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| Supreme Court Bars Favoring Mothers Over Fathers in Citizenship Case | Supreme Court Bars Favoring Mothers Over Fathers in Citizenship Case |
| (about 5 hours later) | |
| WASHINGTON — Unwed mothers and fathers may not be treated differently in determining whether their children may claim American citizenship, the Supreme Court ruled on Monday. “The gender line Congress drew is incompatible with the requirement that the government accord to all persons ‘the equal protection of the laws,’” Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote for the majority. | WASHINGTON — Unwed mothers and fathers may not be treated differently in determining whether their children may claim American citizenship, the Supreme Court ruled on Monday. “The gender line Congress drew is incompatible with the requirement that the government accord to all persons ‘the equal protection of the laws,’” Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote for the majority. |
| The case concerned Luis Ramon Morales-Santana, who was born in 1962 in the Dominican Republic. His father was an American citizen, but his mother was not. His parents were unwed but later married. | The case concerned Luis Ramon Morales-Santana, who was born in 1962 in the Dominican Republic. His father was an American citizen, but his mother was not. His parents were unwed but later married. |
| The family moved to the United States when Mr. Morales-Santana was 13, and he lived in this country for decades. After convictions for robbery, attempted murder and other crimes, federal authorities sought to deport him. | The family moved to the United States when Mr. Morales-Santana was 13, and he lived in this country for decades. After convictions for robbery, attempted murder and other crimes, federal authorities sought to deport him. |
| He resisted, claiming American citizenship. But the law in effect when he was born allowed unwed fathers of children born abroad to transmit citizenship to them only if the fathers had lived in the United States before the child was born for a total of 10 years, five of them after age 14. Mr. Morales-Santana’s father fell just short of satisfying that requirement. | He resisted, claiming American citizenship. But the law in effect when he was born allowed unwed fathers of children born abroad to transmit citizenship to them only if the fathers had lived in the United States before the child was born for a total of 10 years, five of them after age 14. Mr. Morales-Santana’s father fell just short of satisfying that requirement. |
| The same law made it much easier for unwed mothers to transmit citizenship to their children, requiring them to have lived in the United States for a year before their child was born. (The law has since been amended, but it continues to favor mothers over fathers.) | The same law made it much easier for unwed mothers to transmit citizenship to their children, requiring them to have lived in the United States for a year before their child was born. (The law has since been amended, but it continues to favor mothers over fathers.) |
| The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in New York, ruled for Mr. Morales-Santana, saying that the differing treatment of mothers and fathers was unconstitutional sex discrimination. The appeals court declared him a citizen. | The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in New York, ruled for Mr. Morales-Santana, saying that the differing treatment of mothers and fathers was unconstitutional sex discrimination. The appeals court declared him a citizen. |
| Justice Ginsburg agreed that the law was based on stereotypes that violated equal protection principles. The law, she wrote, was built on a faulty assumption “that unwed fathers care little about, indeed are strangers to, their children.” | Justice Ginsburg agreed that the law was based on stereotypes that violated equal protection principles. The law, she wrote, was built on a faulty assumption “that unwed fathers care little about, indeed are strangers to, their children.” |
| “Lump characterization of that kind, however, no longer passes equal protection inspection,” Justice Ginsburg wrote. | “Lump characterization of that kind, however, no longer passes equal protection inspection,” Justice Ginsburg wrote. |
| Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined the majority opinion in the case, Sessions v. Morales-Santana, No. 15-1191. | Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined the majority opinion in the case, Sessions v. Morales-Santana, No. 15-1191. |
| Justice Ginsburg said treating mothers and fathers differently was unjustified. | Justice Ginsburg said treating mothers and fathers differently was unjustified. |
| “The scheme permits the transmission of citizenship to children who have no tie to the United States so long as their mother was a U.S. citizen continuously present in the United States for one year at any point in her life prior to the child’s birth,” she wrote. “The transmission holds even if the mother marries the child’s alien father immediately after the child’s birth and never returns with the child to the United States. | |
| “At the same time,” Justice Ginsburg wrote, “the legislation precludes citizenship transmission by a U.S.-citizen father who falls a few days short of meeting” the law’s “longer physical-presence requirements, even if the father acknowledges paternity on the day of the child’s birth and raises the child in the United States.” | “At the same time,” Justice Ginsburg wrote, “the legislation precludes citizenship transmission by a U.S.-citizen father who falls a few days short of meeting” the law’s “longer physical-presence requirements, even if the father acknowledges paternity on the day of the child’s birth and raises the child in the United States.” |
