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| Milton Mollen, 97, Dies; Investigated Police Corruption in New York | Milton Mollen, 97, Dies; Investigated Police Corruption in New York |
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| Milton Mollen, who led a commission that found that the New York City Police Department had been “willfully blind” to drug-related corruption by organized bands of rogue officers in the 1980s and early ’90s, died on Monday at his home in Manhattan. He was 97. | Milton Mollen, who led a commission that found that the New York City Police Department had been “willfully blind” to drug-related corruption by organized bands of rogue officers in the 1980s and early ’90s, died on Monday at his home in Manhattan. He was 97. |
| His son, Scott, confirmed the death. | His son, Scott, confirmed the death. |
| The Mollen Commission was established by Mayor David N. Dinkins in 1992 after five officers in two Brooklyn precincts were arrested by the Suffolk County police and accused of working as a ring to buy cocaine in drug-infested neighborhoods in their precincts and resell it on Long Island. | The Mollen Commission was established by Mayor David N. Dinkins in 1992 after five officers in two Brooklyn precincts were arrested by the Suffolk County police and accused of working as a ring to buy cocaine in drug-infested neighborhoods in their precincts and resell it on Long Island. |
| It quickly emerged that over several years the New York Police Department had repeatedly received complaints that one of the officers, Michael Dowd, was dealing drugs but had nonetheless allowed him to remain on the force, until he was arrested by the Suffolk County authorities. | It quickly emerged that over several years the New York Police Department had repeatedly received complaints that one of the officers, Michael Dowd, was dealing drugs but had nonetheless allowed him to remain on the force, until he was arrested by the Suffolk County authorities. |
| Reports also surfaced that federal investigators were pursuing allegations of corruption by officers in other city precincts. | Reports also surfaced that federal investigators were pursuing allegations of corruption by officers in other city precincts. |
| When Mr. Dinkins called on him to head the commission, Mr. Mollen had months before stepped down as deputy mayor for public safety, after a long public career in which he had been a top city housing official in the 1960s and a high-ranking state judge in the 1970s and ’80s. | When Mr. Dinkins called on him to head the commission, Mr. Mollen had months before stepped down as deputy mayor for public safety, after a long public career in which he had been a top city housing official in the 1960s and a high-ranking state judge in the 1970s and ’80s. |
| His mission was to assess the extent of police corruption in the city and the department’s efforts to combat it. | His mission was to assess the extent of police corruption in the city and the department’s efforts to combat it. |
| In reports in 1993 and 1994, the Mollen Commission concluded that since the mid-’80s police corruption had been rife in five precincts across the city, high-crime areas in Brooklyn, Manhattan and the Bronx heavily populated by poor blacks and Hispanics. Groups of up to a dozen officers had, among other crimes, stolen drugs or cash from dealers, often beating them up, and then trafficked in the narcotics themselves, the commission found. | In reports in 1993 and 1994, the Mollen Commission concluded that since the mid-’80s police corruption had been rife in five precincts across the city, high-crime areas in Brooklyn, Manhattan and the Bronx heavily populated by poor blacks and Hispanics. Groups of up to a dozen officers had, among other crimes, stolen drugs or cash from dealers, often beating them up, and then trafficked in the narcotics themselves, the commission found. |
| The finding that corruption was confined to small “crews,” as Mr. Mollen called them, in a handful of precincts contrasted with the conclusion of a similar panel in the 1970s, the Knapp Commission, which said the corruption it found had been an “extensive, departmentwide phenomenon.” | The finding that corruption was confined to small “crews,” as Mr. Mollen called them, in a handful of precincts contrasted with the conclusion of a similar panel in the 1970s, the Knapp Commission, which said the corruption it found had been an “extensive, departmentwide phenomenon.” |
| Like the Knapp Commission, however, the Mollen panel concluded that police officials had fallen short in fighting the criminality in its ranks. | Like the Knapp Commission, however, the Mollen panel concluded that police officials had fallen short in fighting the criminality in its ranks. |
| The Mollen Commission found a “deep-rooted institutional reluctance to uncover corruption in the department,” and faulted “willfully blind supervisors” who “fear the consequences of a corruption scandal more than corruption itself.” It held that the police commissioners during the half-dozen years it examine were ultimately responsible for the failure. The officials had served under Mr. Dinkins and his predecessor, Edward I. Koch, and had by then left the police force. | The Mollen Commission found a “deep-rooted institutional reluctance to uncover corruption in the department,” and faulted “willfully blind supervisors” who “fear the consequences of a corruption scandal more than corruption itself.” It held that the police commissioners during the half-dozen years it examine were ultimately responsible for the failure. The officials had served under Mr. Dinkins and his predecessor, Edward I. Koch, and had by then left the police force. |
| In releasing the report, Mr. Mollen described those officials as having been “honest officers” who had lacked “a sense of commitment to combating corruption to the fullest extent.” | In releasing the report, Mr. Mollen described those officials as having been “honest officers” who had lacked “a sense of commitment to combating corruption to the fullest extent.” |
| The former commissioners insisted that they had not been lax. | The former commissioners insisted that they had not been lax. |
