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| Chilcot report live: George Bush says 'world is better off' without Saddam as Tony Blair mounts Iraq war defence | Chilcot report live: George Bush says 'world is better off' without Saddam as Tony Blair mounts Iraq war defence |
| (35 minutes later) | |
| 8.27pm BST | |
| 20:27 | |
| Russia has claimed it warned the UK of the “unjust and highly dangerous” Iraq war, with its embassy in London seizing on the Chilcot report to boast about its warnings. | |
| “No real WMD in Baghdad, unjust & highly dangerous war. The entire region on the receiving end,” embassy staff tweeted. Since Vladimir Putin assumed the presidency in 1999, the Kremlin has generally opposed western intervention abroad – even though in recent years Russia has grown more active in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria. | |
| My colleague Ian Black reports on reaction around the world: | |
| Franz Klintsevich, first deputy chairman of the defence and security committee in the upper house of Russia’s parliament, said the UK should apologise to the Iraqi people, pay compensation and prosecute the officials who decided on the invasion. | |
| In Iran, widely seen as the greatest beneficiary of the US-led invasion, there was no official comment and the media paid scant attention to the report. The exception was Press TV, an English-language state broadcaster, which provided live coverage of Tony Blair’s press conference. | |
| In Tehran, Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s president, pledged that his country would stand by the Iraqi government in a phone call to the prime minister, Haidar al-Abadi. He expressed his condolences for the recent terrorist attacks that have killed 250 people in Baghdad. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, also failed to mention Chilcot. | |
| Iraqi media were dominated by the mounting death toll in the Karrada bombings. Another story was about Abadi accepting the resignation of his interior minister in the wake of the carnage. | |
| “Iraq as a country has become a battlefield for regional and international powers, and this is one of the most critical consequences of the invasion,” Iraqi political analyst Hadi al-Isami told al-Jazeera, saying Chilcot would do nothing to assuage the country’s plight. | |
| #Chilcot inquiry: No real WMD in Baghdad, unjust & highly dangerous war. The entire region on the receiving end. pic.twitter.com/UoL09xfqqQ | |
| 8.09pm BST | |
| 20:09 | |
| Paul Bremer, the US diplomat put in charge of governing Iraq after the invasion and occupation, has backed several key findings of the Chilcot report. | |
| Bremer agreed in a piece in the Guardian that the US and UK made “inadequate” plans for the occupation of Iraq, and accused both George W Bush and Tony Blair of ignoring internal warnings. | |
| “The commission noted that that ‘bad tidings’ tended not to be heard in London,” he said. “The same was true in Washington. Before the war, a few American military officers suggested the need for a substantial post-conflict military presence. They were not heard.” | |
| Bremer also criticized the failure to prevent looting after the invasion and inconsistent military commitments. | |
| “As David Richmond, one of the able British CPA colleagues, told the commission, the coalition ‘never got on top of security’,” he said. “So the coalition gave the impression to Iraqis that we were not serious in this most important goal of any government. No doubt this failure encouraged some members of what became the resistance.” | |
| But the former diplomat agreed with Bush and Blair’s insistence that they made the right decision even if their methods were severely wanting. | |
| “I believe history will agree that it was the correct, if difficult decision to remove Saddam,” he writes. “Had we not done so, today we would likely confront a nuclear armed Iraq facing off against a nuclear armed Iran. Bad as the unrest in the region is today, that would be worse.” | |
| Earlier on Wednesday a spokesperson for Bush said the former president acknowledges “intelligence failures and other mistakes”, but added “the whole world is better off without Saddam Hussein in power”. | |
| Related: I ran Iraq in 2003. Washington hadn't prepared for the aftermath of war | Paul Bremer | |
| 7.52pm BST | 7.52pm BST |
| 19:52 | 19:52 |
| Former defence secretary Geoff Hoon has also stoically defended his and Tony Blair’s conduct in an interview to Sky News. He says he has read only the executive summary of the Chilcot report. | Former defence secretary Geoff Hoon has also stoically defended his and Tony Blair’s conduct in an interview to Sky News. He says he has read only the executive summary of the Chilcot report. |
| “We do have to learn the lessons of process,” he says. There were ways we could and should have done better.” Hoon says that Blair “accepted those cirticisms, as do I.” | “We do have to learn the lessons of process,” he says. There were ways we could and should have done better.” Hoon says that Blair “accepted those cirticisms, as do I.” |
| Like Blair, McFadden and Clwyd, he argues that everyone made decisions in good faith. | |
| “We know now that there were not weapons of mass destruction,” Hoon says. “Knowing that now we would not have had the legal basis to have gone into Iraq.” | “We know now that there were not weapons of mass destruction,” Hoon says. “Knowing that now we would not have had the legal basis to have gone into Iraq.” |
