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| The End of the Left and the Right as We Knew Them | The End of the Left and the Right as We Knew Them |
| (about 1 hour later) | |
| By now it has become quite clear that conservative parties in Europe and the United States have been gaining strength from white voters who have been mobilized around issues related to nationalism — resistance to open borders and to third-world immigration. In the United States, this development has been exacerbated by ongoing conservative recruitment on issues of race that has reinforced opposition to immigration. On the liberal side, the Democratic Party and the center-left European parties have been allied in favor of globalization, if we define globalization as receptivity to open borders, the expansion of local and nationalistic perspectives and support for a less rigid social order and for liberal cultural, immigration and trade policies. In recent decades, these parties, both in Europe and in the United States have begun to include and reflect the views of large numbers of well-educated elites — relatively affluent knowledge or creative class workers – in alliance with predominantly nonwhite minority constituencies of the less well-off. | By now it has become quite clear that conservative parties in Europe and the United States have been gaining strength from white voters who have been mobilized around issues related to nationalism — resistance to open borders and to third-world immigration. In the United States, this development has been exacerbated by ongoing conservative recruitment on issues of race that has reinforced opposition to immigration. On the liberal side, the Democratic Party and the center-left European parties have been allied in favor of globalization, if we define globalization as receptivity to open borders, the expansion of local and nationalistic perspectives and support for a less rigid social order and for liberal cultural, immigration and trade policies. In recent decades, these parties, both in Europe and in the United States have begun to include and reflect the views of large numbers of well-educated elites — relatively affluent knowledge or creative class workers – in alliance with predominantly nonwhite minority constituencies of the less well-off. |
| Ewald Engelen, a social scientist at the University of Amsterdam, argues that the old paradigm of a left arguing for strong government intervention and a right preferring market solutions to social problems has been replaced. “Today,” he told Al Jazeera,“we see that the dominant dichotomy has become globalism versus nationalism.” | Ewald Engelen, a social scientist at the University of Amsterdam, argues that the old paradigm of a left arguing for strong government intervention and a right preferring market solutions to social problems has been replaced. “Today,” he told Al Jazeera,“we see that the dominant dichotomy has become globalism versus nationalism.” |
| Stewart Patrick, the director of the International Institutions and Global Governance Program at the Council on Foreign Relations, elaborated on these trends in an email: | Stewart Patrick, the director of the International Institutions and Global Governance Program at the Council on Foreign Relations, elaborated on these trends in an email: |
| In the United States, Sean McElwee, a policy analyst at the liberal think tank Demos, and Jason McDaniel, a professor of political science at San Francisco State University, examined data from American National Election Studies and reported in The Nation that | In the United States, Sean McElwee, a policy analyst at the liberal think tank Demos, and Jason McDaniel, a professor of political science at San Francisco State University, examined data from American National Election Studies and reported in The Nation that |
| In their essay, McElwee and McDaniel graphed data documenting their findings, which is reproduced in the accompanying chart. White voters who supported Trump were decidedly strong on measures of anti-black affect and hostility to the integration of immigrants into the population of the United States. | In their essay, McElwee and McDaniel graphed data documenting their findings, which is reproduced in the accompanying chart. White voters who supported Trump were decidedly strong on measures of anti-black affect and hostility to the integration of immigrants into the population of the United States. |
| Elections over the past two years here and in Britain, Austria, France and the Netherlands have demonstrated the depth of this transformation of the organized left and the organized right. Whatever the outcome of the voting in a particular country, a clear pattern appears. The emerging or nascent partisan divide has a strong cultural subtext: for or against “traditional values”; young versus old; rural versus urban; the college educated versus those without degrees; blue collar against white collar; us versus them; whites versus nonwhites; immigrant versus native born; European versus non-European. | Elections over the past two years here and in Britain, Austria, France and the Netherlands have demonstrated the depth of this transformation of the organized left and the organized right. Whatever the outcome of the voting in a particular country, a clear pattern appears. The emerging or nascent partisan divide has a strong cultural subtext: for or against “traditional values”; young versus old; rural versus urban; the college educated versus those without degrees; blue collar against white collar; us versus them; whites versus nonwhites; immigrant versus native born; European versus non-European. |
| The rise of an affluent left — sometimes triumphant, sometimes not — can be seen in the victories of Emmanuel Macron and his new La République en Marche (the Republic on the Move) party in France; in the surprise showing of Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party in the June 8 parliamentary elections in Britain; in the composition of the electorate that unsuccessfully backed Hillary Clinton; and in the victories of Alexander Van der Bellen, president of Austria, and of Mark Rutte’s People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy in the Netherlands. | |
