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| Cities and terror: an indivisible and brutal relationship | Cities and terror: an indivisible and brutal relationship |
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| Through successive waves of terrorist attacks, the city has consistently been the target – for reasons that are unlikely to change any time soon, writes Jason Burke | Through successive waves of terrorist attacks, the city has consistently been the target – for reasons that are unlikely to change any time soon, writes Jason Burke |
| The bureaucracy of evil: how Islamic State ran a city | The bureaucracy of evil: how Islamic State ran a city |
| In pictures: a century of cities at war | In pictures: a century of cities at war |
| Tell us your experiences of cities at war | Tell us your experiences of cities at war |
| Jason Burke | Jason Burke |
| Mon 29 Jan 2018 07.30 GMT | Mon 29 Jan 2018 07.30 GMT |
| Last modified on Mon 29 Jan 2018 15.56 GMT | |
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| Almost 140 years ago, a wave of bombs exploded in London. Though they killed a relatively small number of people, they attracted a lot of attention. | Almost 140 years ago, a wave of bombs exploded in London. Though they killed a relatively small number of people, they attracted a lot of attention. |
| The work of Irish extremists hoping to shift public opinion and political thinking about the future of their nation lasted several years. In October 1883, one of their bloodiest attacks injured 40 people on a tube train pulling out of Paddington station. Other targets included the offices of the The Times newspaper, Nelson’s Column, the Tower of London and Scotland Yard. | The work of Irish extremists hoping to shift public opinion and political thinking about the future of their nation lasted several years. In October 1883, one of their bloodiest attacks injured 40 people on a tube train pulling out of Paddington station. Other targets included the offices of the The Times newspaper, Nelson’s Column, the Tower of London and Scotland Yard. |
| Throughout the decade, there were other bombings elsewhere in Europe perpetrated by various extremist groups and hitting theatres, opera houses, the French parliament and streetside cafes. In 1920, Wall Street itself was bombed. The wave of attacks prompted concern about new technologies, such as timers and dynamite, which was said to be “cheap as soap and common as sugar”, and drew debate as to how to protect cities and mass transit systems from violence. | Throughout the decade, there were other bombings elsewhere in Europe perpetrated by various extremist groups and hitting theatres, opera houses, the French parliament and streetside cafes. In 1920, Wall Street itself was bombed. The wave of attacks prompted concern about new technologies, such as timers and dynamite, which was said to be “cheap as soap and common as sugar”, and drew debate as to how to protect cities and mass transit systems from violence. |
| Nearly 150 years later, a spate of recent attacks in major European cities have led to similar warnings. Experts tell us how easy it is to construct a viable explosive device with instructions from the internet, and warn of how we can, or can’t, protect our public spaces from the new tactic of using vehicles as murderous rams. After a truck was driven into a crowd at a Christmas market in Berlin last year, the police chief, Klaus Kandt, pointed out that with so many potential targets – 2,500 such markets in Germany and 60 in the city alone – it was impossible to reduce the risk to zero. | Nearly 150 years later, a spate of recent attacks in major European cities have led to similar warnings. Experts tell us how easy it is to construct a viable explosive device with instructions from the internet, and warn of how we can, or can’t, protect our public spaces from the new tactic of using vehicles as murderous rams. After a truck was driven into a crowd at a Christmas market in Berlin last year, the police chief, Klaus Kandt, pointed out that with so many potential targets – 2,500 such markets in Germany and 60 in the city alone – it was impossible to reduce the risk to zero. |
| With so many strikes in urban settings in the last two years, residents of London, Manchester, Paris, Nice, Brussels or Barcelona (to list just a few of those places which have suffered a significant attack in the last 20 months) have had little time to step back and see this latest wave of violence in any kind of longer perspective. But this is problematic. If a longer view teaches us anything about the strange times we find ourselves in, it is that the seemingly inextricable link between terror and our cities is nothing new. | With so many strikes in urban settings in the last two years, residents of London, Manchester, Paris, Nice, Brussels or Barcelona (to list just a few of those places which have suffered a significant attack in the last 20 months) have had little time to step back and see this latest wave of violence in any kind of longer perspective. But this is problematic. If a longer view teaches us anything about the strange times we find ourselves in, it is that the seemingly inextricable link between terror and our cities is nothing new. |