| He insists that he saw nothing to suggest that British intelligence had received flawed intelligence – such as a description of a chemical weapon that was suspiciously akin to a device in the movie The Rock. “Had I seen something that doubted it maybe things would’ve been different,” he says, when asked why he didn’t challenge intelligence or Blair. | He insists that he saw nothing to suggest that British intelligence had received flawed intelligence – such as a description of a chemical weapon that was suspiciously akin to a device in the movie The Rock. “Had I seen something that doubted it maybe things would’ve been different,” he says, when asked why he didn’t challenge intelligence or Blair. |
| “I did not detect anyone at that time who did not do anything otherwise than a serious job,” he says. “I believe they were hardworking, conscientious dedicated people.” | “I did not detect anyone at that time who did not do anything otherwise than a serious job,” he says. “I believe they were hardworking, conscientious dedicated people.” |
| “With the benefit of hindsight you can look back on any group of people and say they could’ve done better.” | “With the benefit of hindsight you can look back on any group of people and say they could’ve done better.” |
| Q: But wasn’t it your responsibility? | Q: But wasn’t it your responsibility? |
| Hoon: “they gave me their best military advice and I certainly challenged that advice form time to time.” | Hoon: “they gave me their best military advice and I certainly challenged that advice form time to time.” |
| But more often than not, Hoon hints, he deferred to others. “These are peple who devoted their entire lives [to the military and intellgience]. It’s not for politicians to second guess their expert advice.” | But more often than not, Hoon hints, he deferred to others. “These are peple who devoted their entire lives [to the military and intellgience]. It’s not for politicians to second guess their expert advice.” |
| Hoon also insists that information never received the ministry about the dire need for equipment to protect against IEDs and the guerrilla warfare that came with occupation and Iraq’s sectarian wars. | Hoon also insists that information never received the ministry about the dire need for equipment to protect against IEDs and the guerrilla warfare that came with occupation and Iraq’s sectarian wars. |
| There was “no sense of anyone at the ground at the time saying this piece of equip or that piece of equip was required,” Hoon says. | There was “no sense of anyone at the ground at the time saying this piece of equip or that piece of equip was required,” Hoon says. |
| “Very little of this information actually made it to the ministry of defense, nevermind to the ministers,” he concludes. “I recognize that overall I was responsible.” | “Very little of this information actually made it to the ministry of defense, nevermind to the ministers,” he concludes. “I recognize that overall I was responsible.” |
| Updated | |
| at 8.03pm BST | |
| 7.39pm BST | 7.39pm BST |
| 19:39 | 19:39 |
| Labour MP Pat McFadden has given a partial defense of Tony Blair and the decision to invade Iraq on BBC News, saying “these decisions were taken in good faith.” | Labour MP Pat McFadden has given a partial defense of Tony Blair and the decision to invade Iraq on BBC News, saying “these decisions were taken in good faith.” |
| “Intelligence was not falsified, parliament was not lied to, the cabinet was not lied to,” he says, meaning British intelligence agencies did not falsify material, although they accepted bogus information. | “Intelligence was not falsified, parliament was not lied to, the cabinet was not lied to,” he says, meaning British intelligence agencies did not falsify material, although they accepted bogus information. |
| “This was not unconditional support,” he adds. “All the effort on the British end was to persuade the Americans to go down the UN route.” | “This was not unconditional support,” he adds. “All the effort on the British end was to persuade the Americans to go down the UN route.” |
| McFadden was an adviser to Blair in Downing Street, and defends the former prime minister. “Advisers can advise,” he says, “but a prime minister more than anyone has to make that decision. He still believes it was the right decision, but of course it had many consequences and he’s had to live with them since.” | McFadden was an adviser to Blair in Downing Street, and defends the former prime minister. “Advisers can advise,” he says, “but a prime minister more than anyone has to make that decision. He still believes it was the right decision, but of course it had many consequences and he’s had to live with them since.” |
| “He could’ve opted out of not taking part, I don’t think he could’ve stopped the Americans,” he adds. “It was at that time, to use a phrase from our age, a binary decision.” | “He could’ve opted out of not taking part, I don’t think he could’ve stopped the Americans,” he adds. “It was at that time, to use a phrase from our age, a binary decision.” |
| Like Ann Clwyd he argues that sectarian violence was rampant in Iraq before the invasion created a power vacuum out of which a Shia-Sunni civil war erupted. People act as though “history began in 2003”, McFadden says, and as though “now all the extremist violence stemmed from that”. | Like Ann Clwyd he argues that sectarian violence was rampant in Iraq before the invasion created a power vacuum out of which a Shia-Sunni civil war erupted. People act as though “history began in 2003”, McFadden says, and as though “now all the extremist violence stemmed from that”. |
