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How overconfidence played into UK failiure in Iraq How overconfidence played into UK failure in Iraq
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Many reasons have been given for the disastrous - and in view of the government’s top lawyers, illegal - invasion of Iraq whose repercussions are still being so brutally felt 13 years later.Many reasons have been given for the disastrous - and in view of the government’s top lawyers, illegal - invasion of Iraq whose repercussions are still being so brutally felt 13 years later.
High on the list, along with the fatal mix of arrogance and ignorance, is the failure to prepare for the aftermath of the invasion and the toppling of Saddam Hussein, a failure compounded by the US decision to disband (but not disarm) the Iraqi army and blacklist Ba’athists who might have helped build a new civil administration.High on the list, along with the fatal mix of arrogance and ignorance, is the failure to prepare for the aftermath of the invasion and the toppling of Saddam Hussein, a failure compounded by the US decision to disband (but not disarm) the Iraqi army and blacklist Ba’athists who might have helped build a new civil administration.
Chilcot no doubt will have many words to say about this in his long-awaited report, due out in July or July. A senior army officer, whose evidence to Chilcot the government is suppressing, has now added another reason.Chilcot no doubt will have many words to say about this in his long-awaited report, due out in July or July. A senior army officer, whose evidence to Chilcot the government is suppressing, has now added another reason.
Ben Barry, a retired brigadier and senior fellow for land warfare at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), says successes in difficult operations in Bosnia and elsewhere contributed to the problems British armed forces faced later in Iraq.Ben Barry, a retired brigadier and senior fellow for land warfare at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), says successes in difficult operations in Bosnia and elsewhere contributed to the problems British armed forces faced later in Iraq.
The British army that entered Iraq in 2003 had a quarter of a century of peace support operations behind them and many commanders thought southern Iraq would be much the same, he writes in The Road from Sarajevo*.The British army that entered Iraq in 2003 had a quarter of a century of peace support operations behind them and many commanders thought southern Iraq would be much the same, he writes in The Road from Sarajevo*.
Barry refers, among other conflicts, to Northern Ireland, the Falklands, the first Gulf war, east Timor, and Sierra Leone, as well as setting up the Nato-led “international security assistance force” in Kabul in 2002.Barry refers, among other conflicts, to Northern Ireland, the Falklands, the first Gulf war, east Timor, and Sierra Leone, as well as setting up the Nato-led “international security assistance force” in Kabul in 2002.
All those operations, Barry notes, were supported by parliament, public, and the media. There were remarkable few casualties, and opposing forces were mostly unwilling to stand and fight.All those operations, Barry notes, were supported by parliament, public, and the media. There were remarkable few casualties, and opposing forces were mostly unwilling to stand and fight.
All the brief battles, in Bosnia and Sierra Leone, for example, were successful. Barry writes: “But I believe that this success may have resulted in a degree of overconfidence, an expectation that future opponents would be as easily countered by British forces”.All the brief battles, in Bosnia and Sierra Leone, for example, were successful. Barry writes: “But I believe that this success may have resulted in a degree of overconfidence, an expectation that future opponents would be as easily countered by British forces”.
He adds: “Looking back on the period between Easter 1996 and the beginning of efforts to stabilise Iraq in April 2003, I have a sense that the British army and the UK Ministry of Defence were probably a bit too pleased with themselves.”He adds: “Looking back on the period between Easter 1996 and the beginning of efforts to stabilise Iraq in April 2003, I have a sense that the British army and the UK Ministry of Defence were probably a bit too pleased with themselves.”
“So when British troops in Iraq found themselves fighting against enemies who rejected western values and were prepared to stand, fight, and die, the shock was profound”.“So when British troops in Iraq found themselves fighting against enemies who rejected western values and were prepared to stand, fight, and die, the shock was profound”.
The unexpected intensity of the fighting, combined with the unpopularity of the war, served a “strategic shock” to the British government, the MoD, and the army. “All were too slow to adapt”, writes Barry.The unexpected intensity of the fighting, combined with the unpopularity of the war, served a “strategic shock” to the British government, the MoD, and the army. “All were too slow to adapt”, writes Barry.
The MoD turned down my freedom of information request for Barry’s separate “lessons- learned-from-Iraq” study, telling me to wait for the Chilcot report. The study is believed to state that the army admits it suffered a blow to its reputation and lost the trust of its US allies during the bloody aftermath of the Iraq war, according to leaks.The MoD turned down my freedom of information request for Barry’s separate “lessons- learned-from-Iraq” study, telling me to wait for the Chilcot report. The study is believed to state that the army admits it suffered a blow to its reputation and lost the trust of its US allies during the bloody aftermath of the Iraq war, according to leaks.
Many in the army seemed to struggle “to find enthusiasm” for the campaign, making it harder for them to make a “psychological commitment to success”, Barry’s study for Chilcot is understood to say.Many in the army seemed to struggle “to find enthusiasm” for the campaign, making it harder for them to make a “psychological commitment to success”, Barry’s study for Chilcot is understood to say.
*An updated edition of A Cold War, published in 2008.*An updated edition of A Cold War, published in 2008.