syrian civil war, bring back the innumerable lives lost, nor assuage our collective moral conscience. But they will keep the United States focused on clear and achievable objectives, avoid strategic overreach and wisely tend to our core national interests.