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Islamist terror has evolved toward lone actors – and it's brutally effective Islamist terror has evolved toward lone actors – and it's brutally effective
(35 minutes later)
The two attacks that shook the US and France on Sunday and Monday suggest a very new form of terrorism, posing a dramatic new threat.The two attacks that shook the US and France on Sunday and Monday suggest a very new form of terrorism, posing a dramatic new threat.
But the horrific actions of Omar Mateen in Orlando, Florida, and Larossi Aballa outside Paris are the result of a 20-year evolution of Islamic militancy towards a decentralised, anarchic but tragically effective type of violence.But the horrific actions of Omar Mateen in Orlando, Florida, and Larossi Aballa outside Paris are the result of a 20-year evolution of Islamic militancy towards a decentralised, anarchic but tragically effective type of violence.
A year after the bombings of two US embassies in east Africa in 1998, Osama bin Laden, the founder and leader of al-Qaida, explained what he saw as his primary task.A year after the bombings of two US embassies in east Africa in 1998, Osama bin Laden, the founder and leader of al-Qaida, explained what he saw as his primary task.
“Our job is to instigate,” he said.“Our job is to instigate,” he said.
Those bombings had been run directly by al-Qaida, as were the 9/11 attacks three years later, but there was no doubting bin Laden’s overall intent. He wanted to use spectacular violence to terrorise his enemies, polarise communities across the Islamic world and beyond but above all, to spread his warped ideology. Those bombings had been run directly by al-Qaida, as were the 9/11 attacks three years later, but there was no doubting Bin Laden’s overall intent. He wanted to use spectacular violence to terrorise his enemies, polarise communities across the Islamic world and beyond but above all, to spread his warped ideology.
Bin Laden only partially achieved his aim. In the decade after the 9/11 attacks, there was a series of strikes by so-called “lone actors”, but never anywhere enough for al-Qaida to really claim success in unleashing a mass uprising among the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims.Bin Laden only partially achieved his aim. In the decade after the 9/11 attacks, there was a series of strikes by so-called “lone actors”, but never anywhere enough for al-Qaida to really claim success in unleashing a mass uprising among the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims.
In 2016, Isis is better positioned to launch a far-reaching campaign of “leaderless jihad”, as one analyst dubbed it.In 2016, Isis is better positioned to launch a far-reaching campaign of “leaderless jihad”, as one analyst dubbed it.
The organisation has broadened and deepened bin Laden’s original idea. Isis was influenced by a seminal 2005 jihadi text by Abu Musab al-Suri, a veteran jihadi thinker. Al-Suri called for an end to structured terrorist groups in favour of empowering individuals to act alone. His motto was “no organisations, just principles”. Where could these lone attackers consult these guidelines telling them who, what and how to strike? On the internet. The organisation has broadened and deepened Bin Laden’s original idea. Isis was influenced by a seminal 2005 jihadi text by Abu Musab al-Suri, a veteran jihadi thinker. Al-Suri called for an end to structured terrorist groups in favour of empowering individuals to act alone. His motto was “no organisations, just principles”. Where could these lone attackers consult these guidelines telling them who, what and how to strike? On the internet.
Not only did digital technology change how extremist groups organised their violence, it irrevocably changed the way they reached their audience. For decades, to gain the publicity all terrorists crave, militants had needed to convince a mainstream news organisation to broadcast the images or at least reports of their attacks. Their violence had to be shocking enough not to be ignored. And that needed significant resources – training camps, for example – which were expensive and vulnerable.Not only did digital technology change how extremist groups organised their violence, it irrevocably changed the way they reached their audience. For decades, to gain the publicity all terrorists crave, militants had needed to convince a mainstream news organisation to broadcast the images or at least reports of their attacks. Their violence had to be shocking enough not to be ignored. And that needed significant resources – training camps, for example – which were expensive and vulnerable.
But, as Aballa proved this week with his live stream of a double murder posted on Facebook, anyone can broadcast in the new digital era. Digital cameras – even mounted on phones – mean easy production. Smartphones and laptops mean a readily accessible audience.But, as Aballa proved this week with his live stream of a double murder posted on Facebook, anyone can broadcast in the new digital era. Digital cameras – even mounted on phones – mean easy production. Smartphones and laptops mean a readily accessible audience.