| Of course, there were key differences in the violence of the 1880s and 1890s. Historic attacks were mostly motivated by ideologies such as anarchism and extreme versions of socialism or nationalism, and the numbers killed or wounded were minimal in comparison to today. | Of course, there were key differences in the violence of the 1880s and 1890s. Historic attacks were mostly motivated by ideologies such as anarchism and extreme versions of socialism or nationalism, and the numbers killed or wounded were minimal in comparison to today. |
| War is urbanising. No longer fought on beaches or battlefields, conflict has come to the doors of millions living in densely populated areas, killing thousands of civilians, destroying historic centres and devastating infrastructure for generations to come. | War is urbanising. No longer fought on beaches or battlefields, conflict has come to the doors of millions living in densely populated areas, killing thousands of civilians, destroying historic centres and devastating infrastructure for generations to come. |
| Last year, the world watched the Middle East as Mosul, Raqqa, Sana'a and Aleppo were razed to the ground. Across Europe, brutal attacks stunned urban populations in Paris, London and Berlin, while gang warfare tore apart the fabric of cities in central and south America. | Last year, the world watched the Middle East as Mosul, Raqqa, Sana'a and Aleppo were razed to the ground. Across Europe, brutal attacks stunned urban populations in Paris, London and Berlin, while gang warfare tore apart the fabric of cities in central and south America. |
| In 2018, Guardian Cities will explore the reality of war in cities today – not merely how it is fought, but how citizens struggle to adapt, and to rebuild stronger than ever. Join the conversation at theguardian.com/cities | In 2018, Guardian Cities will explore the reality of war in cities today – not merely how it is fought, but how citizens struggle to adapt, and to rebuild stronger than ever. Join the conversation at theguardian.com/cities |
| Today, terrorists are prepared to contemplate mass casualties on a larger scale, and religious faith plays a far more central role too. The Islamic State, among others, has demonstrated a desire to outrage, not convince; to disgust and horrify, not to influence. The systematic use of vehicles as weapons is unprecedented. | Today, terrorists are prepared to contemplate mass casualties on a larger scale, and religious faith plays a far more central role too. The Islamic State, among others, has demonstrated a desire to outrage, not convince; to disgust and horrify, not to influence. The systematic use of vehicles as weapons is unprecedented. |
| Yet one element remains constant – through successive waves of leftwing, rightwing, state and non-state, European or US, Middle Eastern or South Asian terrorism, the target remains the same: the city. Why? | Yet one element remains constant – through successive waves of leftwing, rightwing, state and non-state, European or US, Middle Eastern or South Asian terrorism, the target remains the same: the city. Why? |
| ‘The urban area continues the rebellion’ | ‘The urban area continues the rebellion’ |
| Even in the fiercest post-colonial battles of the 1940s and 50s, where confrontations happened in the bush, they were still ultimately about gaining the control of cities. | Even in the fiercest post-colonial battles of the 1940s and 50s, where confrontations happened in the bush, they were still ultimately about gaining the control of cities. |
| The Algerian war of independence against France saw a long and intense insurgency in the hills, forests and fields of the sprawling colony, but it was the contest for power in urban areas that was crucial for nationalist forces. The climactic battle was for Algiers, and more specifically the capital’s Casbah, the labyrinth of alleys and homes of the old city which was the base of insurgents employing terrorist tactics against the French and their supporters. | The Algerian war of independence against France saw a long and intense insurgency in the hills, forests and fields of the sprawling colony, but it was the contest for power in urban areas that was crucial for nationalist forces. The climactic battle was for Algiers, and more specifically the capital’s Casbah, the labyrinth of alleys and homes of the old city which was the base of insurgents employing terrorist tactics against the French and their supporters. |