| “But it’s important to stress that’s not the case. We had 9/11 two years before this, we had Bali, and we also had Saddam’s regime, which had engaged in its own horrific killing.” | “But it’s important to stress that’s not the case. We had 9/11 two years before this, we had Bali, and we also had Saddam’s regime, which had engaged in its own horrific killing.” |
| “I don’t think it was a rush to war, and you know Mr Blair was asked about this today, about whether there could’ve been more time.,” McFadden goes on. “The answer he gave was ‘I had to make a decision.’ That’s what a prime minister has to do.” | “I don’t think it was a rush to war, and you know Mr Blair was asked about this today, about whether there could’ve been more time.,” McFadden goes on. “The answer he gave was ‘I had to make a decision.’ That’s what a prime minister has to do.” |
| Updated | Updated |
| at 7.42pm BST | at 7.42pm BST |
| 7.25pm BST | 7.25pm BST |
| 19:25 | 19:25 |
| The French ambassador to the US, Gérard Araud, has taken the Chilcot report as a vindication of his country’s refusal to join the invasion of Iraq. | The French ambassador to the US, Gérard Araud, has taken the Chilcot report as a vindication of his country’s refusal to join the invasion of Iraq. |
| Araud tweets: “May I remind everybody how France was abused and denigrated for opposing the war? France was right!” | Araud tweets: “May I remind everybody how France was abused and denigrated for opposing the war? France was right!” |
| Alongside some statistics about the toll of the war – approximately 165,000 civilian casualties, 4,486 American soldiers killed, 179 British service members killed, more than $2tn spent and no weapons of mass destruction found – Araud posted another tweet. “Not only a geopolitical disaster, not only distortion and manipulation but also a human tragedy,” he wrote. | Alongside some statistics about the toll of the war – approximately 165,000 civilian casualties, 4,486 American soldiers killed, 179 British service members killed, more than $2tn spent and no weapons of mass destruction found – Araud posted another tweet. “Not only a geopolitical disaster, not only distortion and manipulation but also a human tragedy,” he wrote. |
| .@benjaminhaddad In 2003, Blair was not facing more "uncertainties and constraints" that the French President who opposed an absurd war. | .@benjaminhaddad In 2003, Blair was not facing more "uncertainties and constraints" that the French President who opposed an absurd war. |
| Updated | Updated |
| at 7.50pm BST | at 7.50pm BST |
| 7.10pm BST | 7.10pm BST |
| 19:10 | 19:10 |
| MI6 stood by bogus intelligence | |
| Ewen MacAskill | Ewen MacAskill |
| British intelligence agencies accepted false information even after a source told them of a supposed chemical weapon that was remarkably similar to one from the 1996 movie The Rock, my colleague Ewen MacAskill has learned from the report. | |
| The incident is just one of a series of blunders described by the Chilcot report committed by Britain’s overseas spy agency, the Secret Intelligence Service in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. | The incident is just one of a series of blunders described by the Chilcot report committed by Britain’s overseas spy agency, the Secret Intelligence Service in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. |
| In the incident, the report describes a source providing details about spherical glass containers allegedly filled with chemical weapons at an establishment in Iraq. | In the incident, the report describes a source providing details about spherical glass containers allegedly filled with chemical weapons at an establishment in Iraq. |
| MI6 at the time defended the authenticity of the source and the material, according to the Chilcot report. “However, it drew attention to the fact that the source’s description of the device and its spherical glass contents was remarkably similar to the fictional chemical weapon portrayed in the film The Rock,” the report says. | MI6 at the time defended the authenticity of the source and the material, according to the Chilcot report. “However, it drew attention to the fact that the source’s description of the device and its spherical glass contents was remarkably similar to the fictional chemical weapon portrayed in the film The Rock,” the report says. |
| In the 1996 movie, Nicolas Cage, playing an FBI chemical warfare specialist, joins Sean Connery, playing a former British spy, to prevent chemical weapons being launched against San Francisco. | In the 1996 movie, Nicolas Cage, playing an FBI chemical warfare specialist, joins Sean Connery, playing a former British spy, to prevent chemical weapons being launched against San Francisco. |
| The similarity between the movie and the source’s alleged device had been noted when the MI6 report was first circulated on 11 and 23 September 2002, well before the Iraq invasion in March 2003. | The similarity between the movie and the source’s alleged device had been noted when the MI6 report was first circulated on 11 and 23 September 2002, well before the Iraq invasion in March 2003. |
| But this and other bogus claims were not formally withdrawn by MI6 until 29 July 2003, four months after the invasion, Chilcot reports. | But this and other bogus claims were not formally withdrawn by MI6 until 29 July 2003, four months after the invasion, Chilcot reports. |
