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| Tackling social ills will do more than bombs to defeat Isis and its gospel of hate | |
| (about 2 hours later) | |
| Tuesday’s murder of an 84-year-old priest in Normandy by Isis sympathisers was surprising for two reasons. Until now, Isis had avoided attacking religious leaders in the west who had not directly harmed Muslims, in line with the prophet Muhammad’s command. And French security forces had been monitoring both perpetrators for trying to join Isis in Syria. | Tuesday’s murder of an 84-year-old priest in Normandy by Isis sympathisers was surprising for two reasons. Until now, Isis had avoided attacking religious leaders in the west who had not directly harmed Muslims, in line with the prophet Muhammad’s command. And French security forces had been monitoring both perpetrators for trying to join Isis in Syria. |
| One of the teenage assassins was wearing an electronic bracelet, and foreign intelligence sources had provided a photograph of the other as preparing for an imminent attack. | One of the teenage assassins was wearing an electronic bracelet, and foreign intelligence sources had provided a photograph of the other as preparing for an imminent attack. |
| Isis’s claims of responsibility for the killings by the Normandy and Nice “soldiers” further heightens a growing sense of helplessness and despair, especially among the young people in France I talk to, as to whether or not any direct connection to Isis even matters for its murderous contagion to spread. | Isis’s claims of responsibility for the killings by the Normandy and Nice “soldiers” further heightens a growing sense of helplessness and despair, especially among the young people in France I talk to, as to whether or not any direct connection to Isis even matters for its murderous contagion to spread. |
| Whether security forces actually find some direct connection or not, these sorts of actions, possibly non-directed but probably inspired and oxygenated by media speculation, are a critical way to confound the ability of security services to hinder those who would benefit from such attacks. | Whether security forces actually find some direct connection or not, these sorts of actions, possibly non-directed but probably inspired and oxygenated by media speculation, are a critical way to confound the ability of security services to hinder those who would benefit from such attacks. |
| Related: Don’t underestimate Islamic State. More atrocities are on their way | Abdel Bari Atwan | Related: Don’t underestimate Islamic State. More atrocities are on their way | Abdel Bari Atwan |
| In fact, Isis’s claims of responsibility have never been merely opportunistic; they refer to those who have either sworn allegiance to Isis (as in the case of last week’s suicide bomber at a music concert in Bavaria or last month’s Orlando nightclub shooter) or those who have actually been involved in an Isis plot (the Brussels and Paris attackers, this year and last). | In fact, Isis’s claims of responsibility have never been merely opportunistic; they refer to those who have either sworn allegiance to Isis (as in the case of last week’s suicide bomber at a music concert in Bavaria or last month’s Orlando nightclub shooter) or those who have actually been involved in an Isis plot (the Brussels and Paris attackers, this year and last). |
| But with this past week’s shootings at a teenagers’ club night in Florida, stabbings at a train station in southern Germany and mass stabbings at a facility for people with disabilities in Japan, there is also a growing suspicion, and possibility, that a contagion of mass killings in democratic societies is spreading beyond any organised political or ideological agenda. And it is precisely this cascade of confusion and fear that Isis has always aimed to create. | But with this past week’s shootings at a teenagers’ club night in Florida, stabbings at a train station in southern Germany and mass stabbings at a facility for people with disabilities in Japan, there is also a growing suspicion, and possibility, that a contagion of mass killings in democratic societies is spreading beyond any organised political or ideological agenda. And it is precisely this cascade of confusion and fear that Isis has always aimed to create. |
| Reassurances by western leaders that it is really Isis who is running scared are unconvincing. Noting that a recent surge in Isis-related attacks in France and across the world (more than 500 dead in barely a month) has coincided with large territorial losses for Isis in Iraq and Syria, the US secretary of state, John Kerry, said at the end of June that the group was desperate because “they know they are losing”. | Reassurances by western leaders that it is really Isis who is running scared are unconvincing. Noting that a recent surge in Isis-related attacks in France and across the world (more than 500 dead in barely a month) has coincided with large territorial losses for Isis in Iraq and Syria, the US secretary of state, John Kerry, said at the end of June that the group was desperate because “they know they are losing”. |
