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| Uncertainty Over Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Risks Global Instability | Uncertainty Over Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Risks Global Instability |
| (35 minutes later) | |
| Whether or not Donald J. Trump follows through on his campaign pledges to diminish or possibly abandon American commitments to security alliances such as NATO, his election victory forces nations around the world to begin preparing for the day they can no longer count on the American-backed order. | |
| This creates a danger that derives less from Mr. Trump’s words, which are often inconsistent or difficult to parse, than from the inability to predict his actions or how other states might respond to them. | This creates a danger that derives less from Mr. Trump’s words, which are often inconsistent or difficult to parse, than from the inability to predict his actions or how other states might respond to them. |
| That uncertainty puts pressure on allies and adversaries alike to position themselves, before Mr. Trump even takes office, for a world that could be on the verge of losing one of its longest-standing pillars of stability. | That uncertainty puts pressure on allies and adversaries alike to position themselves, before Mr. Trump even takes office, for a world that could be on the verge of losing one of its longest-standing pillars of stability. |
| “You’re going to see a lot of fear among America’s allies, and in some cases they may try to do something about it,” said James Goldgeier, a political scientist and the dean of American University’s school of international service. | “You’re going to see a lot of fear among America’s allies, and in some cases they may try to do something about it,” said James Goldgeier, a political scientist and the dean of American University’s school of international service. |
| This development comes at a moment when rising powers are already pushing against the American-led order: China in Asia, Iran in the Middle East, and particularly Vladimir V. Putin’s Russia in Europe. | This development comes at a moment when rising powers are already pushing against the American-led order: China in Asia, Iran in the Middle East, and particularly Vladimir V. Putin’s Russia in Europe. |
| Those powers will be tempted to test their new limits. | Those powers will be tempted to test their new limits. |
| Allies in Europe or Asia, suddenly considering the prospect of facing a hostile power alone, cannot wait to see whether Mr. Trump means what he says, Mr. Goldgeier said, adding that they “will have to start making alternate plans now.” | Allies in Europe or Asia, suddenly considering the prospect of facing a hostile power alone, cannot wait to see whether Mr. Trump means what he says, Mr. Goldgeier said, adding that they “will have to start making alternate plans now.” |
| Western European states like Germany and France “may decide they can no longer afford to take a tough stand against Putin’s Russia,” he suggested. “They may decide their best bet is to cut some kind of deal with him,” even if it means tolerating Russian influence over Eastern Europe. | Western European states like Germany and France “may decide they can no longer afford to take a tough stand against Putin’s Russia,” he suggested. “They may decide their best bet is to cut some kind of deal with him,” even if it means tolerating Russian influence over Eastern Europe. |
| Or they may not. But that possibility — and the fact that Eastern European states may have to worry, and plan accordingly — shows how uncertainty can build on itself, adding instability to already tumultuous regions. | Or they may not. But that possibility — and the fact that Eastern European states may have to worry, and plan accordingly — shows how uncertainty can build on itself, adding instability to already tumultuous regions. |
| Over the past year, I have been asking policy experts to evaluate Mr. Trump’s likely foreign policy, and they have consistently given me the same answer: They are unable to stitch Mr. Trump’s rambling speeches and scant white papers into a coherent worldview. | Over the past year, I have been asking policy experts to evaluate Mr. Trump’s likely foreign policy, and they have consistently given me the same answer: They are unable to stitch Mr. Trump’s rambling speeches and scant white papers into a coherent worldview. |
| That lack of clarity seemed purely academic when polls predicted a sweeping victory for his rival, Hillary Clinton. | That lack of clarity seemed purely academic when polls predicted a sweeping victory for his rival, Hillary Clinton. |
| Now, it is a problem shared by world leaders, friendly and unfriendly, who had long planned their foreign policies around the role reliably played by the United States. | Now, it is a problem shared by world leaders, friendly and unfriendly, who had long planned their foreign policies around the role reliably played by the United States. |
| Instead, countries must prepare for a very unfamiliar world, one whose most powerful nation and global guarantor is no longer so easy to predict. Even if they believe that the United States-led order will most likely remain, they have little choice but to hedge against its disintegration — acting as if the world had already returned to a bygone era of shifting alliances and regional spheres of power. | Instead, countries must prepare for a very unfamiliar world, one whose most powerful nation and global guarantor is no longer so easy to predict. Even if they believe that the United States-led order will most likely remain, they have little choice but to hedge against its disintegration — acting as if the world had already returned to a bygone era of shifting alliances and regional spheres of power. |