| In much of Europe, although not in Britain, the growth of the populist right has devastated once powerful labor and social democratic parties on the left. In the Austrian presidential election, for example, the success of the far right Freedom Party resulted in a fourth place showing for the Social Democratic candidate. In the French parliamentary elections this month, the ruling Socialist Party saw its 280 seats dwindle to 29 out of 577. In the Netherlands, the number of seats held in parliament by the Dutch Labor Party fell from 38 to 9 after the March election. | In much of Europe, although not in Britain, the growth of the populist right has devastated once powerful labor and social democratic parties on the left. In the Austrian presidential election, for example, the success of the far right Freedom Party resulted in a fourth place showing for the Social Democratic candidate. In the French parliamentary elections this month, the ruling Socialist Party saw its 280 seats dwindle to 29 out of 577. In the Netherlands, the number of seats held in parliament by the Dutch Labor Party fell from 38 to 9 after the March election. |
| On the surface, the success of the British Labour Party in the elections two weeks ago would appear to stand apart. But Labour’s gains were not based on improved margins in traditionally Labour leaning constituencies. Corbyn’s Labour Party actually lost ground on its home turf, but it more than made up for those setbacks by prevailing in Conservative constituencies. | On the surface, the success of the British Labour Party in the elections two weeks ago would appear to stand apart. But Labour’s gains were not based on improved margins in traditionally Labour leaning constituencies. Corbyn’s Labour Party actually lost ground on its home turf, but it more than made up for those setbacks by prevailing in Conservative constituencies. |
| The Financial Times has documented a steady decline in class-based voting in Britain. In 1987, the British middle class voted for the Conservative Party by 40 points more than the national average, while the working class voted for the Labor Party by 32 points more than the national average — a 72-point spread. By 2017, the spread had dropped to 15 points. Once a Tory stronghold, the British middle class now splits its vote evenly. | The Financial Times has documented a steady decline in class-based voting in Britain. In 1987, the British middle class voted for the Conservative Party by 40 points more than the national average, while the working class voted for the Labor Party by 32 points more than the national average — a 72-point spread. By 2017, the spread had dropped to 15 points. Once a Tory stronghold, the British middle class now splits its vote evenly. |
| A parallel voting pattern emerged in the case of education, as Labour Party gains were strongest in districts with high percentages of voters with college and advanced degrees. The outcome of the contest for a parliamentary seat in the Kensington section of London has become a symbol of the election. “Labour wins Kensington — UK’s richest constituency — for first time,” declared the June 9 New Statesman headline. | A parallel voting pattern emerged in the case of education, as Labour Party gains were strongest in districts with high percentages of voters with college and advanced degrees. The outcome of the contest for a parliamentary seat in the Kensington section of London has become a symbol of the election. “Labour wins Kensington — UK’s richest constituency — for first time,” declared the June 9 New Statesman headline. |
| In other words, the Labour Party in England can no longer be considered a labor party in the traditional sense of representing the working class. In this respect, there is a growing demographic convergence between the Democratic Party, the Labour Party in England, Macron’s En Marche in France, the voters who elected Van der Bellen president of Austria and those who voted for the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy in the Netherlands. | In other words, the Labour Party in England can no longer be considered a labor party in the traditional sense of representing the working class. In this respect, there is a growing demographic convergence between the Democratic Party, the Labour Party in England, Macron’s En Marche in France, the voters who elected Van der Bellen president of Austria and those who voted for the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy in the Netherlands. |
| In France, Macron’s margin of victory over Marine Le Pen grew larger as the average income and average level of education in a community rose — as the average percentage of working class voters declined. The Financial Times noted that the pattern in France was echoed in the 2016 Brexit referendum, in the presidential election here and in the recent Dutch election. In each of these plebiscites, education emerged as the strongest predictor of votes for a right populist option, where the less educated chose it more often than those with degrees. | In France, Macron’s margin of victory over Marine Le Pen grew larger as the average income and average level of education in a community rose — as the average percentage of working class voters declined. The Financial Times noted that the pattern in France was echoed in the 2016 Brexit referendum, in the presidential election here and in the recent Dutch election. In each of these plebiscites, education emerged as the strongest predictor of votes for a right populist option, where the less educated chose it more often than those with degrees. |
| The FT could have added Austria to this list. The presidential election there in May of 2016 pitted Van der Bellen, the center-left candidate, against the hard-right populist Norbert Hofer. Polls showed that Van der Bellen won decisively among the well educated and the better paid, while Hofer won workers and the less well educated in a landslide. The election in the Netherlands was also emblematic of the disruption of traditional partisan divisions. Koen Damhuis, a Dutch sociologist at the European University Institute in Florence, said in an interview with Al Jazeera that this new dichotomy has been problematic for all traditional parties — “some of them haven’t decided yet how they want to position themselves” — but especially so for labor: “They are visibly confused.” | |
