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Was America Duped at Khe Sanh? Was America Duped at Khe Sanh?
(2 days later)
At the time, he seemed like the perfect fit: a tall, articulate, handsome paladin. His posture was always ramrod straight, his uniform constantly and precisely starched. He had punched all the right tickets: Eagle Scout, first captain of the West Point class of 1936, commander of both the elite 504th Parachute Infantry of the 82nd Airborne Division and later the 101st Airborne Division, superintendent of West Point and honorary member of the Society of Cincinnati. So when Lyndon Johnson went looking for someone to command the overall anti-Communist crusade in Vietnam in 1964, Gen. William Westmoreland’s name was at the top of a shortlist.At the time, he seemed like the perfect fit: a tall, articulate, handsome paladin. His posture was always ramrod straight, his uniform constantly and precisely starched. He had punched all the right tickets: Eagle Scout, first captain of the West Point class of 1936, commander of both the elite 504th Parachute Infantry of the 82nd Airborne Division and later the 101st Airborne Division, superintendent of West Point and honorary member of the Society of Cincinnati. So when Lyndon Johnson went looking for someone to command the overall anti-Communist crusade in Vietnam in 1964, Gen. William Westmoreland’s name was at the top of a shortlist.
Johnson had taken over the presidency, and the challenges in Southeast Asia, from John Kennedy in November 1963. Kennedy’s plan to contain Communism in that part of the world had been to supply aid — both monetary and in the form of American military advisers — to the anti-Communist regime of President Nho Dinh Diem of South Vietnam. By the time of Kennedy’s death, the United States had more than 16,000 soldiers advising the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, and it wasn’t working. At the Battle of Ap Bac, in January 1963, a force of 1,500 South Vietnamese, despite superior firepower, was decimated by a few hundred Vietcong. Johnson’s top aides offered two solutions to the American president: get in or get out. Clad in the panoply of American exceptionalism, Johnson opted for the former and turned to Westmoreland to lead the charge at the head of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam — MACV for short. Johnson had taken over the presidency, and the challenges in Southeast Asia, from John Kennedy in November 1963. Kennedy’s plan to contain Communism in that part of the world had been to supply aid — both monetary and in the form of American military advisers — to the anti-Communist regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam. By the time of Kennedy’s death, the United States had more than 16,000 soldiers advising the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, and it wasn’t working. At the Battle of Ap Bac, in January 1963, a force of 1,500 South Vietnamese, despite superior firepower, was decimated by a few hundred Vietcong. Johnson’s top aides offered two solutions to the American president: get in or get out. Clad in the panoply of American exceptionalism, Johnson opted for the former and turned to Westmoreland to lead the charge at the head of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam — MACV for short.
In the first major engagement under Westmoreland’s leadership, the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley in November 1965, American forces killed 10 enemy soldiers for every one of their own lost. The hard-fought victory persuaded Westmoreland to adopt a strategy of attrition — if American troops killed enough North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, the enemy would have to sue for peace. Westmoreland explained his plan to an old friend, Senator Fritz Hollings of South Carolina. “Westy,” Hollings explained, “the American people don’t care about the 10, they care about the one.”In the first major engagement under Westmoreland’s leadership, the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley in November 1965, American forces killed 10 enemy soldiers for every one of their own lost. The hard-fought victory persuaded Westmoreland to adopt a strategy of attrition — if American troops killed enough North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, the enemy would have to sue for peace. Westmoreland explained his plan to an old friend, Senator Fritz Hollings of South Carolina. “Westy,” Hollings explained, “the American people don’t care about the 10, they care about the one.”
Westmoreland’s opposite number in North Vietnam, Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, had also punched the right tickets. A former history teacher and a self-taught military strategist, he had led the Viet Minh resistance against the Japanese during World War II and later commanded the Viet Minh troops who defeated the French forces at Dien Bien Phu in 1953. Considered one of the greatest military strategists of the 20th century, Giap had as his goal not a classic military victory, but rather, as he wrote later, “to break the will of the American government” — just as he had done against the French. Westmoreland’s opposite number in North Vietnam, Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, had also punched the right tickets. A former history teacher and a self-taught military strategist, he had led the Viet Minh resistance against the Japanese during World War II and later commanded the Viet Minh troops who defeated the French forces at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Considered one of the greatest military strategists of the 20th century, Giap had as his goal not a classic military victory, but rather, as he wrote later, “to break the will of the American government” — just as he had done against the French.