| The difficulty of predicting Mr. Trump’s foreign policy could create other forms of destabilizing uncertainty. | The difficulty of predicting Mr. Trump’s foreign policy could create other forms of destabilizing uncertainty. |
| Asked about the international agreement to restrict Iran’s nuclear program, Daryl G. Kimball, director of the Arms Control Association, said it was unclear to him — and most likely to Middle Eastern leaders — whether Mr. Trump “would deliberately or inadvertently take actions that unravel that agreement.” | Asked about the international agreement to restrict Iran’s nuclear program, Daryl G. Kimball, director of the Arms Control Association, said it was unclear to him — and most likely to Middle Eastern leaders — whether Mr. Trump “would deliberately or inadvertently take actions that unravel that agreement.” |
| Because Middle Eastern countries would so struggle to predict or plan around Mr. Trump’s Iran policies, and because he seems thus far unlikely to win over European leaders whom he has insulted from the campaign trail, Mr. Kimball said, “the future of the Iran deal is now in greater jeopardy.” | Because Middle Eastern countries would so struggle to predict or plan around Mr. Trump’s Iran policies, and because he seems thus far unlikely to win over European leaders whom he has insulted from the campaign trail, Mr. Kimball said, “the future of the Iran deal is now in greater jeopardy.” |
| While Mr. Kimball doubted that renewed Iranian nuclear development would inspire other Middle Eastern states to seek their own nuclear programs, the region’s turmoil seems likely to worsen if American-brokered restrictions fall away. | While Mr. Kimball doubted that renewed Iranian nuclear development would inspire other Middle Eastern states to seek their own nuclear programs, the region’s turmoil seems likely to worsen if American-brokered restrictions fall away. |
| Some states, rather than reconciling with the threats from which the United States currently protects them, could consider extreme steps to protect themselves without American help. | Some states, rather than reconciling with the threats from which the United States currently protects them, could consider extreme steps to protect themselves without American help. |
| Mr. Kimball worried that South Korea, for example, could inch closer to developing its own nuclear weapons program. Mr. Trump’s threats to withdraw American troops from the country, and North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile programs, “could be a tipping point,” Mr. Kimball said. | Mr. Kimball worried that South Korea, for example, could inch closer to developing its own nuclear weapons program. Mr. Trump’s threats to withdraw American troops from the country, and North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile programs, “could be a tipping point,” Mr. Kimball said. |
| Smaller states will face even harder choices. | Smaller states will face even harder choices. |
| “If you’re in the Baltics, you now have no idea whether you can count on the U.S. if Putin makes a move,” Mr. Goldgeier said, referring to Mr. Trump’s suggestions that he might not fulfill American treaty obligations to defend a NATO ally such as Estonia from Russian aggression. | “If you’re in the Baltics, you now have no idea whether you can count on the U.S. if Putin makes a move,” Mr. Goldgeier said, referring to Mr. Trump’s suggestions that he might not fulfill American treaty obligations to defend a NATO ally such as Estonia from Russian aggression. |
| Similar dynamics could play out in Asia, where countries like the Philippines and Malaysia are already straining to balance the United States and a rising China. If American support looks less assured, then China becomes more attractive. | Similar dynamics could play out in Asia, where countries like the Philippines and Malaysia are already straining to balance the United States and a rising China. If American support looks less assured, then China becomes more attractive. |
| Such defections would fracture the region’s relatively pro-American unity, allowing Beijing to assert a greater role, for example in the heavily disputed South China Sea. China is still too weak to dominate the region outright, though, risking years of competition that would not necessarily be peaceful. | Such defections would fracture the region’s relatively pro-American unity, allowing Beijing to assert a greater role, for example in the heavily disputed South China Sea. China is still too weak to dominate the region outright, though, risking years of competition that would not necessarily be peaceful. |
| Mr. Goldgeier said it was impossible to predict what precisely would happen, because Mr. Trump’s plans are broadly unknown and because it is difficult to guess how the world would meet drastic changes in the American role. | Mr. Goldgeier said it was impossible to predict what precisely would happen, because Mr. Trump’s plans are broadly unknown and because it is difficult to guess how the world would meet drastic changes in the American role. |
| Mostly, we know what he opposes: “There’s no indication that Donald Trump wants to continue the kind of foreign policy that the U.S. has followed since World War II,” he said. | Mostly, we know what he opposes: “There’s no indication that Donald Trump wants to continue the kind of foreign policy that the U.S. has followed since World War II,” he said. |
| Whatever path the next president takes, Mr. Goldgeier added after a pause, “it’s going to be very different.” | Whatever path the next president takes, Mr. Goldgeier added after a pause, “it’s going to be very different.” |