| In its final report in 1994, the panel — officially the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the Police Department — said that the corrupt officers had established “distinctive corruption methods” in each of the five precincts. | In its final report in 1994, the panel — officially the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the Police Department — said that the corrupt officers had established “distinctive corruption methods” in each of the five precincts. |
| But it also found what it called “predominant patterns”: “Cops committing theft from street dealers, from radio runs, from warrantless searches and seizures, from legitimate raids and searches, from car stops and drug ‘couriers’ ” and in off-duty robberies, as well as “cops protecting and assisting narcotics traffickers” and dealing and using drugs. | But it also found what it called “predominant patterns”: “Cops committing theft from street dealers, from radio runs, from warrantless searches and seizures, from legitimate raids and searches, from car stops and drug ‘couriers’ ” and in off-duty robberies, as well as “cops protecting and assisting narcotics traffickers” and dealing and using drugs. |
| Mr. Dowd, the much-accused officer who was arrested by the Suffolk County authorities, was a star witness at the Mollen Commission’s hearings. He portrayed himself as an outlaw in uniform for most of the previous decade, guilty of much more than the drug dealing for which he was originally arrested. | Mr. Dowd, the much-accused officer who was arrested by the Suffolk County authorities, was a star witness at the Mollen Commission’s hearings. He portrayed himself as an outlaw in uniform for most of the previous decade, guilty of much more than the drug dealing for which he was originally arrested. |
| He said that while working out of a precinct in the East New York section of Brooklyn — one of several precincts he had worked in — he often raced to the scenes of assaults and shootings outside his patrol sector because he thought the calls might involve a drug site from which he could steal drugs and money. He also testified that he and a partner had provided protection for a drug dealer, who paid them $8,000 a week | He said that while working out of a precinct in the East New York section of Brooklyn — one of several precincts he had worked in — he often raced to the scenes of assaults and shootings outside his patrol sector because he thought the calls might involve a drug site from which he could steal drugs and money. He also testified that he and a partner had provided protection for a drug dealer, who paid them $8,000 a week |
| Mr. Dowd pleaded guilty to federal corruption charges and was sentenced to 11 to 14 years in prison. | Mr. Dowd pleaded guilty to federal corruption charges and was sentenced to 11 to 14 years in prison. |
| Another key witness, Officer Barry T. Brown, who testified about corruption in the 30th Precinct in West Harlem, admitted a year later that he had lied under oath in several criminal court cases, though his testimony to the commission was not at issue. | Another key witness, Officer Barry T. Brown, who testified about corruption in the 30th Precinct in West Harlem, admitted a year later that he had lied under oath in several criminal court cases, though his testimony to the commission was not at issue. |
| Mr. Mollen, having to respond to the officer’s admission, said he still considered him a hero for helping to expose corruption in the precinct, 30 of whose officers were convicted at trial or pleaded guilty in federal prosecutions. | Mr. Mollen, having to respond to the officer’s admission, said he still considered him a hero for helping to expose corruption in the precinct, 30 of whose officers were convicted at trial or pleaded guilty in federal prosecutions. |
| Mr. Mollen was not always on the side of investigating events. His actions, and those of Mayor Dinkins and other top City Hall officials, were scrutinized by state investigators looking into four days of violence in Crown Heights, Brooklyn, in 1991. Roving bands of black youths had attacked Hasidic Jews, killing one, after a car driven by another Hasidic man had accidentally struck and killed a black child. | Mr. Mollen was not always on the side of investigating events. His actions, and those of Mayor Dinkins and other top City Hall officials, were scrutinized by state investigators looking into four days of violence in Crown Heights, Brooklyn, in 1991. Roving bands of black youths had attacked Hasidic Jews, killing one, after a car driven by another Hasidic man had accidentally struck and killed a black child. |
| Hasidic leaders and their supporters complained that the response to the violence by City Hall and the police had been inadequate. (The state investigators’ report would later agree.) | Hasidic leaders and their supporters complained that the response to the violence by City Hall and the police had been inadequate. (The state investigators’ report would later agree.) |
| Mr. Mollen told the investigators that though he had been the deputy mayor for public safety, he could not, as the violence unfolded, engage with the police regarding its actions because of an “institutional problem.” As he explained it, from the time he had assumed his post he had been viewed by police officials as a meddler in the department’s business. | Mr. Mollen told the investigators that though he had been the deputy mayor for public safety, he could not, as the violence unfolded, engage with the police regarding its actions because of an “institutional problem.” As he explained it, from the time he had assumed his post he had been viewed by police officials as a meddler in the department’s business. |
| Milton Mollen was born in Brooklyn on Jan. 25, 1920, to Hyman and Esther Mollen. His father was a produce merchant. | Milton Mollen was born in Brooklyn on Jan. 25, 1920, to Hyman and Esther Mollen. His father was a produce merchant. |