| Having decided that mothers and fathers must be treated the same, Justice Ginsburg delivered some bad news to Mr. Morales-Santana. Ordinarily, she wrote, the court would extend the benefits conferred by the statute to the disfavored group. In this case, that would mean allowing Mr. Morales-Santana the benefit of the one-year period. | Having decided that mothers and fathers must be treated the same, Justice Ginsburg delivered some bad news to Mr. Morales-Santana. Ordinarily, she wrote, the court would extend the benefits conferred by the statute to the disfavored group. In this case, that would mean allowing Mr. Morales-Santana the benefit of the one-year period. |
| But the shorter period for unwed mothers, she wrote, was an exception to a general rule, one that also applied to married parents. The right solution, she wrote, was to subject all children seeking citizenship under the statute to the longer period. | But the shorter period for unwed mothers, she wrote, was an exception to a general rule, one that also applied to married parents. The right solution, she wrote, was to subject all children seeking citizenship under the statute to the longer period. |
| “Going forward,” Justice Ginsburg wrote, “Congress may address the issue and settle on a uniform prescription that neither favors nor disadvantages any person on the basis of gender.” | “Going forward,” Justice Ginsburg wrote, “Congress may address the issue and settle on a uniform prescription that neither favors nor disadvantages any person on the basis of gender.” |
| In the meantime, she added, the law’s “now-five-year requirement should apply, prospectively, to children born to unwed U.S.-citizen mothers.” | In the meantime, she added, the law’s “now-five-year requirement should apply, prospectively, to children born to unwed U.S.-citizen mothers.” |
| Mr. Morales-Santana will now be subject to deportation proceedings. | Mr. Morales-Santana will now be subject to deportation proceedings. |
| In a concurrence, Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., wrote that the court had decided more than it had to. Since it was powerless to grant relief to Mr. Morales-Santana, Justice Thomas wrote, it was unnecessary to decide whether the law violated equal protection principles. | In a concurrence, Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., wrote that the court had decided more than it had to. Since it was powerless to grant relief to Mr. Morales-Santana, Justice Thomas wrote, it was unnecessary to decide whether the law violated equal protection principles. |
| In a second decision on Monday, Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, No. 16-349, Justice Neil M. Gorsuch issued his first opinion. Writing for a unanimous court, he said it was for Congress rather than the court to address a possible gap in a federal debt collection law. | |
| When Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act in 1977, it imposed strict regulations on firms that collected other companies’ debts. But it did not address the activities of businesses like banks, credit card companies and car dealerships that collect their own debts. | When Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act in 1977, it imposed strict regulations on firms that collected other companies’ debts. But it did not address the activities of businesses like banks, credit card companies and car dealerships that collect their own debts. |
| That distinction failed to anticipate an increasingly popular business model, in which companies buy distressed debt outright and then try to collect it. The question in the case was whether such companies qualified as debt collectors under the law. | That distinction failed to anticipate an increasingly popular business model, in which companies buy distressed debt outright and then try to collect it. The question in the case was whether such companies qualified as debt collectors under the law. |
| “Everyone agrees that the term embraces the repo man — someone hired by a creditor to collect an outstanding debt,” Justice Gorsuch wrote. “But what if you purchase a debt and then try to collect it for yourself — does that make you a ‘debt collector’ too? That’s the nub of the dispute now before us.” | “Everyone agrees that the term embraces the repo man — someone hired by a creditor to collect an outstanding debt,” Justice Gorsuch wrote. “But what if you purchase a debt and then try to collect it for yourself — does that make you a ‘debt collector’ too? That’s the nub of the dispute now before us.” |
| He concluded that the law as written did not reach the new business model. | He concluded that the law as written did not reach the new business model. |
| “While it is of course our job to apply faithfully the law Congress has written,” Justice Gorsuch wrote, “it is never our job to rewrite a constitutionally valid statutory text under the banner of speculation about what Congress might have done had it faced a question that, on everyone’s account, it never faced.” | “While it is of course our job to apply faithfully the law Congress has written,” Justice Gorsuch wrote, “it is never our job to rewrite a constitutionally valid statutory text under the banner of speculation about what Congress might have done had it faced a question that, on everyone’s account, it never faced.” |