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| Theresa May’s first test is to stand up to the lobbyists | Theresa May’s first test is to stand up to the lobbyists |
| (about 1 month later) | |
| We were warned – and by David Cameron, no less. In February 2010, shortly before taking office, he said “the next big scandal waiting to happen” was the “far too cosy relationship between politics, government, business and money”, the world of the political lobbyist. He knew: he was one once. He pledged he would “come clean about who is buying power and influence”. | We were warned – and by David Cameron, no less. In February 2010, shortly before taking office, he said “the next big scandal waiting to happen” was the “far too cosy relationship between politics, government, business and money”, the world of the political lobbyist. He knew: he was one once. He pledged he would “come clean about who is buying power and influence”. |
| Cameron tried and failed. His lobbyists’ register was a fiasco. Instead, his administration was dominated by lobbyists as never before, from the early dismantling of planning control to the final collapse of measures against sugar in food. When he hurriedly left Downing Street last week, he did not find refuge with some Tory grandee. He moved overnight into the Notting Hill home of Sir Alan Parker, prince among lobbyists. Parker’s clients are as secret as his contacts. Both Britain’s last prime ministers are family godparents. | Cameron tried and failed. His lobbyists’ register was a fiasco. Instead, his administration was dominated by lobbyists as never before, from the early dismantling of planning control to the final collapse of measures against sugar in food. When he hurriedly left Downing Street last week, he did not find refuge with some Tory grandee. He moved overnight into the Notting Hill home of Sir Alan Parker, prince among lobbyists. Parker’s clients are as secret as his contacts. Both Britain’s last prime ministers are family godparents. |
| Political lobbyists do not waste time on the cliches of politics, on big societies, wealth gaps or social justice. They deal in hard, grinding, money-laden decisions. Four such decisions tortured Cameron’s period in office: those on Trident renewal, Hinkley Point C nuclear reactor, HS2 and Heathrow’s third runway. Cameron contrived to funk them all, bequeathing them to his successor, Theresa May. | Political lobbyists do not waste time on the cliches of politics, on big societies, wealth gaps or social justice. They deal in hard, grinding, money-laden decisions. Four such decisions tortured Cameron’s period in office: those on Trident renewal, Hinkley Point C nuclear reactor, HS2 and Heathrow’s third runway. Cameron contrived to funk them all, bequeathing them to his successor, Theresa May. |
| To sane heads in Whitehall, and especially the Treasury, all four decisions are no-brainers, gross misallocations of public money. But all have been subject to intense lobbying. The question for May is, has she the guts to stand up to such insidious pressure? Will she too be putty in the lobbyists’ hands? | To sane heads in Whitehall, and especially the Treasury, all four decisions are no-brainers, gross misallocations of public money. But all have been subject to intense lobbying. The question for May is, has she the guts to stand up to such insidious pressure? Will she too be putty in the lobbyists’ hands? |
| Trident | Trident |
| This week’s Commons vote to renew Britain’s nuclear deterrent was not a decision, rather a vote in principle. Within the defence community, at least outside the Royal Navy, it is hard to find a coherent defence of renewing Trident. Plausible scenarios for such a weapon outside the Nato umbrella are fanciful. Trident’s last true apologist, Thatcher’s defence guru, the late Michael Quinlan, concluded back in 2006 that the cost of renewal was so vast it all but destroyed the argument. Latest estimates are in the region of £200bn for the complete programme. | This week’s Commons vote to renew Britain’s nuclear deterrent was not a decision, rather a vote in principle. Within the defence community, at least outside the Royal Navy, it is hard to find a coherent defence of renewing Trident. Plausible scenarios for such a weapon outside the Nato umbrella are fanciful. Trident’s last true apologist, Thatcher’s defence guru, the late Michael Quinlan, concluded back in 2006 that the cost of renewal was so vast it all but destroyed the argument. Latest estimates are in the region of £200bn for the complete programme. |
| With strategic defence moving towards drones and cyber-warfare, and operational defence hungry for better ground forces, spending such sums is justified only by machismo and prestige. But for the submarine builder and armaments firm, BAE, money talks, as do MPs for Barrow-in-Furness and the Clyde. Monday’s debate was almost entirely emotional – ban-the-bomb versus “only the best will do”. Chilcot’s damnation of the misuse of defence resources before Iraq might as well be wrapping fish and chips. More people died in Iraq than from all the nuclear weapons in history. | With strategic defence moving towards drones and cyber-warfare, and operational defence hungry for better ground forces, spending such sums is justified only by machismo and prestige. But for the submarine builder and armaments firm, BAE, money talks, as do MPs for Barrow-in-Furness and the Clyde. Monday’s debate was almost entirely emotional – ban-the-bomb versus “only the best will do”. Chilcot’s damnation of the misuse of defence resources before Iraq might as well be wrapping fish and chips. More people died in Iraq than from all the nuclear weapons in history. |
| Hinkley Point C | Hinkley Point C |
| Supposedly the costliest power station on Earth lies like a beached whale on the shores of the Bristol Channel. Whitehall’s department of energy hated it from the start, seeing it not as sensible investment but diplomatic fantasy. The French government, which owns the contractor EDF, is happy to proceed, but only if the soaring cost, now put at £37bn, is guaranteed by future British governments and energy consumers. Accountants working for EDF have run screaming for the hills. | Supposedly the costliest power station on Earth lies like a beached whale on the shores of the Bristol Channel. Whitehall’s department of energy hated it from the start, seeing it not as sensible investment but diplomatic fantasy. The French government, which owns the contractor EDF, is happy to proceed, but only if the soaring cost, now put at £37bn, is guaranteed by future British governments and energy consumers. Accountants working for EDF have run screaming for the hills. |