| It is true that in the past 18 months Isis has lost about a third of the territory it had seized, while the group’s foreign forces have also decreased by about a third, to 20,000 fighters, since coalition bombing began in August 2014. Yet it is a mistake to think that such claims, or resorting to such operations, is desperate or new. | It is true that in the past 18 months Isis has lost about a third of the territory it had seized, while the group’s foreign forces have also decreased by about a third, to 20,000 fighters, since coalition bombing began in August 2014. Yet it is a mistake to think that such claims, or resorting to such operations, is desperate or new. |
| In September 2014, when Isis was still gaining territory, a spokesman, Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, urged supporters around the world to “kill in any manner,” including “running … over with your car” any “disbelieving American or European – especially the spiteful and filthy French, or … the citizens of the countries that entered into a coalition against the Islamic State”. From Isis’s strategic vantage, attacks such as those in France are key tactics in a global guerrilla counteroffensive. | In September 2014, when Isis was still gaining territory, a spokesman, Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, urged supporters around the world to “kill in any manner,” including “running … over with your car” any “disbelieving American or European – especially the spiteful and filthy French, or … the citizens of the countries that entered into a coalition against the Islamic State”. From Isis’s strategic vantage, attacks such as those in France are key tactics in a global guerrilla counteroffensive. |
| What seems increasingly clear is that Isis has created a surprisingly durable and seductive call to arms | What seems increasingly clear is that Isis has created a surprisingly durable and seductive call to arms |
| By creating chaos among the enemy’s civilian populations, as outlined in Management of Savagery (required reading for every Isis religious and military leader), by undermining faith in their own governments’ abilities to provide security for their people (the primary function of government), and by polarising Muslims and non-Muslims to “eliminate the grey zone” between true believer and infidel, as outlined in the online publication Dabiq, Isis demonstrates that individual and small group acts of violence amplified through the media constitutes the most effective way to publicise, and possibly propagate, revolutionary change of the political, social and moral order. | By creating chaos among the enemy’s civilian populations, as outlined in Management of Savagery (required reading for every Isis religious and military leader), by undermining faith in their own governments’ abilities to provide security for their people (the primary function of government), and by polarising Muslims and non-Muslims to “eliminate the grey zone” between true believer and infidel, as outlined in the online publication Dabiq, Isis demonstrates that individual and small group acts of violence amplified through the media constitutes the most effective way to publicise, and possibly propagate, revolutionary change of the political, social and moral order. |
| Rather than reflecting a movement in decline, recent attacks are better understood as a recalibration of long-endorsed tactics in the service of a constant, overriding strategy of world revolution. | Rather than reflecting a movement in decline, recent attacks are better understood as a recalibration of long-endorsed tactics in the service of a constant, overriding strategy of world revolution. |
| Even if Isis loses all territory in Syria and Iraq, the global jihadi archipelago could continue to expand if the social and political conditions that led to its emergence persist. | Even if Isis loses all territory in Syria and Iraq, the global jihadi archipelago could continue to expand if the social and political conditions that led to its emergence persist. |
| Meanwhile, as we continue to fight Isis on the battlefield, we may overlook the extent to which it has been able to attract recruits amid military defeat in the past. During the 2007-08 Iraq war surge, before it became a self-declared caliphate, Isis lost nearly all the territory it had held, up to three-quarters of its foot soldiers, and about a dozen “high-value” leaders each month for 15 consecutive months. Nonetheless, its diffuse religious, political, military and economic organisation (including payoffs to martyrs’ families) continued to function in a fairly orderly fashion. | Meanwhile, as we continue to fight Isis on the battlefield, we may overlook the extent to which it has been able to attract recruits amid military defeat in the past. During the 2007-08 Iraq war surge, before it became a self-declared caliphate, Isis lost nearly all the territory it had held, up to three-quarters of its foot soldiers, and about a dozen “high-value” leaders each month for 15 consecutive months. Nonetheless, its diffuse religious, political, military and economic organisation (including payoffs to martyrs’ families) continued to function in a fairly orderly fashion. |