| In a devastating finding, Chilcot said: “SIS did not inform No 10 or others that the source who had provided the reporting issued on 11 and 23 September 2002 about production of chemical and biological agent had been lying to SIS.” | In a devastating finding, Chilcot said: “SIS did not inform No 10 or others that the source who had provided the reporting issued on 11 and 23 September 2002 about production of chemical and biological agent had been lying to SIS.” |
| Related: MI6 stood by bogus intelligence until after Iraq invasion | Related: MI6 stood by bogus intelligence until after Iraq invasion |
| False allegations that Saddam could attack UK targets within “45 minutes” were not withdrawn until 28 September 2004. Bogus information by a source known as Curve Ball that also fed into the case for war was not withdrawn until the following day, 29 September 2004. | False allegations that Saddam could attack UK targets within “45 minutes” were not withdrawn until 28 September 2004. Bogus information by a source known as Curve Ball that also fed into the case for war was not withdrawn until the following day, 29 September 2004. |
| The faulty intelligence from MI6 was compounded by Tony Blair who hardened up the information when he wrote the foreword to the so-called “dodgy dossier” in September 2002. Chilcot concluded that Blair presented the assessments of the spy agencies to parliament with a “certainty” not justified by available intelligence. | The faulty intelligence from MI6 was compounded by Tony Blair who hardened up the information when he wrote the foreword to the so-called “dodgy dossier” in September 2002. Chilcot concluded that Blair presented the assessments of the spy agencies to parliament with a “certainty” not justified by available intelligence. |
| Chilcot blames the intelligence community not just for passing on bogus information in the first place but failing to correct the prime minister when he toughened up the so-called intelligence. | Chilcot blames the intelligence community not just for passing on bogus information in the first place but failing to correct the prime minister when he toughened up the so-called intelligence. |
| The intelligence agencies had a serious blind spot. “At no stage was the proposition that Iraq might no longer have chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or programmes identified and examined by either JIC (the Joint Intelligence Committee, the umbrella organisation representing all the intelligence agencies) or the policy community.” | The intelligence agencies had a serious blind spot. “At no stage was the proposition that Iraq might no longer have chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or programmes identified and examined by either JIC (the Joint Intelligence Committee, the umbrella organisation representing all the intelligence agencies) or the policy community.” |
| In the foreword to the dossier presented to the public in September 2002 preparing the case for war, Blair said he believed the intelligence had “established beyond doubt” that Saddam had continued to produce WMDs. | In the foreword to the dossier presented to the public in September 2002 preparing the case for war, Blair said he believed the intelligence had “established beyond doubt” that Saddam had continued to produce WMDs. |
| But the Chilcot report concludes: “The assessed intelligence had not established beyond doubt that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons.” | But the Chilcot report concludes: “The assessed intelligence had not established beyond doubt that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons.” |
| Updated | Updated |
| at 8.03pm BST | |
| 6.50pm BST | 6.50pm BST |
| 18:50 | 18:50 |
| The Labour MP Ann Clwyd, who was Tony Blair’s special envoy on human rights in Iraq before the war, has defended the former prime minister in an interview on Sky TV. | The Labour MP Ann Clwyd, who was Tony Blair’s special envoy on human rights in Iraq before the war, has defended the former prime minister in an interview on Sky TV. |
| “I think Tony Blair did the right thing at the time on the evidence that he had,” she says. | “I think Tony Blair did the right thing at the time on the evidence that he had,” she says. |
| When pressed to defend her support for the invasion, she cites what she saw in the 1990s and early 2000s in her argument that Saddam Hussein was going to inflict war crimes on minorities in Iraq. | When pressed to defend her support for the invasion, she cites what she saw in the 1990s and early 2000s in her argument that Saddam Hussein was going to inflict war crimes on minorities in Iraq. |
| “I’d just come back in February that year from Kurdistan where the Kurds are already fleeing out of the towns and the cities into the countryside, because they believed that Saddam Hussein was going to be using chemical weapons against them again. | “I’d just come back in February that year from Kurdistan where the Kurds are already fleeing out of the towns and the cities into the countryside, because they believed that Saddam Hussein was going to be using chemical weapons against them again. |
| “In all the years that I’ve known them they said there was no other way but war.” | “In all the years that I’ve known them they said there was no other way but war.” |