| The world of nuclear energy has moved on from these giant 20th-century plants, not one of which has yet been made to work. But the lobbyists have been hard at work: from Weber Shandwick, Bell Pottinger and Finsbury, to the pro-nuclear former minister, John (Lord) Hutton. The cry is always: stop arguing the cost and get building. We don’t want the lights to go out, do we? Someone else will pay. | The world of nuclear energy has moved on from these giant 20th-century plants, not one of which has yet been made to work. But the lobbyists have been hard at work: from Weber Shandwick, Bell Pottinger and Finsbury, to the pro-nuclear former minister, John (Lord) Hutton. The cry is always: stop arguing the cost and get building. We don’t want the lights to go out, do we? Someone else will pay. |
| HS2 | HS2 |
| Conventional wisdom holds that this project, once £50bn, or £70bn if you believe the Treasury, is “unstoppable”. Originally backed by Cameron as an alternative to a new Heathrow runway, it acquired a life of its own as spending on consultants, surveyors and contractors soared past £300m a year. With the sturdy help of Westbourne Communications, HS2 is notable as a case of taxpayers being forced to pay lobbyists to lobby taxpayers. | Conventional wisdom holds that this project, once £50bn, or £70bn if you believe the Treasury, is “unstoppable”. Originally backed by Cameron as an alternative to a new Heathrow runway, it acquired a life of its own as spending on consultants, surveyors and contractors soared past £300m a year. With the sturdy help of Westbourne Communications, HS2 is notable as a case of taxpayers being forced to pay lobbyists to lobby taxpayers. |
| No sensible transport economist stands behind HS2, any more than did the 2006 Eddington report on future rail investment. Most would want new track where it is obviously most needed, on chronically overcrowded commuter lines round big cities. If the desire is to help the north and get spending fast, go for HS3 and upgrade the links between the north-west and north-east. HS2 is way over budget. Already there is talk of dropping the link to Sheffield, the line into Manchester and possibly the final stage from Acton into Euston. | No sensible transport economist stands behind HS2, any more than did the 2006 Eddington report on future rail investment. Most would want new track where it is obviously most needed, on chronically overcrowded commuter lines round big cities. If the desire is to help the north and get spending fast, go for HS3 and upgrade the links between the north-west and north-east. HS2 is way over budget. Already there is talk of dropping the link to Sheffield, the line into Manchester and possibly the final stage from Acton into Euston. |
| This last could be May’s let-out. Bringing HS2 to Euston would disrupt west coast mainline services for up to a decade and involve compensation to Virgin and huge inconvenience to its passengers. But stopping at Old Oak Common, and switching passengers on to Crossrail to get into London would be a parody of high-speed rail. The sensible answer is to “postpone” HS2 and give priority, and the money, to HS3 instead. | This last could be May’s let-out. Bringing HS2 to Euston would disrupt west coast mainline services for up to a decade and involve compensation to Virgin and huge inconvenience to its passengers. But stopping at Old Oak Common, and switching passengers on to Crossrail to get into London would be a parody of high-speed rail. The sensible answer is to “postpone” HS2 and give priority, and the money, to HS3 instead. |
| Heathrow runway | Heathrow runway |
| Heathrow’s most recent bid for a new runway has been Cameron’s nightmare. He swore not to build it, “no ifs, no buts”, and backed HS2 instead. He could have simply reversed Gordon Brown’s opposition to BAA’s 2005 plan, to switch growth from Heathrow to Stansted. Or he could have gone for Gatwick, given that London airports are 85% for leisure travel. Instead he let the lobbyists, with Portland in the lead, force him back on his Heathrow decision, into indecision. | Heathrow’s most recent bid for a new runway has been Cameron’s nightmare. He swore not to build it, “no ifs, no buts”, and backed HS2 instead. He could have simply reversed Gordon Brown’s opposition to BAA’s 2005 plan, to switch growth from Heathrow to Stansted. Or he could have gone for Gatwick, given that London airports are 85% for leisure travel. Instead he let the lobbyists, with Portland in the lead, force him back on his Heathrow decision, into indecision. |
| The case against a bigger Heathrow is not so much economic – though at £18bn, plus an estimated £18bn of access costs to the public purse, it would be vastly expensive. It is environmental. No world city nowadays builds big airports in built-up areas. But Heathrow’s lobbyists never give up. | The case against a bigger Heathrow is not so much economic – though at £18bn, plus an estimated £18bn of access costs to the public purse, it would be vastly expensive. It is environmental. No world city nowadays builds big airports in built-up areas. But Heathrow’s lobbyists never give up. |
| In each case, the cry from the City and industry is the same: “infrastructure or bust”. Business wants its snout in the Treasury trough, however silly the projects. How far May can resist the lobbyists will be the test of her commitment to fair government. The omens are not good. Her head of policy, John Godfrey, is – guess what – a lobbyist. | In each case, the cry from the City and industry is the same: “infrastructure or bust”. Business wants its snout in the Treasury trough, however silly the projects. How far May can resist the lobbyists will be the test of her commitment to fair government. The omens are not good. Her head of policy, John Godfrey, is – guess what – a lobbyist. |