| One key factor was the arrival of televisions in US and European homes, and radio across the Islamic world. Those fighting colonial regimes immediately recognised the implications. No one was going to report violence in the middle of nowhere. In 1956, the Algerian political activist and revolutionary Ramdane Abane wondered aloud if it was better to kill 10 enemies in a remote gully “when no one will talk of it”, or “a single man in Algiers, which will be noted the next day” by audiences in distant countries who could influence policymakers. | One key factor was the arrival of televisions in US and European homes, and radio across the Islamic world. Those fighting colonial regimes immediately recognised the implications. No one was going to report violence in the middle of nowhere. In 1956, the Algerian political activist and revolutionary Ramdane Abane wondered aloud if it was better to kill 10 enemies in a remote gully “when no one will talk of it”, or “a single man in Algiers, which will be noted the next day” by audiences in distant countries who could influence policymakers. |
| The most intense period of urban terrorist violence in the west was the 1970s and 80s. In 1979, 1,019 attacks were perpetrated in Europe, and around 10 every week over the two decades. If much of the attention in the early part of the decade was grabbed by aerial hijackings or spectacular operations by Middle Eastern organisations. German and Italian leftist terrorists were primarily focused on urban targets. So too were Irish, Basque, Breton and other nationalists, and their diverse counterparts in the US and Latin America. | The most intense period of urban terrorist violence in the west was the 1970s and 80s. In 1979, 1,019 attacks were perpetrated in Europe, and around 10 every week over the two decades. If much of the attention in the early part of the decade was grabbed by aerial hijackings or spectacular operations by Middle Eastern organisations. German and Italian leftist terrorists were primarily focused on urban targets. So too were Irish, Basque, Breton and other nationalists, and their diverse counterparts in the US and Latin America. |
| Through successive waves terrorism, the target remains the same: the city | Through successive waves terrorism, the target remains the same: the city |
| Carlos Marighella, a Brazilian communist revolutionary, turned Mao and Che Guevara’s rural-focused insurgency strategy back to front. “Beginning with the city and the support of the people, the guerrilla war develops rapidly, establishing its rural infrastructure carefully while the urban area continues the rebellion,” he wrote in 1969. | Carlos Marighella, a Brazilian communist revolutionary, turned Mao and Che Guevara’s rural-focused insurgency strategy back to front. “Beginning with the city and the support of the people, the guerrilla war develops rapidly, establishing its rural infrastructure carefully while the urban area continues the rebellion,” he wrote in 1969. |
| Inevitably perhaps, the pioneering attacks which set new standards of lethality for terrorists – such as the bombings by Islamists of embassies and military facilities in Kuwait and Lebanon in the early 1980s – took place in cities. | Inevitably perhaps, the pioneering attacks which set new standards of lethality for terrorists – such as the bombings by Islamists of embassies and military facilities in Kuwait and Lebanon in the early 1980s – took place in cities. |
| Even the Islamist militant violence of the early 1990s, largely focused on the overthrow of local regimes with mujahideen often based in remote areas, involved a significant component of urban terrorism exported to metropolises in western Europe. In Afghanistan in the late 1990s, run-of-the-mill extremist recruits received basic training that equipped them to act as cannon fodder on front lines locally, but the best fighters were selected to receive further instruction in terrorism and urban warfare. | Even the Islamist militant violence of the early 1990s, largely focused on the overthrow of local regimes with mujahideen often based in remote areas, involved a significant component of urban terrorism exported to metropolises in western Europe. In Afghanistan in the late 1990s, run-of-the-mill extremist recruits received basic training that equipped them to act as cannon fodder on front lines locally, but the best fighters were selected to receive further instruction in terrorism and urban warfare. |