| What seems increasingly clear, both in its earlier rise and in its current form, is that Isis has created a surprisingly durable and seductive call to arms. We witnessed this with my research team’s recent work on the frontlines in Iraq, where we interviewed combatants near the village of Kudilah, site of the first battle in the continuing offensive to ultimately retake Mosul. | What seems increasingly clear, both in its earlier rise and in its current form, is that Isis has created a surprisingly durable and seductive call to arms. We witnessed this with my research team’s recent work on the frontlines in Iraq, where we interviewed combatants near the village of Kudilah, site of the first battle in the continuing offensive to ultimately retake Mosul. |
| Some 90 Isis fighters, with no heavy weaponry, managed to prevent a sustained advance by more than 500 coalition fighters representing Arab Sunni militia, the Iraqi army and Kurdish Peshmerga, aided by US and German advisers and airstrikes. This despite the fact (according to Peshmerga leaders) that more than 50 Isis fighters were killed in the battle, including a score of inghamasi (“those who dive in deep” – suicide attackers trained to storm enemy positions and cover any retreat). | Some 90 Isis fighters, with no heavy weaponry, managed to prevent a sustained advance by more than 500 coalition fighters representing Arab Sunni militia, the Iraqi army and Kurdish Peshmerga, aided by US and German advisers and airstrikes. This despite the fact (according to Peshmerga leaders) that more than 50 Isis fighters were killed in the battle, including a score of inghamasi (“those who dive in deep” – suicide attackers trained to storm enemy positions and cover any retreat). |
| Related: The only way to defeat Islamic State is to give young Arabs hope | Daoud Kuttab | Related: The only way to defeat Islamic State is to give young Arabs hope | Daoud Kuttab |
| Many who fought in the battle, including some who had been fighting in various wars since the 1960s, told us this was their fiercest combat ever. According to both Isis media and to leaders of the coalition forces, there has been a notable increase in Isis suicide attacks in recent battles. | Many who fought in the battle, including some who had been fighting in various wars since the 1960s, told us this was their fiercest combat ever. According to both Isis media and to leaders of the coalition forces, there has been a notable increase in Isis suicide attacks in recent battles. |
| In September 2014 the US president, Barack Obama, endorsed the declaration of his national intelligence director: “We underestimated Isil [Isis] and overestimated the fighting capability of the Iraqi army … It boils down to predicting the will to fight, which is an imponderable.” | In September 2014 the US president, Barack Obama, endorsed the declaration of his national intelligence director: “We underestimated Isil [Isis] and overestimated the fighting capability of the Iraqi army … It boils down to predicting the will to fight, which is an imponderable.” |
| The inghamasi warcry is: “The Islamic state is enduring and expanding!” And in our interviews and psychological studies, coalition combatants considered Isis fighters to have decidedly inferior physical means but vastly superior fighting spirit to that of US, French, Arab Sunni militia, or Iraqi army forces. | The inghamasi warcry is: “The Islamic state is enduring and expanding!” And in our interviews and psychological studies, coalition combatants considered Isis fighters to have decidedly inferior physical means but vastly superior fighting spirit to that of US, French, Arab Sunni militia, or Iraqi army forces. |
| Are we again not dangerously underestimating Isis’s will to fight, and its ability to endure and expand? | Are we again not dangerously underestimating Isis’s will to fight, and its ability to endure and expand? |
| Although military defeat of Isis in Iraq, Syria, and Libya could help make it more difficult for the group to recruit, we will not be able to defeat Isis itself until we find a way to reconnect the neighbourhoods, online communities, and other particularly susceptible social and political settings where attacks continue to find inspiration and support. The “will to fight” is eminently understandable, and more readily countered, if we are not blinded by our own mindless propaganda about feckless, desperate, cowardly, criminally minded, nihilistic or brainwashed psychopaths. | Although military defeat of Isis in Iraq, Syria, and Libya could help make it more difficult for the group to recruit, we will not be able to defeat Isis itself until we find a way to reconnect the neighbourhoods, online communities, and other particularly susceptible social and political settings where attacks continue to find inspiration and support. The “will to fight” is eminently understandable, and more readily countered, if we are not blinded by our own mindless propaganda about feckless, desperate, cowardly, criminally minded, nihilistic or brainwashed psychopaths. |