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| Response to Paris Attacks Points to Weaknesses in French Police Structure | Response to Paris Attacks Points to Weaknesses in French Police Structure |
| (about 2 hours later) | |
| PARIS — Since the devastating Nov. 13 attacks in Paris, the French police have offered only a fragmentary outline of their response and of how they deployed antiterror teams and other forces. The somberness and solidarity in the weeks since have muted public criticism. No review of the police’s performance has been announced. | |
| Yet accounts from survivors and police officials, as well as the analysis of outside experts, make clear that there were substantial periods when the terrorists operated with little or no hindrance from the authorities, and that France’s top-heavy chain of command, which has diminished neighborhood patrols in favor of specialized units, contributed to delays. | Yet accounts from survivors and police officials, as well as the analysis of outside experts, make clear that there were substantial periods when the terrorists operated with little or no hindrance from the authorities, and that France’s top-heavy chain of command, which has diminished neighborhood patrols in favor of specialized units, contributed to delays. |
| The first officer to reach the worst of the carnage — at the Bataclan concert hall, where 90 of the 130 victims that night were killed — got there roughly 15 minutes into the attack. Armed with only a service sidearm, he managed to stall the killing by shooting one attacker, blowing up the terrorist’s suicide vest while sparing the victims around him. | |
| Yet the officer was ordered to withdraw in favor of a more specialized antiterrorism unit, which arrived half an hour into the assault after initially being sent to sites where the violence had already ended. Another specialized unit nearby was apparently never deployed, according to a French news report. | Yet the officer was ordered to withdraw in favor of a more specialized antiterrorism unit, which arrived half an hour into the assault after initially being sent to sites where the violence had already ended. Another specialized unit nearby was apparently never deployed, according to a French news report. |
| In the meantime, the remaining two attackers at the Bataclan fortified themselves with hostages, while scores of wounded — pretending to be dead or paralyzed with fear — lay scattered in eerie silence, bleeding on the concert-hall floor among dozens of corpses. It would be nearly three hours before the police brought the assault to an end. | In the meantime, the remaining two attackers at the Bataclan fortified themselves with hostages, while scores of wounded — pretending to be dead or paralyzed with fear — lay scattered in eerie silence, bleeding on the concert-hall floor among dozens of corpses. It would be nearly three hours before the police brought the assault to an end. |
| By any measure, the events of Nov. 13 were a nightmare scenario: three teams of terrorists, the country’s president under threat, and suicidal killers with military-grade weapons striking six sites within minutes of one another. There is no doubt the French police acted bravely. A seamlessly choreographed response by any police force may well have been impossible. | By any measure, the events of Nov. 13 were a nightmare scenario: three teams of terrorists, the country’s president under threat, and suicidal killers with military-grade weapons striking six sites within minutes of one another. There is no doubt the French police acted bravely. A seamlessly choreographed response by any police force may well have been impossible. |
| Still, several French police experts, and a look at the chronology, suggest that the delayed response points to weaknesses in the highly centralized French police structure. A greater local police presence might have limited the killing, several experts said. | Still, several French police experts, and a look at the chronology, suggest that the delayed response points to weaknesses in the highly centralized French police structure. A greater local police presence might have limited the killing, several experts said. |
| “We have a big machine, and a relatively heavy one,” said Christian Mouhanna, the leader of a unit focused on law and order at the National Center for Scientific Research, one of France’s main research institutions. | |
| “By the time the information gets out and reaches up, mobilizing the specialized units takes a relatively long time,” Mr. Mouhanna said. “Our police are not organized along local lines. Everything has to filter up to the central organization at the prefecture.” | “By the time the information gets out and reaches up, mobilizing the specialized units takes a relatively long time,” Mr. Mouhanna said. “Our police are not organized along local lines. Everything has to filter up to the central organization at the prefecture.” |
| A colleague of his, René Lévy, a police expert, said the response raised the question of whether that system needs to be changed. As with the deadly assault on the Charlie Hebdo satirical newspaper, terrorists eluded the authorities in the heart of Paris after nimble and deadly attacks. | |