| Unsurprisingly, the major strikes from Islamic extremists overseas targeted New York in 1993, Paris in 1994, and Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam in 1998. These heralded the new wave of terrorism of today, and obscured the ongoing threat from right wing terrorists like Timothy McVeigh, who bombed Oklahoma City in 1995. Attackers learned that the psychological impact of an attack on a population was amplified when it took place in a city. Inhabitants naturally extrapolate, if this school can be raided or this train destroyed, or a bus over there hijacked, all in my town, then it can happen to me or my loved ones, too. | Unsurprisingly, the major strikes from Islamic extremists overseas targeted New York in 1993, Paris in 1994, and Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam in 1998. These heralded the new wave of terrorism of today, and obscured the ongoing threat from right wing terrorists like Timothy McVeigh, who bombed Oklahoma City in 1995. Attackers learned that the psychological impact of an attack on a population was amplified when it took place in a city. Inhabitants naturally extrapolate, if this school can be raided or this train destroyed, or a bus over there hijacked, all in my town, then it can happen to me or my loved ones, too. |
| If the urban environment offers practical assistance to the aspirant terrorist – a degree of anonymity, ease of sourcing components or funds, proximity to others in a network, communication facilities, transport – it also offers a wealth of targets. The nature of these virtually guarantees what all terrorists seek: attention. | If the urban environment offers practical assistance to the aspirant terrorist – a degree of anonymity, ease of sourcing components or funds, proximity to others in a network, communication facilities, transport – it also offers a wealth of targets. The nature of these virtually guarantees what all terrorists seek: attention. |
| A new wave of terrorism | A new wave of terrorism |
| Simply striking in a capital anywhere is a bonus for extremists set on undermining confidence in the ability of a state to protect its citizens, or of occupying powers to keep order. Bombing campaigns as diverse as that against the British in Palestine in the mid 1940s, perpetrated by hardline Jewish activists, and that in Baghdad in 2003-2005, which was largely the work of Islamic militants aided by some nationalists and Ba’athist loyalists, show just how effective this can be. | Simply striking in a capital anywhere is a bonus for extremists set on undermining confidence in the ability of a state to protect its citizens, or of occupying powers to keep order. Bombing campaigns as diverse as that against the British in Palestine in the mid 1940s, perpetrated by hardline Jewish activists, and that in Baghdad in 2003-2005, which was largely the work of Islamic militants aided by some nationalists and Ba’athist loyalists, show just how effective this can be. |
| The Zionist Irgun’s bombing of the King David hotel in Jerusalem in 1946, which killed 91 people, dramatically demonstrated the organisation’s capability and the weakness of the British authorities. Just over a year later, the British announced they would effectively abandon their rule in Palestine, allowing the state of Israel to come into being. | The Zionist Irgun’s bombing of the King David hotel in Jerusalem in 1946, which killed 91 people, dramatically demonstrated the organisation’s capability and the weakness of the British authorities. Just over a year later, the British announced they would effectively abandon their rule in Palestine, allowing the state of Israel to come into being. |
| In Baghdad, almost six decades later, the early targets of the militants seemed indiscriminate – the Red Cross, the Jordanian embassy, the United Nations – until it became clear that they were informed by a careful strategy of isolating the US forces from all support or assistance in their project to control the Iraqi capital. Within 18 months, diplomats from even Middle Eastern states, NGOs and the UN had all either fled the country or were confined to the bunker of the Green Zone. The US was on its own, fighting a war it couldn’t win. | In Baghdad, almost six decades later, the early targets of the militants seemed indiscriminate – the Red Cross, the Jordanian embassy, the United Nations – until it became clear that they were informed by a careful strategy of isolating the US forces from all support or assistance in their project to control the Iraqi capital. Within 18 months, diplomats from even Middle Eastern states, NGOs and the UN had all either fled the country or were confined to the bunker of the Green Zone. The US was on its own, fighting a war it couldn’t win. |
| But it is the strikes against ordinary civilians, in pubs and bars and hotels, on trains or buses, that stay most visibly in the public consciousness. In 2004 and 2005, militants targeted commuter transport in Madrid and London. That same year al-Qaida in Iraq launched coordinated bomb attacks on three hotel luxury hotels in Amman, Jordan, killing 60 people at weddings and receptions. | But it is the strikes against ordinary civilians, in pubs and bars and hotels, on trains or buses, that stay most visibly in the public consciousness. In 2004 and 2005, militants targeted commuter transport in Madrid and London. That same year al-Qaida in Iraq launched coordinated bomb attacks on three hotel luxury hotels in Amman, Jordan, killing 60 people at weddings and receptions. |