| The Sky host argues that the invasion and mistake-riddled occupation destabilised Iraq and created the circumstances ripe for civil war – the brutal Shia-Sunni wars that were not quelled until the so-called US “surge”. Al-Qaida did not have a strong presence in Iraq before the war, but Clwyd says: “Sectarian violence had been going a long time in Iraq, before 2003.” | The Sky host argues that the invasion and mistake-riddled occupation destabilised Iraq and created the circumstances ripe for civil war – the brutal Shia-Sunni wars that were not quelled until the so-called US “surge”. Al-Qaida did not have a strong presence in Iraq before the war, but Clwyd says: “Sectarian violence had been going a long time in Iraq, before 2003.” |
| “The elements of al-Qaida in the north of Iraq, they were closely associated subsequently with al-Qaida, those are also still in existence,” she says. | “The elements of al-Qaida in the north of Iraq, they were closely associated subsequently with al-Qaida, those are also still in existence,” she says. |
| Q: So you don’t see the links between dismantling the security forces and the rise of al-Qaida in Iraq with the invasion? | Q: So you don’t see the links between dismantling the security forces and the rise of al-Qaida in Iraq with the invasion? |
| Clwyd: “No, I think that’s much too simplistic.” | Clwyd: “No, I think that’s much too simplistic.” |
| She again says that the atrocities perpetrated by Saddam justified the invasion. “If you’d stood by the mass graves,” she says, “near Babylon and you’d see bodies being excavated … they were Shia [and they] had tried an uprising against Saddam Hussein, and they’d been ruthlessly suppressed. The Kurds had tried to raise an uprising against Saddam Hussein and they were ruthlessly suppressed.” | She again says that the atrocities perpetrated by Saddam justified the invasion. “If you’d stood by the mass graves,” she says, “near Babylon and you’d see bodies being excavated … they were Shia [and they] had tried an uprising against Saddam Hussein, and they’d been ruthlessly suppressed. The Kurds had tried to raise an uprising against Saddam Hussein and they were ruthlessly suppressed.” |
| She notes the UN resolutions being ignored by Saddam. “I think there is an argument for intervention,” she says. | She notes the UN resolutions being ignored by Saddam. “I think there is an argument for intervention,” she says. |
| Q: Was there no alternative to war? | Q: Was there no alternative to war? |
| “I didn’t want a war,” Clwyd says. “We gathered evidence of Iraqi war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide.” She suggests that perhaps the international community could have obtained indictments against Saddam and members of his regime. “Also sanctions. Although there were sanctions against the regime, they did not work properly. Saddam Hussein really subverted the oil for food programme.” | “I didn’t want a war,” Clwyd says. “We gathered evidence of Iraqi war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide.” She suggests that perhaps the international community could have obtained indictments against Saddam and members of his regime. “Also sanctions. Although there were sanctions against the regime, they did not work properly. Saddam Hussein really subverted the oil for food programme.” |
| Updated | Updated |
| at 7.33pm BST | at 7.33pm BST |
| 6.23pm BST | 6.23pm BST |
| 18:23 | 18:23 |
| 9 Chilcot findings rejected by Tony Blair | 9 Chilcot findings rejected by Tony Blair |
| Andrew Sparrow | Andrew Sparrow |
| Tony Blair’s lengthy speech about the Chilcot report, and his subsequent Q&A with journalists, was remarkable. Blair has expressed sorrow and regret about what happened before, but today, particularly in his opening remarks, he sounded more emotional and contrite than ever. | Tony Blair’s lengthy speech about the Chilcot report, and his subsequent Q&A with journalists, was remarkable. Blair has expressed sorrow and regret about what happened before, but today, particularly in his opening remarks, he sounded more emotional and contrite than ever. |
| The intelligence statements made at the time of going to war turned out to be wrong. | The intelligence statements made at the time of going to war turned out to be wrong. |
| The aftermath turned out more hostile, protracted and bloody than we ever imagined. | The aftermath turned out more hostile, protracted and bloody than we ever imagined. |
| The coalition planned for one set of ground facts and encountered another. | The coalition planned for one set of ground facts and encountered another. |
| A nation whose people we wanted to see free and secure from the evil of Saddam became instead victim of sectarian terrorism. | A nation whose people we wanted to see free and secure from the evil of Saddam became instead victim of sectarian terrorism. |
| For all of this I express more sorrow, regret and apology and in greater measure than you can know or may believe. | For all of this I express more sorrow, regret and apology and in greater measure than you can know or may believe. |
| But the raw emotion (genuine, I believe, although no doubt many will assume it wasn’t) could not conceal the fact that Blair’s performance was a statement of defiance. | But the raw emotion (genuine, I believe, although no doubt many will assume it wasn’t) could not conceal the fact that Blair’s performance was a statement of defiance. |
