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Copeland was an easy sprint. Theresa May now faces a muddy marathon Copeland was an easy sprint. Theresa May now faces a muddy marathon
(35 minutes later)
Politics offers so few outright triumphs that they deserve celebration when they occur. Seizing the Big Mo, Theresa May threw on her ceremonial visit-to-the-north Barbour and headed to Copeland. It was the nearest we have seen to this restrained prime minister basking in success, thanking voters for the best byelection trounce of on opposition challenger in decades. Special affection went to Jeremy Corbyn, for a performance that emboldens the Conservative central office strategists to talk of a push for 70 more Tory seats at the next election. Ukip’s insurgency foundering in Stoke is a bonus to those planning for a second May term.Politics offers so few outright triumphs that they deserve celebration when they occur. Seizing the Big Mo, Theresa May threw on her ceremonial visit-to-the-north Barbour and headed to Copeland. It was the nearest we have seen to this restrained prime minister basking in success, thanking voters for the best byelection trounce of on opposition challenger in decades. Special affection went to Jeremy Corbyn, for a performance that emboldens the Conservative central office strategists to talk of a push for 70 more Tory seats at the next election. Ukip’s insurgency foundering in Stoke is a bonus to those planning for a second May term.
But the tests of the prime minister’s strengths are yet to come. For one thing, her party, while it will never be united on Europe, needs to reach a more settled view on why what she is proposing on the detail of Brexit is a good idea – one that will also look credible if the economic impact in the coming year or two looks less sunny than it does now, before its true impact is felt.But the tests of the prime minister’s strengths are yet to come. For one thing, her party, while it will never be united on Europe, needs to reach a more settled view on why what she is proposing on the detail of Brexit is a good idea – one that will also look credible if the economic impact in the coming year or two looks less sunny than it does now, before its true impact is felt.
Amber Rudd’s tergiversations on Peston on Sunday over whether the future of free movement lies in limited-term work visas for EU nationals or work permits is an indicator of ongoing cabinet disagreement. Remain supporters, such as May and her nearest avatar Rudd, favour an outcome that is really as near to free movement as possible – an overall cap on numbers and an emergency brake that can be triggered without the EU getting in the way. Sundry dotted lines and question marks linger. They range from how rigorously UK entry should be linked with a particular job to how far student numbers should count towards a target, and on what terms.Amber Rudd’s tergiversations on Peston on Sunday over whether the future of free movement lies in limited-term work visas for EU nationals or work permits is an indicator of ongoing cabinet disagreement. Remain supporters, such as May and her nearest avatar Rudd, favour an outcome that is really as near to free movement as possible – an overall cap on numbers and an emergency brake that can be triggered without the EU getting in the way. Sundry dotted lines and question marks linger. They range from how rigorously UK entry should be linked with a particular job to how far student numbers should count towards a target, and on what terms.
Plans for trade arrangements after Brexit are even more fissiparous. So far, May’s negotiating strategy has been a double bluff to Europe. Give us the deal you know you need with us, she says, or we quit the EU with only the very basic provisions of the World Trade Organisation treaty, storing up negotiations as long as the never-done Doha trade round. It reminds us of the cartoon robber who tells his target that in the event of not handing over the goods, the robber is not afraid to shoot himself. But it might nonetheless come to pass.Plans for trade arrangements after Brexit are even more fissiparous. So far, May’s negotiating strategy has been a double bluff to Europe. Give us the deal you know you need with us, she says, or we quit the EU with only the very basic provisions of the World Trade Organisation treaty, storing up negotiations as long as the never-done Doha trade round. It reminds us of the cartoon robber who tells his target that in the event of not handing over the goods, the robber is not afraid to shoot himself. But it might nonetheless come to pass.
May’s defence for this position is that the Brexit that must be delivered cannot be transformed into something that looks more like staying in the EU than leaving it. Such ruthlessness is the source of her power, but also poses the internal contradiction of how far she is prepared to go to keep Eurosceptics happy.May’s defence for this position is that the Brexit that must be delivered cannot be transformed into something that looks more like staying in the EU than leaving it. Such ruthlessness is the source of her power, but also poses the internal contradiction of how far she is prepared to go to keep Eurosceptics happy.
The view of Philip Hammond, her stolid chancellor, is that after a shortish period of lambasting foolish Brits, Berlin will come round to the need to lead a better deal to benefit major economic powers (notably Germany) and the UK. Even that is a dicey prospect in electorally turbulent 2017. The view of Philip Hammond, her stolid chancellor, is that after a shortish period of lambasting foolish Brits, Berlin will come round to the need to lead a better deal arrangement to benefit major economic powers (notably Germany) and the UK. Even that is a dicey prospect in electorally turbulent 2017.