In late 1967, Giap concentrated some 40,000 soldiers in the hills of northwest South Vietnam and orchestrated a series of assaults on a string of American combat bases in the highlands, not far from a Marine base called Khe Sanh, which the North besieged in January 1968. Giap later called these attacks a “diversion” to trick the Americans into moving forces from the populated areas to defensive positions in the hinterland. Most American leaders fell for it; one of the few who didn’t, Adm. U. S. Grant Sharp, Westmoreland’s nominal superior, presciently argued that “the Communist strategy continued to reflect an effort to draw Allied forces into remote areas,” therefore “leaving the populated areas unprotected.”In late 1967, Giap concentrated some 40,000 soldiers in the hills of northwest South Vietnam and orchestrated a series of assaults on a string of American combat bases in the highlands, not far from a Marine base called Khe Sanh, which the North besieged in January 1968. Giap later called these attacks a “diversion” to trick the Americans into moving forces from the populated areas to defensive positions in the hinterland. Most American leaders fell for it; one of the few who didn’t, Adm. U. S. Grant Sharp, Westmoreland’s nominal superior, presciently argued that “the Communist strategy continued to reflect an effort to draw Allied forces into remote areas,” therefore “leaving the populated areas unprotected.”
To Westmoreland, the North Vietnamese gambit looked more like the beginning of the end for the North. Called home that fall to convince America that the war was close to being won, he famously claimed, “I begin to see the light at the end of the tunnel” — coincidentally, nearly the same language used by his French predecessor, Gen. Henry Navarre, not long before Dien Bien Phu. For “the light” to glow full orbed, it was essential that the Marine position at Khe Sanh be held.To Westmoreland, the North Vietnamese gambit looked more like the beginning of the end for the North. Called home that fall to convince America that the war was close to being won, he famously claimed, “I begin to see the light at the end of the tunnel” — coincidentally, nearly the same language used by his French predecessor, Gen. Henry Navarre, not long before Dien Bien Phu. For “the light” to glow full orbed, it was essential that the Marine position at Khe Sanh be held.
Both Westmoreland and Johnson quickly became obsessed with Khe Sanh; the president even had a scale model of the outpost built in the Situation Room of the White House so that he could track the course of the battle daily. He also demanded a signed affirmation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the base could and would be successfully defended. For both men, the landmark French defeat — likewise a siege against a hilly outpost far to the north — hung over them heavily. “I don’t want any damn Dien Bien Phu,” Johnson told his staff in 1967, while Westmoreland requested a thorough analysis of the 1954 battle “to ascertain that we are taking all countering actions possible in relationship to the analogous Khe Sanh situation,” according to a MACV memo. Khe Sanh likewise took hold of the American public, which bought into the notion of a pivotal battle that would leave one side sprawling and the other limping to final defeat.Both Westmoreland and Johnson quickly became obsessed with Khe Sanh; the president even had a scale model of the outpost built in the Situation Room of the White House so that he could track the course of the battle daily. He also demanded a signed affirmation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the base could and would be successfully defended. For both men, the landmark French defeat — likewise a siege against a hilly outpost far to the north — hung over them heavily. “I don’t want any damn Dien Bien Phu,” Johnson told his staff in 1967, while Westmoreland requested a thorough analysis of the 1954 battle “to ascertain that we are taking all countering actions possible in relationship to the analogous Khe Sanh situation,” according to a MACV memo. Khe Sanh likewise took hold of the American public, which bought into the notion of a pivotal battle that would leave one side sprawling and the other limping to final defeat.
Westmoreland threw everything he could at Khe Sanh. During the 77-day siege, American jets flew more than 24,000 sorties, dropping 110,000 tons of bombs on the enemy positions. At one point, Westmoreland even considered the use of tactical nuclear weapons to defend the Marine garrison.Westmoreland threw everything he could at Khe Sanh. During the 77-day siege, American jets flew more than 24,000 sorties, dropping 110,000 tons of bombs on the enemy positions. At one point, Westmoreland even considered the use of tactical nuclear weapons to defend the Marine garrison.