| Earlier this year Tony Blair said in an interview that at some point “the political class as a whole has got to get up and stand up for itself”. That’s what he was doing this afternoon. His main complaint about Sir John Chilcot was that Chilcot did not recognise what it was like to have to take decisions. Blair repeatedly criticised Chilcot for refusing to consider what might have happened if Britain has chosen not to support the invasion of Iraq, suggesting that there was a thick streak of naivety or otherworldliness running through the report. | Earlier this year Tony Blair said in an interview that at some point “the political class as a whole has got to get up and stand up for itself”. That’s what he was doing this afternoon. His main complaint about Sir John Chilcot was that Chilcot did not recognise what it was like to have to take decisions. Blair repeatedly criticised Chilcot for refusing to consider what might have happened if Britain has chosen not to support the invasion of Iraq, suggesting that there was a thick streak of naivety or otherworldliness running through the report. |
| But Blair also rejected many of Chilcot’s specific conclusions. I’ve counted at least nine points where Blair said Chilcot was wrong. Here they are: | But Blair also rejected many of Chilcot’s specific conclusions. I’ve counted at least nine points where Blair said Chilcot was wrong. Here they are: |
| The inquiry finds that as at 18 March war was not the ‘last resort’. But given the impasse at the UN and the insistence of the USA – for reasons I completely understood and with hundreds of thousands of troops in theatre which could not be kept in situ indefinitely – it was the last moment of decision for us, as the report accepts. | The inquiry finds that as at 18 March war was not the ‘last resort’. But given the impasse at the UN and the insistence of the USA – for reasons I completely understood and with hundreds of thousands of troops in theatre which could not be kept in situ indefinitely – it was the last moment of decision for us, as the report accepts. |
| The inquiry finds that going to war without a majority of the UNSC in agreement ‘undermined the authority of the UN.’ | The inquiry finds that going to war without a majority of the UNSC in agreement ‘undermined the authority of the UN.’ |
| The reality is that we – Britain – had continually tried to act with the authority of the UN. I successfully convinced the Americans to go back to the UN in November 2002 to secure resolution 1441. | The reality is that we – Britain – had continually tried to act with the authority of the UN. I successfully convinced the Americans to go back to the UN in November 2002 to secure resolution 1441. |
| Whilst they accept that it was my prerogative as PM to decide to be with the USA in military action, the inquiry questions whether this was really necessary. | Whilst they accept that it was my prerogative as PM to decide to be with the USA in military action, the inquiry questions whether this was really necessary. |
| 9/11 was an event like no other in US history. I considered it an attack on all the free world. I believed that Britain – as America’s strongest ally – should be with them in tackling this new and unprecedented security challenge. I believed it important that America was not alone but part of a wider coalition. In the end, a majority even of the European Union nations supported action in Iraq. | 9/11 was an event like no other in US history. I considered it an attack on all the free world. I believed that Britain – as America’s strongest ally – should be with them in tackling this new and unprecedented security challenge. I believed it important that America was not alone but part of a wider coalition. In the end, a majority even of the European Union nations supported action in Iraq. |
| The inquiry finds that there were some warnings about sectarian fighting and bloodletting. I accept that but would point out that nowhere were these highlighted as the main risk and in any event what we faced was not the anticipated internal bloodletting but an all-out insurgency stimulated by external arms and money. | The inquiry finds that there were some warnings about sectarian fighting and bloodletting. I accept that but would point out that nowhere were these highlighted as the main risk and in any event what we faced was not the anticipated internal bloodletting but an all-out insurgency stimulated by external arms and money. |
| I do not think it is fair or accurate to criticise the armed forces, intelligence services, or civil service. It was my decision they were acting upon. The armed forces in particular did an extraordinary job throughout our engagement in Iraq in the incredibly difficult mission we gave them. | I do not think it is fair or accurate to criticise the armed forces, intelligence services, or civil service. It was my decision they were acting upon. The armed forces in particular did an extraordinary job throughout our engagement in Iraq in the incredibly difficult mission we gave them. |
| Some of the Chilcot criticisms are of the armed forces are set out here. | Some of the Chilcot criticisms are of the armed forces are set out here. |
| That’s all from me and Peter for today. | That’s all from me and Peter for today. |
| We are handing over to Alan Yuhas. | We are handing over to Alan Yuhas. |
| Updated | Updated |
| at 6.30pm BST | at 6.30pm BST |
| 5.48pm BST | 5.48pm BST |
| 17:48 | 17:48 |
| George Bush says world is better off without Saddam Hussein in power | George Bush says world is better off without Saddam Hussein in power |
| George W Bush, the former American president, has defended the decision to invade Iraq following the publication of today’s report. A spokesman for Bush said: | George W Bush, the former American president, has defended the decision to invade Iraq following the publication of today’s report. A spokesman for Bush said: |