| In 2008 a group of Pakistani jihadists attacked a luxury hotel, a Jewish centre, tourist cafes and the main train station in Mumbai, India. More than 200 people died. In Nairobi, Kenya, around 70 people were killed in 2013 by the Somalia-based al-Shabaab group in an upscale mall. An Isis gunman shot at a nightclub in Istanbul on New Year’s Eve in 2016. Al-Shabaab struck again in October last year, killing around 500 people in a single massive truck bomb on a crowded street in Mogadishu. In all these instances, terrorists were able to dominate the news agenda for several days. | In 2008 a group of Pakistani jihadists attacked a luxury hotel, a Jewish centre, tourist cafes and the main train station in Mumbai, India. More than 200 people died. In Nairobi, Kenya, around 70 people were killed in 2013 by the Somalia-based al-Shabaab group in an upscale mall. An Isis gunman shot at a nightclub in Istanbul on New Year’s Eve in 2016. Al-Shabaab struck again in October last year, killing around 500 people in a single massive truck bomb on a crowded street in Mogadishu. In all these instances, terrorists were able to dominate the news agenda for several days. |
| The history of terrorism is the history of our cities | The history of terrorism is the history of our cities |
| That such locations are in the line of fire is easily explained, and often comes down to what the city represents. Rightwingers in the US see Washington as the seat of corrupt, evil power and New York or Los Angeles as decadent and polluting. | That such locations are in the line of fire is easily explained, and often comes down to what the city represents. Rightwingers in the US see Washington as the seat of corrupt, evil power and New York or Los Angeles as decadent and polluting. |
| Islamic militants see similar perils in urbanisation. Often there is a historical factor; in Afghanistan, militants see Kabul as a city that has collaborated with successive overseas powers from the Soviets to the US. Or an ethnic or religious one; in Iraq, Sunni communities now see Baghdad as a hub of Shia dominance. The texts of many contemporary extremists reveal an outright animosity towards cities and urbanisation. | Islamic militants see similar perils in urbanisation. Often there is a historical factor; in Afghanistan, militants see Kabul as a city that has collaborated with successive overseas powers from the Soviets to the US. Or an ethnic or religious one; in Iraq, Sunni communities now see Baghdad as a hub of Shia dominance. The texts of many contemporary extremists reveal an outright animosity towards cities and urbanisation. |
| These are often contrasted with a lost rural idyll of social harmony and justice which, though entirely invented, is a powerful vision. Mohammed Atta, the Egyptian leader of the 9/11 hijackers was a student of town planning whose master’s dissertation focused on the destruction of old parts of Aleppo to allow modern, western-style development. He saw cities as a battlefield between the old and the new, but beyond that, between an authentic Islamic and Middle Eastern identity and a westernised, faithless one. | These are often contrasted with a lost rural idyll of social harmony and justice which, though entirely invented, is a powerful vision. Mohammed Atta, the Egyptian leader of the 9/11 hijackers was a student of town planning whose master’s dissertation focused on the destruction of old parts of Aleppo to allow modern, western-style development. He saw cities as a battlefield between the old and the new, but beyond that, between an authentic Islamic and Middle Eastern identity and a westernised, faithless one. |
| This vision of cities as a conflict zone, a place of moral and political contest, is not surprising. If a terrorist wants to strike at a way of life, then modern cities are the places to do this. The London 7/7 strikes in 2005 took place on tube trains and on a bus. But, whether selected consciously or not, all – King’s Cross, Edgware Road, Aldgate East and Tavistock Square – were representative in different ways of the cultural diversity of the UK’s capital. Recent attacks in the Sahel have hit hotels and restaurants patronised by westerners and wealthy locals. One reason investigators cited for the selection a nightclub in Bali for an attack in 2002 was that few local people were rarely allowed in. | This vision of cities as a conflict zone, a place of moral and political contest, is not surprising. If a terrorist wants to strike at a way of life, then modern cities are the places to do this. The London 7/7 strikes in 2005 took place on tube trains and on a bus. But, whether selected consciously or not, all – King’s Cross, Edgware Road, Aldgate East and Tavistock Square – were representative in different ways of the cultural diversity of the UK’s capital. Recent attacks in the Sahel have hit hotels and restaurants patronised by westerners and wealthy locals. One reason investigators cited for the selection a nightclub in Bali for an attack in 2002 was that few local people were rarely allowed in. |