| “It made me think about the strategy, which is that one does nothing and one waits for the arrival of the specialists,” Mr. Lévy said. “Maybe there is something to think about, because in fact, ordinary police might have limited the damage.” | “It made me think about the strategy, which is that one does nothing and one waits for the arrival of the specialists,” Mr. Lévy said. “Maybe there is something to think about, because in fact, ordinary police might have limited the damage.” |
| But the local police — officers patrolling a beat by foot — essentially do not exist in France. An attempt at “neighborhood police” in the late 1990s was unpopular with the police unions and was stopped once political power shifted to the right a few years later. | But the local police — officers patrolling a beat by foot — essentially do not exist in France. An attempt at “neighborhood police” in the late 1990s was unpopular with the police unions and was stopped once political power shifted to the right a few years later. |
| “We have a police force that is disconnected from the terrain,” Mr. Mouhanna said. | “We have a police force that is disconnected from the terrain,” Mr. Mouhanna said. |
| That disconnect was a decided disadvantage with so much shooting and bombing happening at so many locations at once, leaving the cartography of the November attacks unclear for critical stretches for a force under centralized command. | |
| Beyond the Bataclan, the Paris police faced attacks that played out quickly across miles and threatened President François Hollande, who was at the soccer stadium where two suicide bombers blew themselves up. Scores were wounded, overwhelming hospitals. | Beyond the Bataclan, the Paris police faced attacks that played out quickly across miles and threatened President François Hollande, who was at the soccer stadium where two suicide bombers blew themselves up. Scores were wounded, overwhelming hospitals. |
| So great was the confusion that the specialized antiterrorism unit — the Search and Intervention Brigade, known by its French initials, B.R.I. — initially headed toward restaurants on Rue de Charonne where the killing had ended more than 20 minutes before, according to the French news media. By then, the terrorists were long gone. | |
| It then took half an hour for the B.R.I. to reach the Bataclan. They arrived at about 10:15 p.m., by which time the slaughter on the concert-hall floor was over, according to police statements in the French news media. | It then took half an hour for the B.R.I. to reach the Bataclan. They arrived at about 10:15 p.m., by which time the slaughter on the concert-hall floor was over, according to police statements in the French news media. |
| “Right there, we skidded,” the B.R.I.’s chief, Christophe Molmy, told the newspaper Libération, acknowledging the mistake. | |
| Another two hours passed before the B.R.I. ended the siege at the Bataclan, storming an upstairs room where the terrorists had taken refuge behind a group of terrified hostages. | Another two hours passed before the B.R.I. ended the siege at the Bataclan, storming an upstairs room where the terrorists had taken refuge behind a group of terrified hostages. |
| Other experts emphasized the importance of speed. “Your job is to reduce the time on target, which is how long is that person in there, actively engaged in killing, before you can get in there and stop it,” said John J. Miller, the deputy commissioner for counterterrorism and intelligence at the New York Police Department. | Other experts emphasized the importance of speed. “Your job is to reduce the time on target, which is how long is that person in there, actively engaged in killing, before you can get in there and stop it,” said John J. Miller, the deputy commissioner for counterterrorism and intelligence at the New York Police Department. |
| Major tragedies are bound to expose flaws. After the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, an independent federal commission found that the response of the police and fire departments had been undermined by poor planning, inadequate equipment, faulty communication and generations-old interagency rivalries. | Major tragedies are bound to expose flaws. After the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, an independent federal commission found that the response of the police and fire departments had been undermined by poor planning, inadequate equipment, faulty communication and generations-old interagency rivalries. |
| The Paris police prefecture, which oversees all police units in the city under the Interior Ministry, declined to make officers available for interviews, as did the Interior Ministry and a leading police union. | |
| But several officers spoke on television and in newspapers in the days immediately after the attacks. Their graphic accounts of the Bataclan siege underscored the horror of what they had found. “It was an incredible scene,” Mr. Molmy told the Figaro newspaper. | |
| But the accounts also speak to the segmented nature of French policing. | |