| President Bush is hosting wounded warriors at his ranch today and has not had the chance to read the Chilcot report. Despite the intelligence failures and other mistakes he has acknowledged previously, President Bush continues to believe the whole world is better off without Saddam Hussein in power. He is deeply grateful for the service and sacrifice of American and coalition forces in the war on terror. And there was no stronger ally than the United Kingdom under the leadership of Prime Minister Tony Blair. President Bush believes we must now find the unity and resolve to stay on the offensive and defeat radical extremism wherever it exists. | President Bush is hosting wounded warriors at his ranch today and has not had the chance to read the Chilcot report. Despite the intelligence failures and other mistakes he has acknowledged previously, President Bush continues to believe the whole world is better off without Saddam Hussein in power. He is deeply grateful for the service and sacrifice of American and coalition forces in the war on terror. And there was no stronger ally than the United Kingdom under the leadership of Prime Minister Tony Blair. President Bush believes we must now find the unity and resolve to stay on the offensive and defeat radical extremism wherever it exists. |
| 5.21pm BST | 5.21pm BST |
| 17:21 | 17:21 |
| Here are two diplomatic experts on Chilcot. | Here are two diplomatic experts on Chilcot. |
| From John Simpson, the BBC’s world affairs editor | From John Simpson, the BBC’s world affairs editor |
| #Chilcot shows that UK's Iraq invasion as bad as Suez.Led to cynicism about politics which maybe played part in #Brexit | #Chilcot shows that UK's Iraq invasion as bad as Suez.Led to cynicism about politics which maybe played part in #Brexit |
| From Patrick Wintour, the Guardian’s diplomatic editor | From Patrick Wintour, the Guardian’s diplomatic editor |
| Apart the effective damning Blair judgement, Chilcot totally lacks historical sweep, context or analysis. Reads like Diary of a Mandarin. | Apart the effective damning Blair judgement, Chilcot totally lacks historical sweep, context or analysis. Reads like Diary of a Mandarin. |
| 5.13pm BST | 5.13pm BST |
| 17:13 | 17:13 |
| Corbyn apologises for war on behalf of Labour to Iraqis, to soldiers' families and to Britons | Corbyn apologises for war on behalf of Labour to Iraqis, to soldiers' families and to Britons |
| Jeremy Corbyn, the Labour leader, is giving a speech in Westminster about the Chilcot report now. Much of the speech was the same as the one he gave in the House of Commons, but towards the end he has just included an apology on behalf of Labour for the decision to go to war. | Jeremy Corbyn, the Labour leader, is giving a speech in Westminster about the Chilcot report now. Much of the speech was the same as the one he gave in the House of Commons, but towards the end he has just included an apology on behalf of Labour for the decision to go to war. |
| So I now apologise sincerely on behalf of my party for the disastrous decision to go to war in Iraq in March 2003. | So I now apologise sincerely on behalf of my party for the disastrous decision to go to war in Iraq in March 2003. |
| That apology is owed first of all to the people of Iraq. Hundreds of thousands of lives have been lost and the country is still living with the devastating consequences of the war and the forces it unleashed. | That apology is owed first of all to the people of Iraq. Hundreds of thousands of lives have been lost and the country is still living with the devastating consequences of the war and the forces it unleashed. |
| They have paid the greatest price for the most serious foreign policy calamity of the last 60 years. | They have paid the greatest price for the most serious foreign policy calamity of the last 60 years. |
| The apology is also owed to the families of those soldiers who died in Iraq or who have returned home injured or incapacitated. | The apology is also owed to the families of those soldiers who died in Iraq or who have returned home injured or incapacitated. |
| They did their duty but it was in a conflict they should never have been sent to. | They did their duty but it was in a conflict they should never have been sent to. |
| Finally, it is an apology to the millions of British citizens who feel our democracy was traduced and undermined by the way in which the decision to go to war was taken on the basic of secret ‘I will be with you, whatever’ understandings given to the US president that have now been publicly exposed. | Finally, it is an apology to the millions of British citizens who feel our democracy was traduced and undermined by the way in which the decision to go to war was taken on the basic of secret ‘I will be with you, whatever’ understandings given to the US president that have now been publicly exposed. |
| Updated | Updated |
| at 5.48pm BST | at 5.48pm BST |
| 5.05pm BST | 5.05pm BST |
| 17:05 | 17:05 |
| Lord Butler says Blair exaggerated the reliability of the intelligence, but did not lie | Lord Butler says Blair exaggerated the reliability of the intelligence, but did not lie |