| In World War II, Mr. Mollen, serving in the Army Air Forces, was a navigator on bombing run over Nazi-occupied France in July 1944 when his plane was shot down. He bailed out, was captured, and escaped from a German prison camp in April 1945. | In World War II, Mr. Mollen, serving in the Army Air Forces, was a navigator on bombing run over Nazi-occupied France in July 1944 when his plane was shot down. He bailed out, was captured, and escaped from a German prison camp in April 1945. |
| After the war he attended St. John’s University, enrolling in its School of Commerce and then its School of Law, getting his law degree in 1950. After two years in private practice, he went to work as a lawyer in the City Corporation Counsel’s office, rising to executive assistant corporation counsel. | After the war he attended St. John’s University, enrolling in its School of Commerce and then its School of Law, getting his law degree in 1950. After two years in private practice, he went to work as a lawyer in the City Corporation Counsel’s office, rising to executive assistant corporation counsel. |
| Mr. Mollen was named general counsel to the city’s Housing and Redevelopment Board in 1960 and was made chairman of it in 1962 by Mayor Robert F. Wagner, putting him in one of the hottest seats in the administration. As it continued to push urban renewal projects, the board was being attacked as wrecking the character of neighborhoods. | Mr. Mollen was named general counsel to the city’s Housing and Redevelopment Board in 1960 and was made chairman of it in 1962 by Mayor Robert F. Wagner, putting him in one of the hottest seats in the administration. As it continued to push urban renewal projects, the board was being attacked as wrecking the character of neighborhoods. |
| The next year, Mr. Mollen said the city would also devote resources to preserving buildings suitable for rehabilitation. | The next year, Mr. Mollen said the city would also devote resources to preserving buildings suitable for rehabilitation. |
| In 1965, as the Wagner administration neared its end after 12 years, Mr. Mollen, known as a staunch Democrat, stunned and angered many Democrats when he decided to run for city comptroller on a ticket headed by John V. Lindsay, a Republican congressman from Manhattan who was seeking the mayoralty on the Republican and Liberal lines. | In 1965, as the Wagner administration neared its end after 12 years, Mr. Mollen, known as a staunch Democrat, stunned and angered many Democrats when he decided to run for city comptroller on a ticket headed by John V. Lindsay, a Republican congressman from Manhattan who was seeking the mayoralty on the Republican and Liberal lines. |
| Some critics asserted that Mr. Mollen had taken this step after being refused a place on the ticket of a Democratic mayoral contender. Mr. Mollen denied that and said he would remain a Democrat, but he also said that the city needed a united response to the challenges it faced. Mr. Lindsay won, Mr. Mollen lost, and the new mayor appointed Mr. Mollen a Criminal Court judge. | Some critics asserted that Mr. Mollen had taken this step after being refused a place on the ticket of a Democratic mayoral contender. Mr. Mollen denied that and said he would remain a Democrat, but he also said that the city needed a united response to the challenges it faced. Mr. Lindsay won, Mr. Mollen lost, and the new mayor appointed Mr. Mollen a Criminal Court judge. |
| Mr. Mollen later served as a judge, and then as the administrative judge, in State Supreme Court in Brooklyn. In 1976 he was elevated to the state’s Appellate Division, Second Department, which hears appeals from cases arising in three boroughs as well as some suburban counties. He was the division’s presiding justice from 1978 to 1990. | Mr. Mollen later served as a judge, and then as the administrative judge, in State Supreme Court in Brooklyn. In 1976 he was elevated to the state’s Appellate Division, Second Department, which hears appeals from cases arising in three boroughs as well as some suburban counties. He was the division’s presiding justice from 1978 to 1990. |
| After his four decades away from private law practice, Mr. Mollen returned to it after the Mollen Commission ended its work in 1994. | After his four decades away from private law practice, Mr. Mollen returned to it after the Mollen Commission ended its work in 1994. |
| He later founded the New York office of Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS), which calls itself the largest private alternative dispute resolution provider in the world. | He later founded the New York office of Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS), which calls itself the largest private alternative dispute resolution provider in the world. |
| Mr. Mollen’s wife, the former Bebe Miller, whom he married in 1943, died in 1995. In addition to his son he is survived by a daughter, Ellen Mollen; two grandchildren; and three great-grandchildren. | Mr. Mollen’s wife, the former Bebe Miller, whom he married in 1943, died in 1995. In addition to his son he is survived by a daughter, Ellen Mollen; two grandchildren; and three great-grandchildren. |
| Mr. Mollen’s investigation of police corruption did not sour him on police officers in general. He held to the bad-apples conclusion of his commission’s report. If anything, his brief was with the police brass. | |
| That was the case when he was deputy mayor and was asked to investigate an incident at a City College gymnasium in Harlem in 1991 in which nine young people were crushed to death as thousands of fans tried to push their way into a charity basketball game featuring rap artists. | |
| Mr. Mollen criticized the captain in charge for “passivity” and “questionable judgment” in ordering officers to remain outside the gym as a chaotic scene developed inside. And he was bewildered, The New Yorker magazine reported in 1994, when the police department, in its own report, absolved itself of any failures. | |
| But he had high praise for three officers who had disobeyed orders and escorted emergency medical technicians into the gym. | |
| “Lovely kids,” he told The New Yorker. “They felt they had to do it. They just couldn’t let this thing happen inside and look the other way. There are a great many cops like that. The leadership is where the real problem lies.” |