| According to Steven Patrick of the Council on Foreign Relations, globalization and the Great Recession of 2007-9 have resulted in a “pervasive anxiety” that provides | According to Steven Patrick of the Council on Foreign Relations, globalization and the Great Recession of 2007-9 have resulted in a “pervasive anxiety” that provides |
| Patrick shares with a number of internationalists the hope that Macron and En Marche represent a viable political solution to contemporary conflicts that could be applied in other countries: | Patrick shares with a number of internationalists the hope that Macron and En Marche represent a viable political solution to contemporary conflicts that could be applied in other countries: |
| In the 2016 election, as issues of race and immigration became more salient, the percentage of Trump and Clinton support among voters making more than $50,000 was virtually the same. If anything, those at the top making $200,000 or more tilted slightly to Clinton. | In the 2016 election, as issues of race and immigration became more salient, the percentage of Trump and Clinton support among voters making more than $50,000 was virtually the same. If anything, those at the top making $200,000 or more tilted slightly to Clinton. |
| Even more striking, among all voters, Clinton won 52-42 among the college-educated while Trump carried those without degrees 51-44. | Even more striking, among all voters, Clinton won 52-42 among the college-educated while Trump carried those without degrees 51-44. |
| There is no question that in the days after Trump’s victory, Bernie Sanders’s call on “CBS This Morning” to revive the New Deal origins of the Democratic Party — “I come from the white working class, and I am deeply humiliated that the Democratic Party cannot talk to the people where I came from” was powerful. A candidate making that appeal, however, and seeking to build a broad majority biracial coalition, must in fact have broad biracial appeal. As of now, Sanders is far from personifying broad majority biracial appeal. Worse, existing Democratic candidate recruitment and nomination processes have paid insufficient attention to the selection of candidates who are competent to build bridges across America’s immense cultural gaps. | There is no question that in the days after Trump’s victory, Bernie Sanders’s call on “CBS This Morning” to revive the New Deal origins of the Democratic Party — “I come from the white working class, and I am deeply humiliated that the Democratic Party cannot talk to the people where I came from” was powerful. A candidate making that appeal, however, and seeking to build a broad majority biracial coalition, must in fact have broad biracial appeal. As of now, Sanders is far from personifying broad majority biracial appeal. Worse, existing Democratic candidate recruitment and nomination processes have paid insufficient attention to the selection of candidates who are competent to build bridges across America’s immense cultural gaps. |
| Instead of trying to bridge these gaps, as two of my Times colleagues, Alexander Burns and Jonathan Martin, wrote earlier this week, there is a “growing tension” between the Democratic Party’s “ascendant militant wing and Democrats competing in conservative-leaning terrain.” | Instead of trying to bridge these gaps, as two of my Times colleagues, Alexander Burns and Jonathan Martin, wrote earlier this week, there is a “growing tension” between the Democratic Party’s “ascendant militant wing and Democrats competing in conservative-leaning terrain.” |
| The “ascendant militant wing” — a colorful, if controversial, description of the Sanders-Warren wing of the party — has the moral high ground within Democratic ranks but the votes they want the party to seek are those of some of the least reachable constituencies — white men and women whose views on immigration, race and political correctness are in direct conflict with liberal idealism. It would be an extraordinary challenge to get these particular voters to join with minorities and progressive activists. | The “ascendant militant wing” — a colorful, if controversial, description of the Sanders-Warren wing of the party — has the moral high ground within Democratic ranks but the votes they want the party to seek are those of some of the least reachable constituencies — white men and women whose views on immigration, race and political correctness are in direct conflict with liberal idealism. It would be an extraordinary challenge to get these particular voters to join with minorities and progressive activists. |
| Peter Beinart, writing in The Atlantic, addresses the way this plays out. He argues that party leaders have to draw the line on issues dear to the heart of the left: | Peter Beinart, writing in The Atlantic, addresses the way this plays out. He argues that party leaders have to draw the line on issues dear to the heart of the left: |
| In practical terms, Beinart writes, “it means celebrating America’s diversity less, and its unity more.” | In practical terms, Beinart writes, “it means celebrating America’s diversity less, and its unity more.” |
| The hard part | The hard part |
| Beinart cites Karen Stenner’s 2005 book, “The Authoritarian Dynamic,” in which she wrote: | |
| Americans, Beinart contends, | Americans, Beinart contends, |
| What we are seeing now is the replacement of class-based politics, a trend apparent in the United States and Europe. This gives us a more racialized and xenophobic politics, on one hand, and a politics capitalizing on increasing levels of education and open-mindedness in the electorate on the other. If the building of a viable left coalition is possible, it is likely to require some thoughtful and humane co-optation in the form of deference to our limits and boundaries. | What we are seeing now is the replacement of class-based politics, a trend apparent in the United States and Europe. This gives us a more racialized and xenophobic politics, on one hand, and a politics capitalizing on increasing levels of education and open-mindedness in the electorate on the other. If the building of a viable left coalition is possible, it is likely to require some thoughtful and humane co-optation in the form of deference to our limits and boundaries. |