| In a debate in the House of Lords in 2007 Lord Butler, the former cabinet secretary who chaired a report into the use of intelligence in the run up to the Iraq war, said that Tony Blair was “disingenuous” about the WMD intelligence because it did not show conclusively that Saddam Hussein had WMD, as Blair suggested. Butler also told peers that when Blair said the WMD intelligence was “extensive, detailed and authoritative”, those words “could simply not have been justified”. Peter Oborne quotes Butler repeatedly in his book Not the Chilcot Report to help make his case that Blair can be accused of lying. | In a debate in the House of Lords in 2007 Lord Butler, the former cabinet secretary who chaired a report into the use of intelligence in the run up to the Iraq war, said that Tony Blair was “disingenuous” about the WMD intelligence because it did not show conclusively that Saddam Hussein had WMD, as Blair suggested. Butler also told peers that when Blair said the WMD intelligence was “extensive, detailed and authoritative”, those words “could simply not have been justified”. Peter Oborne quotes Butler repeatedly in his book Not the Chilcot Report to help make his case that Blair can be accused of lying. |
| But Butler has been giving interviews to Sky and BBC News this afternoon and he did not go as far as he did in the Lords. He said that, although Blair was guilty of “exaggerating the reliability of the intelligence”, he would not accuse him of lying. He also said he did not think Blair should be taken to court. That would only be justified if Blair was criminally negligent, Butler said. But he said he did not believe Blair was criminally negligent. | But Butler has been giving interviews to Sky and BBC News this afternoon and he did not go as far as he did in the Lords. He said that, although Blair was guilty of “exaggerating the reliability of the intelligence”, he would not accuse him of lying. He also said he did not think Blair should be taken to court. That would only be justified if Blair was criminally negligent, Butler said. But he said he did not believe Blair was criminally negligent. |
| 4.51pm BST | 4.51pm BST |
| 16:51 | 16:51 |
| Jack Straw, who was foreign secretary at the time of the Iraq war, is being interview on Sky News. He says Tony Blair was “never gung-ho” about war. | Jack Straw, who was foreign secretary at the time of the Iraq war, is being interview on Sky News. He says Tony Blair was “never gung-ho” about war. |
| Asked about the phrase “I will be with you, whatever” that Tony Blair included in his July 2002 memo to Bush, Straw says he thought that was unwise because it would be misinterpreted. | Asked about the phrase “I will be with you, whatever” that Tony Blair included in his July 2002 memo to Bush, Straw says he thought that was unwise because it would be misinterpreted. |
| Updated | Updated |
| at 4.59pm BST | at 4.59pm BST |
| 4.40pm BST | 4.40pm BST |
| 16:40 | 16:40 |
| Goldsmith says Chilcot backs his finding that war was legal | Goldsmith says Chilcot backs his finding that war was legal |
| Lord Goldsmith, attorney general at the time of the Iraq war, has put out a statement about the Chilcot report. | Lord Goldsmith, attorney general at the time of the Iraq war, has put out a statement about the Chilcot report. |
| He says he welcomes the fact that there is nothing in the report that challenges his conclusion that the war was legal, and nothing in the report which challenges the fact that this was his “honestly held view”. | He says he welcomes the fact that there is nothing in the report that challenges his conclusion that the war was legal, and nothing in the report which challenges the fact that this was his “honestly held view”. |
| Lord Goldsmith, then attorney general, on #Chilcot pic.twitter.com/bHEchl16Cl | Lord Goldsmith, then attorney general, on #Chilcot pic.twitter.com/bHEchl16Cl |
| 4.33pm BST | 4.33pm BST |
| 16:33 | 16:33 |
| Here is the full text of Tony Blair’s opening statement. | Here is the full text of Tony Blair’s opening statement. |
| Updated | Updated |
| at 4.33pm BST | at 4.33pm BST |
| 4.15pm BST | 4.15pm BST |
| 16:15 | 16:15 |
| Reg Keys says Blair's statement was 'ramblings of a madman' | Reg Keys says Blair's statement was 'ramblings of a madman' |
| Reg Keys, whose son Tom died in Iraq and who stood against Tony Blair in the 2005 election, is responding to Tony Blair now on BBC News. | Reg Keys, whose son Tom died in Iraq and who stood against Tony Blair in the 2005 election, is responding to Tony Blair now on BBC News. |
| He says Blair was rambling. Blair feels he has been exonerated by Chilcot, Keys says. But he says that is not what the report says. | He says Blair was rambling. Blair feels he has been exonerated by Chilcot, Keys says. But he says that is not what the report says. |
| He says Blair misled parliament. And he accuses Blair of refusing to meeting relatives of those killed in Iraq. | He says Blair misled parliament. And he accuses Blair of refusing to meeting relatives of those killed in Iraq. |
| Keys says his view is that his son and other soldiers did die in vain. | Keys says his view is that his son and other soldiers did die in vain. |
| He says Blair is a “consummate actor”. He says Blair’s comments were just “the ramblings of a madman”. | He says Blair is a “consummate actor”. He says Blair’s comments were just “the ramblings of a madman”. |
| He says Blair has been found guilty by Sir John Chilcot. | He says Blair has been found guilty by Sir John Chilcot. |
| Relatives of servicemen killed are handing the findings to lawyers. They will take whatever action is appropriate. | Relatives of servicemen killed are handing the findings to lawyers. They will take whatever action is appropriate. |
| He says Chilcot has done a “damn good job”. It is a very thorough report, he says. | He says Chilcot has done a “damn good job”. It is a very thorough report, he says. |
| Updated | Updated |
| at 4.34pm BST | at 4.34pm BST |