This means the single blockbuster attack can be replaced by a series of smaller strikes by less capable individuals. There’s no need for infrastructure so vulnerable to airstrikes or political shifts, nor large sums of money. If these smaller attacks kill fewer people, that doesn’t necessarily matter – the cumulative effect is the same.This means the single blockbuster attack can be replaced by a series of smaller strikes by less capable individuals. There’s no need for infrastructure so vulnerable to airstrikes or political shifts, nor large sums of money. If these smaller attacks kill fewer people, that doesn’t necessarily matter – the cumulative effect is the same.
If these smaller attacks kill​ fewer people, that doesn’t necessarily matter – t​​he cumulative effect is the sameIf these smaller attacks kill​ fewer people, that doesn’t necessarily matter – t​​he cumulative effect is the same
But these new militants are not as “leaderless” as they appear. Though they exercise a significant degree of autonomy, they are still at least influenced by senior thinkers and propagandists, just as al-Suri envisaged. Analyst Peter Bergen points out that more than a quarter of the 330 people charged or convicted with terrorism-related crimes in the US since 2001 had the writings or sermons of Anwar al-Awlaki, a US-born radical cleric based in Yemen killed in a US drone strike in 2011, in their possession, or cited him as an influence, or were in direct contact with him.But these new militants are not as “leaderless” as they appear. Though they exercise a significant degree of autonomy, they are still at least influenced by senior thinkers and propagandists, just as al-Suri envisaged. Analyst Peter Bergen points out that more than a quarter of the 330 people charged or convicted with terrorism-related crimes in the US since 2001 had the writings or sermons of Anwar al-Awlaki, a US-born radical cleric based in Yemen killed in a US drone strike in 2011, in their possession, or cited him as an influence, or were in direct contact with him.
Awlaki’s place has now been taken by Isis leaders. In September 2014, Isis told sympathisers to launch their own attacks in its name without seeking prior permission, and using any means available.Awlaki’s place has now been taken by Isis leaders. In September 2014, Isis told sympathisers to launch their own attacks in its name without seeking prior permission, and using any means available.
The latter advice was superfluous. Throughout the past few decades militants have used weapons that are readily available locally. In Afghanistan and Iraq that meant IEDs made out of old mines; in Europe, explosives made of household chemicals and fertiliser, or knives; in the US, that means assault rifles.The latter advice was superfluous. Throughout the past few decades militants have used weapons that are readily available locally. In Afghanistan and Iraq that meant IEDs made out of old mines; in Europe, explosives made of household chemicals and fertiliser, or knives; in the US, that means assault rifles.
Lone attackers are not loners either. A study at Pennsylvania State University found that in 64% of cases, family and friends were aware of an individual’s intent to engage in a terrorism-related activity because the offender verbally told them. Last week it was reported that Mateen’s wife tried but failed to talk him out of the attack.Lone attackers are not loners either. A study at Pennsylvania State University found that in 64% of cases, family and friends were aware of an individual’s intent to engage in a terrorism-related activity because the offender verbally told them. Last week it was reported that Mateen’s wife tried but failed to talk him out of the attack.
The “lone wolves” emerge from a broader culture of extremist values. Of course, not everyone who holds profoundly homophobic, anti-semitic, anti-American or deeply social conservative views on gender roles is violent. But all violent extremists hold these views. The “lone wolves” emerge from a broader culture of extremist values. Of course, not everyone who holds profoundly homophobic, antisemitic, anti-American or deeply social conservative views on gender roles is violent. But all violent extremists hold these views.
The influence on an individual can be offline – Mohammed Merah, who attacked a Jewish school and soldiers in France in 2012, grew up in a household where anti-semitic and anti-French sentiments were frequently voiced, for example – or online, too. Among the last websites viewed by Aballa, before he murdered two police officers in front of their small child earlier this week, were some calling on Muslims not to shake hands with Jews or Christians. The penetration of such views into Muslim communities in the west could perhaps be viewed as a vindication of bin Laden’s original strategy. The influence on an individual can be offline – Mohammed Merah, who attacked a Jewish school and soldiers in France in 2012, grew up in a household where antisemitic and anti-French sentiments were frequently voiced, for example – or online, too. Among the last websites viewed by Aballa, before he murdered two police officers in front of their small child earlier this week, were some calling on Muslims not to shake hands with Jews or Christians. The penetration of such views into Muslim communities in the west could perhaps be viewed as a vindication of Bin Laden’s original strategy.