Angela Merkel, for all the chill she has exuded since last June, remains the best outlook for Britain as de facto leader of the EU’s response to Brexit. No one really believed the EU negotiator, Michel Barnier’s claim that a £50bn “divorce settlement” fee could be slapped on unfaithful Blighty. But the best person to inform him of this fact is the German chancellor, not May.Angela Merkel, for all the chill she has exuded since last June, remains the best outlook for Britain as de facto leader of the EU’s response to Brexit. No one really believed the EU negotiator, Michel Barnier’s claim that a £50bn “divorce settlement” fee could be slapped on unfaithful Blighty. But the best person to inform him of this fact is the German chancellor, not May.
So it would be an ill wind for Downing Street, were she to be defeated by a leftish coalition headed by Martin Schulz, (a narrowcast Social Democrat and no natural friend of UK Tory governments) with Emmanuel Macron as the leading French presidential candidate doubling down on the rhetoric of “no caveats or waivers” for the UK.So it would be an ill wind for Downing Street, were she to be defeated by a leftish coalition headed by Martin Schulz, (a narrowcast Social Democrat and no natural friend of UK Tory governments) with Emmanuel Macron as the leading French presidential candidate doubling down on the rhetoric of “no caveats or waivers” for the UK.
In fact, our future dealings with the EU will be a vast stockpile of caveats and waivers. A large and important trading country close to the continent cannot simply be spun out of EU considerations to buddy up with the Azores. But May could do with more bankable practical allies than she currently has to make that look workable.In fact, our future dealings with the EU will be a vast stockpile of caveats and waivers. A large and important trading country close to the continent cannot simply be spun out of EU considerations to buddy up with the Azores. But May could do with more bankable practical allies than she currently has to make that look workable.
The timelines are already out of joint: article 50 will be triggered, in all likelihood, by the end of next month, while the EU will not address Brexit with seriousness until after the German election in September. That leaves a gap for trouble to brew in parliament. Let me take an early guess as to how this goes. Peers will agitate for extra protections for EU citizens here. May will hold out to strengthen her position on British workers’ access to continental Europe, but there will be a deal and the only question is how long she can spin it out for maximum leverage. She does not mind looking callous, if she prevails (May cares little for how she is perceived, if it gets her what she wants). The timelines are already out of joint: article 50 will be triggered, in all likelihood, by the end of next month, while the EU will not address Brexit with seriousness until after the German election in September. That leaves a gap for trouble to brew in parliament. Let me take an early guess as to how this goes. Peers will agitate for extra protections for EU citizens here. May will hold out to strengthen her position on British workers’ access to continental Europe, but there will be a deal and the only question is how long she can spin it out for maximum leverage. She will not mind looking callous, or even being accused of dithering, if she prevails.
More significant is the shape of “final veto” argument, forcing ministers to get the approval of MPs and peers on the final Brexit deal. The most likely result is lengthy parliamentary “ping pong” in which the government makes clear that it thinks the Lords are on constitutional thin ice. At the same time, the PM will be tending a small Commons majority – and hoping that her own rebel camp of the likes of Nadine Dorries, Claire Perry and Nicky Morgan can be balanced by Labour Brexiteers of the Frank Field/Gisela Stuart ilk.More significant is the shape of “final veto” argument, forcing ministers to get the approval of MPs and peers on the final Brexit deal. The most likely result is lengthy parliamentary “ping pong” in which the government makes clear that it thinks the Lords are on constitutional thin ice. At the same time, the PM will be tending a small Commons majority – and hoping that her own rebel camp of the likes of Nadine Dorries, Claire Perry and Nicky Morgan can be balanced by Labour Brexiteers of the Frank Field/Gisela Stuart ilk.
The lasting lesson of Maastricht is that it does not take many rebels to stir up unquiet ghosts. Soft Brexiteers across the benches will get more alarmed as the prospect of a hard exit nears, figures such as George Osborne will be tempted to break their omerta and the temperature will rise, as post-Brexit generals leap back into the party fray. As this unfolds, soft leavers across the benches will get more alarmed as the prospect of a hard exit nears, figures such as George Osborne will be tempted to break their omerta and the temperature will rise, as post-Brexit generals leap back into the party fray.
Because May is the sole party leader of experience and authority left at Westminster, she has the luxury of no leadership threats, but a host of wearing contests ahead. Copeland was a breezy sprint to victory. Article 50 and beyond will be a muddy marathon, conducted in squally weather. The lesson bequeathed by Maastricht Treaty rows, though, is that it does not take many rebels to stir up unquiet ghosts. That is why May, fresh from a sprint victory last week, is up against a muddy Brexit marathon.