But Khe Sanh was only a prelude to an even bigger campaign: an all-out and unexpected assault on the more densely populated areas in the South, which, Hanoi hoped, would trigger a general uprising against the South Vietnamese government and the Americans. The attack, during the cease-fire for the lunar new year, known as Tet, involved close to 80,000 North Vietnamese and Vietcong fighters who had sneaked into nearly 100 hamlets, villages, cities and towns across South Vietnam.But Khe Sanh was only a prelude to an even bigger campaign: an all-out and unexpected assault on the more densely populated areas in the South, which, Hanoi hoped, would trigger a general uprising against the South Vietnamese government and the Americans. The attack, during the cease-fire for the lunar new year, known as Tet, involved close to 80,000 North Vietnamese and Vietcong fighters who had sneaked into nearly 100 hamlets, villages, cities and towns across South Vietnam.
Though caught off guard, the Americans and their allies reacted quickly and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy force, an estimated 37,000 in the first few weeks of fighting (separate phases of the offensive, which ran into the summer, brought their losses above 100,000). But it came at great cost: The South Vietnamese lost 21,000 men; the Americans and other allies lost nearly 24,000; and tens of thousands of civilians were killed or wounded. A suicide squad of 19 Vietcong sappers breached the American Embassy grounds in Saigon — allegedly one of the most secure locations in South Vietnam. Many of the buildings in the ancient capital of Hue were totally razed during a monthlong battle, resulting in thousands of deaths and tens of thousands of refugees.Though caught off guard, the Americans and their allies reacted quickly and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy force, an estimated 37,000 in the first few weeks of fighting (separate phases of the offensive, which ran into the summer, brought their losses above 100,000). But it came at great cost: The South Vietnamese lost 21,000 men; the Americans and other allies lost nearly 24,000; and tens of thousands of civilians were killed or wounded. A suicide squad of 19 Vietcong sappers breached the American Embassy grounds in Saigon — allegedly one of the most secure locations in South Vietnam. Many of the buildings in the ancient capital of Hue were totally razed during a monthlong battle, resulting in thousands of deaths and tens of thousands of refugees.
American forces broke the siege of Khe Sanh in April 1968 but withdrew a few months later. Afterward, North Vietnamese forces moved into the area, unopposed, and held it until the end of the war. American forces broke the siege of Khe Sanh in April 1968 but withdrew a few months later. Afterward, North Vietnamese forces moved into the area, unopposed, and held it until 1971.
Was Westmoreland duped? Was the attack on the Marines at Khe Sanh simply a ruse to beguile the sclerotic Americans, and especially their obdurate leadership, into believing that Giap was attempting a repeat of the Dien Bien Phu victory? Or were they two separate campaigns? After all, Giap was skeptical of the Tet offensive and paid meticulous attention to Khe Sanh (and, conveniently, was sent to Hungary for medical treatment in the fall of 1967, as the planners behind Tet put the final touches on their offensive).Was Westmoreland duped? Was the attack on the Marines at Khe Sanh simply a ruse to beguile the sclerotic Americans, and especially their obdurate leadership, into believing that Giap was attempting a repeat of the Dien Bien Phu victory? Or were they two separate campaigns? After all, Giap was skeptical of the Tet offensive and paid meticulous attention to Khe Sanh (and, conveniently, was sent to Hungary for medical treatment in the fall of 1967, as the planners behind Tet put the final touches on their offensive).
Duped or not, Westmoreland was replaced soon after the Tet offensive ended. The well-respected CBS newsman Walter Cronkite — a former supporter of the war — now thought the best that the United States could hope for was a “draw.” Johnson chose not to run for a second term as president, and Richard Nixon was elected that fall primarily because of his promise to end the fighting. Whether Khe Sanh and Tet were part of the same campaign, they contributed equally to the emotional collapse of American support for the war, and for their leaders.Duped or not, Westmoreland was replaced soon after the Tet offensive ended. The well-respected CBS newsman Walter Cronkite — a former supporter of the war — now thought the best that the United States could hope for was a “draw.” Johnson chose not to run for a second term as president, and Richard Nixon was elected that fall primarily because of his promise to end the fighting. Whether Khe Sanh and Tet were part of the same campaign, they contributed equally to the emotional collapse of American support for the war, and for their leaders.