| The downside of France’s system of deploying specialized units like the B.R.I. is that “the beat officers are not highly trained, and so you’ve got to wait for the specialists to arrive,” Mr. Mouhanna, of the research institute, said. | The downside of France’s system of deploying specialized units like the B.R.I. is that “the beat officers are not highly trained, and so you’ve got to wait for the specialists to arrive,” Mr. Mouhanna, of the research institute, said. |
| “There is a question of quickness of reaction,” he added. “We have a lot of officers in offices. On the ground, we don’t have that many.” | “There is a question of quickness of reaction,” he added. “We have a lot of officers in offices. On the ground, we don’t have that many.” |
| The first police officer to penetrate the Bataclan was a member of the Brigade Anti-Criminalité, an anti-crime unit known as the BAC: a quasi-local officer whose unit would have been assigned to patrol the area by vehicle. There are few such night patrols in Paris, experts said. | The first police officer to penetrate the Bataclan was a member of the Brigade Anti-Criminalité, an anti-crime unit known as the BAC: a quasi-local officer whose unit would have been assigned to patrol the area by vehicle. There are few such night patrols in Paris, experts said. |
| In an interview on French television that was posted online, a man said to be the officer, unidentified and his face blurred, recalled a scene of “indescribable horror.” “We open the door, nothing,” he said. “It was surreal. Hundreds of bodies stretched out everywhere.” | In an interview on French television that was posted online, a man said to be the officer, unidentified and his face blurred, recalled a scene of “indescribable horror.” “We open the door, nothing,” he said. “It was surreal. Hundreds of bodies stretched out everywhere.” |
| The officer described seeing one of the terrorists on the left of the stage, taking aim at a group of hostages, hands on heads, “who were walking toward him very calmly, very dignified, but who seemed totally resigned to their fate.” | The officer described seeing one of the terrorists on the left of the stage, taking aim at a group of hostages, hands on heads, “who were walking toward him very calmly, very dignified, but who seemed totally resigned to their fate.” |
| Quickly, the officer fired, he said, and there was an explosion. He had hit the terrorist’s suicide belt. At that point, the killing stopped, and the remaining two terrorists retreated to the floor above, grabbing hostages. | Quickly, the officer fired, he said, and there was an explosion. He had hit the terrorist’s suicide belt. At that point, the killing stopped, and the remaining two terrorists retreated to the floor above, grabbing hostages. |
| Some 15 minutes later, Mr. Molmy arrived at the Bataclan with his men from the B.R.I. | Some 15 minutes later, Mr. Molmy arrived at the Bataclan with his men from the B.R.I. |
| “It was absolute silence,” Mr. Molmy said in an interview with AFPTV posted online. “Even those who were still alive didn’t dare move.” | |
| No one knew where the terrorists were. It was dark, and the ground floor of the concert hall was carpeted with bodies. It would take another two hours to end the terrorist attack and retrieve all the wounded. | |
| “We were freeing hostages continuously,” Mr. Molmy told a television interviewer. “Each time somebody came toward us, we had to make sure they were not wearing a suicide belt.” But there were no more gunshots. | |
| About an hour after arriving, Mr. Molmy’s force divided into two thin columns. They were proceeding along a narrow corridor when they finally heard a voice: a hostage, shouting from behind a door, who was being made to serve as the spokesman for the two remaining terrorists. | |
| Hurried exchanges with the terrorists followed over a cellphone for about an hour. | |
| “They were very nervous,” Mr. Molmy told a television interviewer. The attackers threatened to decapitate the hostages and spoke of the caliphate sought by the Islamic State extremist group. “At 12:18, we understood that we had to get on with it, because they had become extremely nervous and were threatening to blow themselves up,” Mr. Molmy said. | |
| The first B.R.I. column opened the door, protected by a 176-pound shield. “We found ourselves in a corridor, faced by about 20 terrified hostages, and behind them, the terrorists,” Mr. Molmy said. The terrorists opened fire immediately. | The first B.R.I. column opened the door, protected by a 176-pound shield. “We found ourselves in a corridor, faced by about 20 terrified hostages, and behind them, the terrorists,” Mr. Molmy said. The terrorists opened fire immediately. |
| The shield sustained dozens of bullet impacts. Then it slipped from the hands of the officers, leaving them exposed. | |
| At that moment, one of them shot at a shadow, hitting the suicide vest of an attacker and causing it to explode. A second explosion quickly followed when the other terrorist detonated his own vest. The assault was over, and to the wonder of the officers, none of the hostages had been killed. | |
| “This scenario, certainly, was a nightmare,” Mr. Mouhanna said. “Very, very difficult to manage.” | “This scenario, certainly, was a nightmare,” Mr. Mouhanna said. “Very, very difficult to manage.” |