Why Frexit Won’t Happen

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/04/opinion/why-frexit-wont-happen.html

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PARIS — And now, Frexit? For the French, the most visible consequence of the Brexit referendum is the return of Marine Le Pen. In February the leader of the far-right National Front stated on her blog that she wanted to “take a break” to “think about the future of the country and nurture a project.” After that she conspicuously retreated from the mainstream media.

As soon as the result of the British vote was announced on June 24, though, Ms. Le Pen was back with a vengeance and a huge grin. Everywhere to be seen, she used Twitter to call for a French referendum on the European Union, held a news conference and met with President François Hollande at the Élysée Palace, along with leaders of the other political parties, to discuss Brexit. She even popped up in Brussels to pour scorn on the European Union from the benches of the European Parliament, which she despises so deeply yet finds so useful as a bully pulpit.

Anticipating the possibility of victory for the Leave camp, the National Front had posters on hand proclaiming, “And now, France?” In the current tense domestic and global situation, with a presidential election only 10 months away, Ms. Le Pen’s party, which got 28 percent of the vote in the regional poll held last December, couldn’t have dreamed of such a godsend.

But France doesn’t seem to be ready for Ms. Le Pen’s Frexit dream. A TNS Sofres poll taken in the immediate aftermath of the British vote and published on June 29 showed that less than half of the electorate, 45 percent, would favor holding such a referendum. If it were held, 45 percent of French voters would have chosen Remain and 33 percent would have voted Leave. Three days later, after giving it cooler thought, 55 percent of French voters rejected the idea of a referendum, according to a C.S.A. poll, and the Remain camp had grown to 61 percent. These figures don’t reflect a revolt on the scale of the British one. Until late June, Frexit was not even part of the public debate.

These numbers, of course, could change, and Ms. Le Pen will make the most of Britain’s decision. But if the British exit process turns ugly or simply drags on in a messy way, it may just as likely backfire against her.

The gamble that Ms. Le Pen is making is that neither she nor anybody else at the moment knows how deep a shock the Brexit vote represents for the French. Will it be seen as part of the general revolt against the effects of globalization, growing inequality, uncontrolled migration and the arrogance of the elites? Or will Britain’s choice also be felt as an existential threat to the European idea and, therefore, to French identity?

Because France has had such a crucial role in creating the European Union, this second dimension should not be underestimated. Whether from the right or the left, postwar French leaders have constantly pushed to take Europe further. Europe, in the French vision, is not only an ideal: It is an instrument of power on the world scene. Ever since France first became a great power in the 13th century, it has had the ambition to remain one. After World War II, France saw Europe as a way to access power again. General Charles de Gaulle got France a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and made it a nuclear power, but the European construction brought it two more benefits: size — which mattered in a bipolar world — and a reining in of that other formidable European power, Germany.

As early as 1950, two Frenchmen, Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, had advanced the idea of a European entity built on common industrial interests and an embrace of a reborn Germany. The Suez fiasco in 1956 made France and Britain painfully aware of their military weakness. While London then thought it wiser to seek closer cooperation with its close American ally, De Gaulle chose the other way, the European way. To achieve what he called a “European Europe,” he proceeded to institutionalize a strengthened Franco-German relationship as the nucleus of this new Continental system. Britain, kept on the sidelines, was able to join what was then the Common Market only after De Gaulle was gone.

Stage by stage, Europe took shape, attracting more and more member states. And at every stage, the Franco-German tandem, the famous “engine” of Europe, was operating behind the scenes.

But in its core identity, Europe had three pillars: France, Germany and Britain. For France, Britain fulfilled another role, as a privileged partner in its strategic vision of the world. Much has been said about London as an ally for Berlin in its free-market economic vision of the European Union. But for Paris, having London as a diplomatic and military power inside the European Union was equally important. Unlike Germany, France and Britain do not shy from a sense of mission in the world, including military intervention.

With Brexit, one of the three pillars is gone. At the top of the European Union’s remaining 27 members, France will now face an uneasy tête-à-tête with Germany at a time when the economic imbalance between the two countries puts Paris at a dramatic disadvantage.

How will this development play out in the French psyche? In the collective soul-searching that has begun within the European Union after the Brexit earthquake, a strong emphasis has rightly been put on the bloc’s austerity policies and on Brussels’ encroachments. Now comes the naked truth: For the past 10 years, the European Union has failed to deliver on the main objective it was set up to achieve: shielding its citizens from insecurity. Over the past few days, European leaders, in a state of shock, have hastily identified three priorities on which to focus if they want to save their union: security, migration and economic growth.

This is a good start, but something is still missing. Well-known divisions among the 27 over these issues will be overcome only if European citizens regain a sense of the political and historical mission of the European idea. Why are they together? The level of emotions expressed in Europe in reaction to the British vote has shown that the feeling of belonging to a common entity, or of being excluded from it, is surprisingly strong, notably in the young generation. Maybe that can even look like something called a European identity. Maybe a new political idea, more attuned to 21st-century realities, can even be built upon that identity. This will be the best way to counter Ms. Le Pen’s argument that Europe is a “prison of the peoples.”