| Yet beyond all of this, there may be a more fundamental reason why cities have always been so important to terrorists and to terrorism. | Yet beyond all of this, there may be a more fundamental reason why cities have always been so important to terrorists and to terrorism. |
| Most experts now date the emergence of terrorism as we know it today to the second half of the 19th century. There were earlier violent activists which some suggest qualify as terrorists – the Jewish zealots who took on the Romans in early the imperial province of Judea in the first century, the medieval Assassins of the 12th century, even the religious Thuggee cult from the 14th to the 18th centuries in what was to become India. But the consensus is that it was around the time of the Paddington station attack that the strategy of using violence to sway public opinion though fear became widespread among actors such as the anarchists, leftists and nationalists looking to bring about dramatic social and political change. | Most experts now date the emergence of terrorism as we know it today to the second half of the 19th century. There were earlier violent activists which some suggest qualify as terrorists – the Jewish zealots who took on the Romans in early the imperial province of Judea in the first century, the medieval Assassins of the 12th century, even the religious Thuggee cult from the 14th to the 18th centuries in what was to become India. But the consensus is that it was around the time of the Paddington station attack that the strategy of using violence to sway public opinion though fear became widespread among actors such as the anarchists, leftists and nationalists looking to bring about dramatic social and political change. |
| This strategy depended on two developments which mark the modern age: democracy and communications. Without the media, developing apace through the 19th century as literacy rates soared and cheap news publications began to achieve mass circulations, impact would be small. Without democracy, there was no point in trying to frighten a population and thus influence policymakers. Absolutist rulers, like subsequent dictators, could simply ignore the pressure from the terrified masses. Of course, a third great development of this period was conditions in the modern city itself. | This strategy depended on two developments which mark the modern age: democracy and communications. Without the media, developing apace through the 19th century as literacy rates soared and cheap news publications began to achieve mass circulations, impact would be small. Without democracy, there was no point in trying to frighten a population and thus influence policymakers. Absolutist rulers, like subsequent dictators, could simply ignore the pressure from the terrified masses. Of course, a third great development of this period was conditions in the modern city itself. |
| Could the terrorism which is so terribly familiar to us today have evolved without the development of the metropolis as we now know it? This seems almost impossible to imagine. Even the terror of the French revolution – Le Terreur – which gives us the modern term terrorism, was most obvious in the centre of Paris where the guillotine sliced heads from a relatively small number of aristocrats in order to strike fear into a much larger number of people. | Could the terrorism which is so terribly familiar to us today have evolved without the development of the metropolis as we now know it? This seems almost impossible to imagine. Even the terror of the French revolution – Le Terreur – which gives us the modern term terrorism, was most obvious in the centre of Paris where the guillotine sliced heads from a relatively small number of aristocrats in order to strike fear into a much larger number of people. |
| The history of terrorism is thus the history of our cities. The history of our cities, at least over the last 150 years or so, is in part the history of terrorism. This is a deadly, inextricable link that is unlikely to be broken anytime soon. | The history of terrorism is thus the history of our cities. The history of our cities, at least over the last 150 years or so, is in part the history of terrorism. This is a deadly, inextricable link that is unlikely to be broken anytime soon. |
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